Health Care Competition Law in the Shadow of State Action: Minimizing MACs

Authors

David A. Hyman
William E. Kovacic, George Washington University Law SchoolFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2016

Status

Accepted

Abstract

How should we go about reconciling competition and consumer protection in health care, given the long shadow cast by the state action doctrine? We consider that issue, using a case study drawn from an obscure corner of the pharmaceutical reimbursement market to motivate and inform our analysis. We show how the balance between competition and consumer protection has been distorted by the political economy of health care regulation – compounded by the extension of the state action doctrine far past its defensible borders. If anything, considerations of political economy argue for much greater skepticism about the utility of regulation – and of the state action doctrine – in the health care space.

GW Paper Series

GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2016-42; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2016-42

SSRN Link

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2829769

Recommended Citation

Hyman, David A. and Kovacic, William E., Health Care Competition Law in the Shadow of State Action: Minimizing MACs (August 25, 2016). GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2016-42; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2016-42. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2829769