Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2013
Status
Accepted
Abstract
When evaluating how to proceed against a corporate investigative target, law enforcement authorities often ignore the target’s governance arrangements, while subsequently negotiating or imposing governance requirements, especially in deferred prosecution agreements. Ignoring governance structures and processes amid investigation can be hazardous and implementing improvised reforms afterwards may have severe unintended consequences—particularly when prescribing standardized governance devices. Drawing, in part, on new lessons from three prominent cases—Arthur Andersen, AIG and Bristol-Myers Squibb—this Article criticizes prevailing discord and urges prosecutors to contemplate corporate governance at the outset and to articulate rationales for prescribed changes. Integrating the role of corporate governance into prosecutions would promote public confidence in prosecutorial decisions to broker firm-specific governance reforms currently lacking and increase their effectiveness. The Article, therefore, contributes a novel perspective on the controversial practice: though substantial commentary urges prosecutors to avoid intruding into corporate governance, this Article explains the importance of prosecutors investing in it.
GW Paper Series
GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2013-74; GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2013-74
SSRN Link
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256624
Recommended Citation
Lawrence A. Cunningham, "Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform" 65 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).