Document Type

Book Review

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In his book, The Cost-Benefit State, democratic theorist Cass Sunstein urges regulatory agencies to make decisions based on numerical assessments of regulatory consequences, factoring in variables ranging from effects on consumer prices to lives saved. In this Review, I seek to illustrate Sunstein's conception of cost-benefit analysis and critique this conception by suggesting that cost-benefit analysis could serve a more important role than Sunstein would allow. I also argue for a more active judicial role in scrutinizing agency actions than Sunstein would recommend, though not necessarily a less deferential one. In Part I of this review, I outline Sunstein's defense of the role of cost-benefit analysis and his recommendations for implementing it. Part II considers how Sunstein envisions implementation of cost-benefit analysis, including the ways in which Sunstein seeks to expand the practice and the ways in which he ultimately would limit it. In Part III, I offer a broader vision of cost-benefit analysis, recognizing the limitations of both unconstrained agency decision-making and unconstrained judicial decision-making. I argue that the development of cost-benefit principles through common law processes best avoids these opposing dangers. Finally, also in Part III, I argue that judicial review of cost-benefit analyses should take into account agency reputation and political proclivities as developed over a number of such analyses, as well as the political orientation of the courts in cases reviewing agency action.

GW Paper Series

GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2013-98; GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2013-98

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