The End of Corporate Law

Authors

Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, George Washington University Law SchoolFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2009

Status

Accepted

Abstract

This article examines how corporate law, specifically the rules applicable to the allocation of power among directors, executives, and shareholders, has become ineffective as a means of regulating corporate power. I argue that in the course of the twentieth century corporate law has been used first to legitimate corporate power and then to exempt those exercising it from liability. The article focuses on jurists’ responses to the growth of the publicly held corporation in the early twentieth century, their midcentury attempts to create corporate democracy, and their ultimate turn to markets as the means of regulating corporate power.

GW Paper Series

GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2018-2; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2018-23

SSRN Link

https://ssrn.com/abstract=3173286

Recommended Citation

Tsuk Mitchell, Dalia, The End of Corporate Law (2009). The End of Corporate Law, in a symposium on “Corporate Governance and Climate Change,” WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW, vol. 44: 703-729 (fall 2009) ; GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2018-23; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2018-23. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3173286