In this article, Dan Kahan and Donald Braman expand upon the cultural theory of gun-risk perception and respond to the commentaries on their previous article, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1291 (2003). Their critics argue that the authors are too quick to dismiss the power of empirical information to influence individuals’ positions on gun control. But in analyzing the variety of their critics’ arguments, Kahan and Braman note the strange pattern of opinions that has emerged on the relative importance of culture and data in the gun debate. What could explain the puzzling congruence of opinion among staunch procontrollers and anticontrolles, all of whom concluded that data mattered most? What commonality could explain the agreement of a Texas law professor and a British social anthropologist that culture is in fact more important? Committed to furnishing empirical proof of the powerlessness of empirical proofs, Kahan and Braman constructed a regression analysis to answer these questions. They conclude in this article that this final study conclusively proves their assertion that statistics are incapable of persuading anyone to accept anything they don’t already believe; or, in other words, that the cultural basis of gun-risk perceptions better explains public perceptions in the gun control debate than a pure empirical information theory.
GW Paper Series
GW Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2012-59, GW Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 2012-59
151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1395-1417 (2003)