GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2005
Status
Accepted
Abstract
Racial justice demands dignity; the acknowledgment and affirmation of the equal humanity of people of color. Denying dignity on the basis of color creates racial subordination, which triggers dignitary harms such as individual acts of racism and communal exclusion leading to diminished health, wealth, income, employment and social status. The legal recognition of dignity is therefore a prerequisite to political and social equality. For Americans of African descent, dignity was long denied by the legal endorsement of slavery and the degrading policies of segregation. The struggle to be treated equally human eventually found success in landmark cases such as Brown v. Board of Education where the Supreme Court enshrined the rights of people color in the name of a collective sense of justice and dignity. But negative racial stereotypes and presumptions of cultural inferiority continue to pervade today’s social network, housing patterns, and racially disparate law enforcement policies. This paper suggests that the Supreme Court has recently shifted its focus away from the idea of dignity and is therefore unable to address the contemporary racial problems of racial stereotypes, subtle racism, and societal discrimination. Instead, the Court is placing too much emphasis on the concept of colorblindness, ignoring the hallmarks of dignity and justice set forth in the civil rights era cases. I propose that the Supreme Court return to a discussion of dignity in contemporary race jurisprudence, and to do so, need only look to the Court’s recent affirmation of gay rights and the dignity of the homosexual lifestyle in Lawrence v. Texas. Second, I offer what a renewed emphasis on dignity night look like in the equally contentious field of race relations. An emphasis on dignity may provide the Court with an anchor for its future race-based decision making designed to address the true nature of racial injustice. Racial justice demands dignity; the acknowledgment and affirmation of the equal humanity of people of color. Denying dignity on the basis of color creates racial subordination, which triggers dignitary harms such as individual acts of racism and communal exclusion leading to diminished health, wealth, income, employment and social status. The legal recognition of dignity is therefore a prerequisite to political and social equality. For Americans of African descent, dignity was long denied by the legal endorsement of slavery and the degrading policies of segregation. The struggle to be treated equally human eventually found success in landmark cases such as Brown v. Board of Education where the Supreme Court enshrined the rights of people color in the name of a collective sense of justice and dignity. But negative racial stereotypes and presumptions of cultural inferiority continue to pervade today’s social network, housing patterns, and racially disparate law enforcement policies. This paper suggests that the Supreme Court has recently shifted its focus away from the idea of dignity and is therefore unable to address the contemporary racial problems of racial stereotypes, subtle racism, and societal discrimination. Instead, the Court is placing too much emphasis on the concept of colorblindness, ignoring the hallmarks of dignity and justice set forth in the civil rights era cases. I propose that the Supreme Court return to a discussion of dignity in contemporary race jurisprudence, and to do so, need only look to the Court’s recent affirmation of gay rights and the dignity of the homosexual lifestyle in Lawrence v. Texas. Second, I offer what a renewed emphasis on dignity night look like in the equally contentious field of race relations. An emphasis on dignity may provide the Court with an anchor for its future race-based decision making designed to address the true nature of racial injustice.
GW Paper Series
No. 2012-15
SSRN Link
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2018311
Recommended Citation
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2005