Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions in the People's Republic of China

Donald C. Clarke

George Washington University Law School, dclarke@law.gwu.edu

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PATHWAY TO MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION: 
DERIVATIVE ACTIONS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 

Donald C. Clarke 
George Washington University Law School 

Nicholas C. Howson 
Michigan Law School 

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Abstract 

Using a dataset of Chinese judicial opinions arising in over fifty cases, this paper analyses the development and current implementation of shareholder derivative actions in the courts of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), both before and after the derivative lawsuit was explicitly authorized in the PRC’s 2006 Company Law effective January 1, 2006. In addition, we describe the very unique ecology of enterprise organization and corporate governance in modern China, and critique the formal design of the derivative action and offer reform suggestions. 

We find the design of the Chinese derivative lawsuit to be, in some respects, innovative and appropriate for Chinese circumstances. For instance, the statutory scheme permits “horizontal” claims against controlling or oppressive shareholders in addition to “vertical” claims against orthodox insiders and fiduciaries. At the same time, we find certain design flaws, including standing-based obstacles for plaintiffs, a lack of clarity regarding demand, demand excuse and refusal, and an unnecessary distinction regarding the required wrong underlying derivative actions directed at corporate fiduciaries, on one hand, and others (such as controlling shareholders), on the other. 

In implementation, we find extremely robust – even overly-aggressive – use of the mechanism by both plaintiffs and deciding judges before and after its formal recognition in law. As in other applications of the corporate law before the courts in China, this use of the derivative action seems to be entirely limited to the closely-held form of corporation. The absence of application with respect to the widely-held, joint stock, form of company is striking because the derivative lawsuit itself was included in the 2006 PRC Company Law revision precisely so as to give minority shareholders in such widely-held companies a way to hold insiders and controlling shareholders accountable at law for rampant malfeasance. 

In addition, we note the way in which some PRC courts are wary or uncomprehending of the underlying corporate law doctrines for which the derivative action is a necessary vehicle, particularly the duty of care. 


I. Introduction

In October 2005, China’s national legislature passed a series of major amendments to the original Company Law of 1994 permitting, among other things, the first form of derivative lawsuit in modern Chinese history. Effective from 2006, this innovation was designed to improve China’s corporate governance system and provide a weapon against insider and controlling shareholder abuse at China’s newly corporatized listed companies. The new mechanism was also consistent with a broader formal shift in the Company Law towards a greater emphasis on judicial power and the ex post remedies instead of ex ante supervision by administrative agencies. The derivative lawsuit was introduced, however, into a political-economic order, and an accompanying legal system, that is barely three decades old, with the nation’s first Western-style corporate law not effective until 1995. Moreover, few of those who draft, administer, or adjudicate on the basis of corporate legislation have any appreciable business experience, the state at multiple levels remains a commanding presence as a regulator and a corporate shareholder, and genuinely private large companies are rare.

In this chapter, we look at the past and present of shareholder derivative actions in the PRC. Using a large set of cases (see Appendix I—Cases), we trace the gradual introduction of the derivative lawsuit into China’s legal system and its development after January 1, 2006. We find the design of the 2006 Company Law derivative lawsuit in some respects innovative and appropriate for Chinese circumstances—for instance, it includes parties other than standard insiders and fiduciaries as defendants, and thus permits “horizontal” claims against controlling or oppressive shareholders. At the same time, we find certain design flaws, including standing-based obstacles placed in the way of plaintiffs, lack of clarity regarding demand, demand excusal, and refusal, and an unnecessary distinction regarding the required wrong underlying derivative actions directed at corporate fiduciaries and “others.” We also find robust use of the derivative lawsuit by plaintiffs and courts both before and after its formal recognition in law. However, that use seems almost entirely limited to the closely-held form of corporation under PRC law, the “limited liability company” (youxian zeren gongsi) (“LLC”), with derivative lawsuits involving widely-held companies limited by shares (gufen youxian gongsi) (“CLS”) strikingly absent. That

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1 Professors of Law, George Washington University Law School and Michigan Law School. The authors wish to thank Tsinghua University Law School doctoral student Ms. Liu Yingjiao for her research assistance, and Ms. Liu’s doctoral advisor Professor Zhu Ciyun, also of the Tsinghua Law School, for her support and assistance.

2 We shall henceforth refer to the original Company Law, passed in 1993 and effective in 1994, as the 1994 Company Law and to the revised version, passed in 2005 and effective on January 1, 2006, as the 2006 Company Law.

3 Case names used in this chapter—e.g., “Zhejiang Golden Bridge CLS 2003”—correspond to the case names provided in Appendix I, which provides a full citation for each case.
absence is particularly striking because the derivative lawsuit was included in the 2006 Company Law precisely in order to give minority shareholders in such CLSs a way to hold insiders and controlling shareholders accountable at law for rampant malfeasance.

II. Economic and Legal Reform in the PRC and the Derivative Action

a. Introduction – the Derivative Lawsuit and Corporate Governance in the Chinese Context

China’s corporate governance experts and legislative drafters have long viewed the derivative lawsuit as a necessary part of that nation’s effective corporate governance system. Yet in China the actual implementation of a derivative lawsuit mechanism has implications going beyond mere corporate governance concerns. As we describe in more detail below, many corporate entities in the PRC are dominated by insiders who have—or represent—significant political power that exceeds their formal economic or management power. Leading directors and officers at large corporatized state-controlled enterprises are often Communist Party nomenklatura appointments or representatives of central government institutions. The same is true of insiders at enterprises controlled by local governments or subordinate Party levels. And even if insiders are not directly tied to the Party or state, they are often part of a system (xitong) of connected actors with overwhelming political and economic power. Thus, any legal mechanism that empowers minority shareholders to attack the misdeeds of such insiders also empowers weak political-economic actors to constrain or penalize vastly superior forces in Chinese society.4

b. Corporatization and Its Effects

The development of derivative suits in China cannot be understood outside of the political and economic history of the PRC over the past several decades.

The early stages of post-Mao economic reform saw efforts by policy-makers to reform traditional state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”), enterprises plagued by low productivity, unresponsiveness to economic signals, and waste. The traditional SOE was not simply a corporation wholly owned by a single shareholder, the state. Instead, it is more aptly seen as a division or aggregation of productive assets within the loosely organized firm of China, Inc. It had managers that could move up a bureaucratic hierarchy into progressively more politically powerful positions. The traditional SOE did not issue any ownership interests in itself, much less something like stock or transferable equity interests. Moreover, the “control” interest in SOEs—for example, the right to appoint management and appropriate profits—was not necessarily in the hands of the same administrative body representing the central state (or not necessarily at the central level). SOEs could be effectively controlled by subordinate units of government at or above the county level even if formally subject to the control of a central line ministry.

4 An excellent example of the forces at play is the Zhejiang Golden Bridge CLS 2003 judgment, described infra at text accompanying note 55.
The policy of corporatization essentially sought to abolish the traditional SOE as an organizational form by converting SOEs into some form of company authorized under and governed by the PRC Company Law: (i) a CLS, the approximate equivalent of a Delaware corporation or the German Aktiengesellschaft, (ii) an LLC, intended for a much smaller and more closely knit group of investors, or (iii) a wholly state-owned LLC, a special type of LLC that is wholly owned by a state agency and has no shareholders’ meeting (effectively, an SOE given enterprise legal person status as a sub-species of LLC). In most cases, this process did not involve privatization or withdrawal of the Party-state from the economy because a controlling share of the stock in the converted enterprise went to non-private entities. Even after two decades, the Party-state, at the central and local levels, remains firmly committed to retaining control over enterprises in many sectors. This is true for both the usual suspects for state control—national security-related industries, natural monopolies, sectors providing important public goods and services, and important enterprises in pillar industries and the increasingly supported high-technology sector—and other enterprises that are profitable for insiders or local-level control parties and can be promoted with public investment. In particular, this strategy of corporatization without privatization coupled with maintenance of central and local state control has determined ownership, control, and governance structures in China’s listed companies, whether listed on China’s domestic exchanges, in Hong Kong, or internationally. In particular, control by a single state shareholder is quite common in Chinese listed companies. A study of corporate governance conducted in 2002 by the China Securities Regulatory Commission ("CSRC") and the State Economic and Trade Commission found that of 1,051 controlling shareholders in the 1,175 listed companies studied, 77 percent could be considered “of a state nature” (guojia xingzhi), while in 390 companies a single state shareholder held over half of the shares.5

This pattern of ownership and control has important implications for China’s corporate law and corporate governance regime in general and the derivative lawsuit in particular:

First, the state’s policy of maintaining a full or controlling interest in enterprises in various sectors leads to a fundamental dilemma in Chinese corporate governance. The state wants the enterprises it controls absolutely and owns partially to be run efficiently, but not solely for the purpose of shareholder wealth maximization. A necessary element of state control of an enterprise is the use of that control for purposes other than the maximization of its wealth as a shareholder—purposes such as the maintenance of urban employment levels, direct control over sensitive industries, effective price control in a given sector, politically-motivated job placement, or extraction of profits for politically-privileged insiders. But in using its control for these purposes, the state openly—and not necessarily fraudulently (for that see below)—exploits minority shareholders who have no other way to benefit from their investment. As long as state policy requires the state to remain an active controlling investor in firms of which it is not the sole shareholder, meaningful legal protection for minority shareholders will mean either constraints on the state's ability to do precisely those things for which it has retained control, or else a de facto separate legal regime (at least as far as minority shareholder rights are concerned) for enterprises in which the state is the dominant shareholder. But a separate legal regime would require the maintenance of a strict boundary between state-controlled companies on the one hand and other companies on the other, a boundary that it was precisely the ambition of the

5 The study is reported in Qi (2003).
corporatization policy and the promulgation of the Company Law to erase. The failure to face this question squarely has made it extremely difficult to formulate legal rules on the duties of insiders and controlling shareholders in these newly-created, and absolutely dominated, firms.

Second, the prevalence of concentrated ownership in Chinese firms means that the main agency problem in Chinese corporate governance is not vertical, between disaggregated shareholders and managers, but horizontal, between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders. In this respect, China is like most of the world. What is exceptional, however, is the identity of the controlling shareholder. In most cases, it either is or is closely connected to a governmental entity or Party organization. This means there is a higher likelihood that a shareholder lawsuit or a derivative suit involving a corporatized entity, especially a politically privileged one which has been allowed to access the public capital markets, will in substance be directed at a Party group, the state, a state-affiliated agency, or the agent of any of those. The claim will therefore be politically sensitive, something that is likely to affect the willingness and ability of judicial institutions to accept the lawsuit and hear the underlying claim.

The political sensitivity of such lawsuits is even clearer when we note that an important legacy of this reform process is that the administrative channels of control present in the traditional SOE have not disappeared, but often continue to function in the shadows, supplanting the formal channels envisaged in the Company Law. For instance, the board of directors may be bypassed entirely in matters such as appointment of the chief executive officer or other important operational decisions. Instead, the government agency that controlled the firm before its restructuring (or the Party structure behind that state institution) will issue instructions in much the same way after restructuring. Thus, in considering the viability of derivative actions in the PRC, analysts and the corporate law itself must always take account of the pervasive state presence inside large corporations in many sectors—in particular, in publicly listed companies—and be alert to the presence of critically important norms, practices, and lines of authority that simply do not show up in any state laws or regulations and are typically not mentioned at all in corporate disclosure documents.

Third, the reform-era corporate capital structures outlined above are an invitation to opportunism, abuse, and outright fraud by controlling shareholders and insiders, an invitation which has been taken up with gusto at both CLSs (publicly-listed or not) and closely held firms. As our case reports show, closely held firms are a fertile setting for fraud, looting and asset stripping, minority shareholder oppression, and mismanagement. And problems in public companies—despite mandatory PRC and foreign disclosure requirements, the power of PRC and foreign securities and stock exchange regulators, and the threat of foreign securities class action suits—are even worse. Public companies have been run as vehicles to attract passive investment capital from the stock markets and serve the needs of the controlling shareholder (and its

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6 See Howson (2009); McGregor (2010), ch. 5.

7 For example, the A-share (Shanghai) and H-share (Hong Kong) prospectuses for the Agricultural Bank of China’s recent initial public offering are almost completely silent on the role of the Communist Party in the bank. The Party’s presence is indicated only obliquely, in the biography of one officer who is also the secretary of the bank’s (Party) discipline inspection committee. Outside of the biographies of key personnel, the word “Party” (dang) does not appear at all. As one of us has noted elsewhere, the same was true for the earlier Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China offerings. See Howson (2009), pp. 140-1 and footnote 16.
Tunneling by individual insiders and controlling shareholders, both state and non-state, by means of related-party transactions is notorious; in 2002 tunneling by controlling shareholders was estimated at 96.7 billion yuan, equivalent to the total amount of money raised in stock markets in the same year, and by the following year it had doubled. It is easy to understand, therefore, why policy-makers in the early 2000s sought to address this and other governance problems by amending the 1994 Company Law wholesale to enhance judicial remedies available to minority shareholders against insiders and controlling shareholders. The 2006 Company Law accomplishes this goal in formal terms, with the derivative action in Article 152 a key element in making the new substantive causes of action on corporate fiduciary duties, shareholder oppression, and related-party transactions truly justiciable or at least immune to the blocking power held by controlling shareholders and their designated directors and officers. In 2008 Jin Jianfeng, Chief Judge of the Supreme People’s Court No. 2 Civil Division (the department of the Court occupied with corporate law litigation), highlighted this critical aspect of the derivative lawsuit mechanism when he wrote, “If we don’t establish a shareholders’ derivative lawsuit system, the articles of the Company Law will be useless and empty provisions.”

c. The LLC Form and Other Non-Company Law Forms

The LLC and its informal close company analogues are at the center of almost all of our derivative lawsuit cases. That is true for two reasons: because the courts do not accept cases related to widely-held CLSs, and because a significant amount of business undertaken in contemporary China is not related to the CLS form (whether or not sourced in traditional SOEs).

In fact, a large amount of investment and commercial activity is effected through arrangements that are neither corporate (CLS or LLC) nor have anything much to do with the PRC Company Law of whatever vintage. Many investment or capital aggregation transactions in China are based in contractual arrangements such as “agreements” (xieyi), “joint operations” (lianying), “cooperative” (hezuo) or non-legal person “partnership” (hehuo) arrangements. Even when something resembling a business organization is established, and even if formal “enterprise legal person” status is conferred on the entity by registration with the appropriate bureau of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce, the resulting firm very often has

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9 See Li (2004).
11 This is stated explicitly in the influential “Corporate Governance Report” issued by the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2003, see Shanghai Stock Exchange Research Center (2003), pp. 20-32.
13 In 2006, for example, there were 7,210 industrial CLSs in China. Their GVIO (gross value of industrial output) was 10.6% of the national total. By contrast, there were 45,738 non-state-owned LLCs; their GVIO was 17.4% of the national total. See SYCIE (2007), p. 54.
14 See, for example, the structures featured in the Shanghai Taiwu Real Estate 2008 and Beijing Glory Project 2009 cases.
no legal basis in the PRC Company Law or the various foreign-invested enterprise (“FIE”) statutes and their implementing regulations.\textsuperscript{15}

This persistent instability in corporate legal identity and corporate law application leads to difficulties in applying a derivative action meant for the corporate form. For example, the Chongqing Coal Mine 2006 case features an LLC established around a coal mine asset. The investor in the coal mine LLC is listed as a government bureau (jù), but another LLC (acting for the bureau) attempts to initiate a derivative action on behalf of the coal mine LLC against a factory (chàng) possibly without independent legal personality. These transitional identities provide ample defenses for the defendants, which are effective in the first-instance hearing but are rejected on appeal.

Another case, Beijing Golden Century 2009, seems a relatively straightforward corporate derivative action. Two LLC shareholders sue the company’s Legal Representative, director and general manager (the same person) to wrest back control of the company after a unanimous shareholders’ resolution ousting him from any role in it. Straightforward, that is, until the opinion recites that the LLC exists only in the most formal sense, that the plaintiff shareholders never contributed capital to the enterprise, and that the equity interests in the LLC have already been distributed to 43 peasants (in exchange for contributions of land use rights) acting through a “rural cooperative.” The defendant’s key defense is that the plaintiffs are not true shareholders of the LLC whose interests they purport to be protecting, and thus their “shareholders’ resolution” ousting the defendant is void. Both the basic-level court and the intermediate court on appeal are forced to rely on pure formalities (the registration of shareholder status and attendant promises to contribute capital) to permit the derivative claim. Likewise, the Beijing Tonghua Online 2009 opinion allows a derivative action on behalf of an LLC transformed from a collectively-owned enterprise, but the court has to use both the “Township Collectively-Owned Enterprise Provisions” and the 2006 Company Law to reject the underlying claim of breach of duty of loyalty by an LLC fiduciary because an “all-workers” meeting at the collective (doing double duty as an investors’ meeting for the LLC) constituted prior approval of the allegedly breaching action.

These forms – whether LLCs or informal analogues that have continued or grown organically – are far more like partnerships (with corporate personality) than corporations with strict separation between ownership and management. The norms governing corporations differ significantly from those governing partnerships, and touch on every major area of enterprise law. Most important in this chapter is the lack of separation of ownership and management in the partnership-like LLC entities. This lack of separation throws into doubt the suitability of corporate derivative actions for entities such as LLCs and contracted partnerships where there is no separation between ownership and management, and management cannot therefore absolutely block a lawsuit against itself brought by other investors, whether in their own name or in that of the entity. In partnership-like entities, any partner can act as an agent for the partnership. Not only that, but the vector of duties is different: in corporations, fiduciaries owe duties to the corporation and in very special situations to the shareholders, whereas in partnerships, partners owe duties not only to the partnership, but also to the other partners. Thus, in many of the cases

\textsuperscript{15} See, for example, the entity at issue in the Beijing Tonghua Online 2009 case, established as an “equity cooperative” (gufên hezuò) collectively-owned enterprise in 1993, and then transformed into an LLC with deemed investment from the former collective’s workers.
we now see in the PRC, courts hearing a derivative lawsuit will reject the claim and instead urge
the shareholder-partners to lodge a direct claim against their co-investors. We see this in the
Beijing Jindao Hongping Advertising 2008, Beijing Glory Project 2009, and Shanghai Tianguang
Medical 2009 cases. In the alternative, courts will allow mixed claims by the company: against
both controlling shareholders for oppression and against fiduciaries (often the same parties as the
controlling shareholders) for breach of fiduciary duties (typically the duty of loyalty). ¹⁶

If China’s corporate landscape is dominated by closely-held corporate partnerships, then
China’s judiciary faces a difficult task in wielding the corporate derivative action with respect to
them. Certainly the mechanism will be useful in allowing a close corporation/corporate
partnership registered as a company under the Company Law that has been damaged to sue those
who have caused the damage (whether traditional fiduciaries or third parties). However, equally
often, individual shareholders qua (effective) partners will suffer harm, and should be entitled to
sue under a direct claim against co-equal partners (who are characterized as management in the
corporate form). Thus, what may appear to be failure to apply a new corporate doctrine (i.e.,
non-application of the new derivative lawsuit mechanism) may in fact be a highly competent and
principled application of business enterprise law. The Dongfang Construction Group 2009 case
demonstrates this. There the 0.68% shareholder in an LLC sues a 10.78% shareholder and
company director for the gratis transfer of a significant receivable by the company to the
defendant shareholder/director without shareholder approval. The underlying breach is correctly
identified as a breach of the investor/director’s duty of loyalty; more appropriately, the injury is
described as being applicable to “the company’s other shareholders” (sunhaile gongsi qita
gudong de quanyi) rather than “the company” and thus the direct claim by the mere 0.68%
shareholder against another breaching shareholder is upheld.

d. The Legal Representative

Another somewhat unique feature animating derivative lawsuits in the PRC is the
singular position of the “Legal Representative” (fading daibiaoren) in Chinese law and practice.
Notwithstanding the election of directors and supervisors and appointment of officers, the
position familiar from civil law systems is still used uniformly in Chinese corporations (and
addressed in the 2006 Company Law). While the new Company Law allows any duly appointed
person to represent that legal person (pursuant to authorization by the shareholders or board of
directors), the Legal Representative is in the view of most PRC civil and judicial actors
intrinsically authorized to represent the company, and in the (mistaken) view of many,
exclusively authorized to act for the company. Moreover, for many corporate actors, only the
specific person who is the Legal Representative can affix the all-important corporate seals (or
“chops”) necessary to confirm corporate action, such as the signature of contracts or
commencement of a lawsuit. Accordingly, many of the derivative lawsuits analyzed in this
chapter—especially in the LLC context—arise where the Legal Representative refuses to act for
the company in enforcing an obligation or suing breaching fiduciaries, or refuses to give over the
corporate chops necessary for corporate action. This situation may seem strange to Western or
Anglo-American system lawyers, but obstacles erected by an inactive or opposing Legal
Representative who will not allow use of the corporate seals can be near absolute, and in many
cases trump the power of a unanimous shareholders’ or board resolution (at least in the short
term).

¹⁶ See, for example, the Shanghai Taiwu Real Estate 2008 case.
e. The Chinese Judiciary – Local Protectionism, Party Control, and Avoidance of “Mass” Litigant Cases

As noted earlier, the more important the political-economic actor involved in a lawsuit, the more likely the lawsuit is to be politically sensitive and subject to various kinds of obstacles and interference. The management and controlling shareholders of significant companies are likely to be influential—certainly in the area where the company is headquartered, employs workers, and pays taxes, and often nationally. Indeed, the controlling shareholders may even be governmental or quasi-governmental bodies of some kind, or tied to Party organizational structures. Therefore, pressure may be brought to bear on courts to protect such actors from claims against them. Local political power—formally, the local People’s Congresses, and in reality, the local Communist Party organization—controls courts both informally and formally through the power of appointment and power over budgets. This means that local Party and state officials—and those who have influence over them—have considerable power over courts. An extensive study of local protectionism in the courts found that “when confronted with interference, disturbance and influence exerted by various external forces, the judiciary has to surrender itself to the external pressure and cater for the needs of local interests.”

Indeed, Communist Party committees can and do issue instructions to courts telling them how to handle particular cases. Some areas have a specific rule providing that where a party from outside the jurisdiction sues a local enterprise, the court must get permission from the local Party leadership to hear the case, or the court is ordered to judge the case in accordance with the instructions of the Party committee.

Courts are particularly reluctant to get involved in lawsuits involving multiple plaintiffs or the interests of multiple parties, and various rules and practices reflecting the state’s own distaste for such suits reinforce that reluctance. Sometimes, courts directly instruct lower courts not to take multiple-plaintiff lawsuits at all. In securities litigation, which by its nature tends to involve many shareholder parties, the Supreme People’s Court has issued instructions to lower courts that strictly limit the claims that litigants may make under the Securities Law as well as the procedures for bringing them. The political sensitivity of group litigation is further shown in the Supreme People’s Court’s efforts to push multi-plaintiff litigation down to the lowest level possible within the court system so that plaintiff groups will not physically take their case to provincial capitals (if appeal lies with a Higher-Level People’s Court) or to Beijing (if appeal lies with the Supreme People’s Court).

 Courts have also sometimes required plaintiffs wishing to...

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19 One of us was informed by a Chinese law professor in 2006 that the Shanghai Higher-Level People’s Court had instructed all lower courts in Shanghai not to accept suits with ten or more plaintiffs. The other of us found this kind of instruction, both explicit and “internal” only, in an extensive review of corporate law and securities litigation in the Shanghai courts 1992-2008, see Howson (2010).
20 See Supreme People’s Court (2001), Supreme People’s Court (2002), and Supreme People’s Court (2003). A judicial document issued to courts internally some time after a nationwide meeting on civil adjudication in May, 2007 has apparently now broadened the scope of permissible claims to include market manipulation and insider trading, but other procedural hurdles established by the aforementioned documents still apply. See Luo (2007) and Wu (2007).
21 See Supreme People’s Court (2005), para. 1.
litigate together to separate their claims into smaller groups. In the first permitted shareholder litigation on false or misleading disclosure, for example, the Harbin intermediate court required the original 381 plaintiffs to split up into smaller groups of ten to twenty persons.  

Restrictions have also been placed on group litigation even before the plaintiffs get to court. In March, 2006, for example, the All-China Lawyers Association—a government-controlled body that, together with the national Ministry of Justice and its local-government counterpart Judicial Bureaus, is in charge of lawyers in China—issued a regulation entitled “Guidance Opinion on the Undertaking by Lawyers of Mass Cases,” applying to all suits with ten or more plaintiffs. This regulation requires lawyers taking such cases to report to government bodies and “accept supervision and guidance” from them.

Derivative suits are not, of course, class actions, and could in theory have a single initiating shareholder plaintiff. But PRC judges will be aware that derivative suits involving widely-held or listed companies will necessarily implicate the interests on one side of large numbers of shareholders even if they are not formally plaintiffs, and on the other of influential and politically-backed corporate managers and controlling shareholders. It is therefore reasonable to think that much of the reluctance to take multi-party suits with some political sensitivity will spill over into derivative suits where widely-held or listed companies are involved.

f. Derivative v. Representative

The derivative action is the subject of considerable doctrinal confusion in China, affecting both the surrounding discourse and judgments in actual cases. Because the classic derivative action outside of China often involves a large number of shareholders, for many years PRC analysts pointed to the “group action” (gongtong susong) provided for in China’s Law on Civil Procedure as somehow related to the shareholders’ derivative action. This is plainly wrong: the group action in Chinese civil procedure merely allows for the aggregation of a number of litigants with the same or similar claims against one or a group of defendants. Similarly, many PRC experts and most opinion-writing judges refer to the derivative action as a “representative action” (daibiao susong), instead of the correct, directly-translated term of art “paisheng [or yansheng] susong.” Indeed, nowhere in the 2006 Company Law are these characters used for a derivative lawsuit; instead, Article 152 speaks of shareholders bringing an

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24 As Prof. Tang Xin of the Tsinghua University Faculty of Law states, “[T]he court system is not active in hearing corporate and securities cases. Listed companies and their officers still have a certain political backing, and Chinese courts are neither experienced nor politically powerful and are hence reluctant to take cases involving complicated reasoning and powerful defendants.” Tang (2008), p. 147. See also Howson (2010).

25 Professor Liu Junhai (2004, pp. 314-5) makes clear that the use of the misleading character set “daibiao susong” (“representative suit”) arose because those are the same Chinese characters used in Japanese and Taiwan’s corporate law. The great majority of the legal opinions we analyze in this chapter use the term “daibiao susong” (“representative lawsuit”) instead of the term of art that accurately conveys the derivative nature of the claim.
action against defendants “in their own names … in the interest of the company” (weile gongsi
de liyi yi ziji de mingyi). Just as with the “group action” noted above, the “representative action”
applies only to a situation where one party among a group of named litigants “represents” the
interests of the group in the judicial proceeding. This problem becomes substantively important,
certainly in the pre-2006 environment, where some litigants fight over the availability of a legal
basis for “derivative” vs. “representative” lawsuits. It also infects the ongoing conversation in
the PRC regarding perfection of the derivative lawsuit, as for example when the Supreme
People’s Court justifies the one-percent shareholding threshold for CLS derivative actions
because it ensures that the plaintiffs are in some sense “representative” of all the shareholders’
interest.

g. Costs, Cost Allocation, and Cost-Benefit for Shareholder Plaintiffs

If a lawsuit cannot be financed, it cannot occur. Typical financing mechanisms include
various combinations of contingency fees, a loser-pays rule, an order whereby the company
whose interest is being protected bears the burden if the derivative suit is accepted (i.e.,
regardless of the success of the underlying claim), and a “common fund” rule where plaintiff’s
attorney’s fees come from the corporate recovery, not the plaintiff. In addition, other
jurisdictions such as Taiwan have experimented with a quasi-public foundation whose mission is
to bring such lawsuits.27

Chinese civil procedure is not now well suited to supporting these financing
mechanisms.28 The basic rule of Chinese civil procedure is that the loser pays various costs of
litigation and court fees, but attorney’s fees are not included in costs of litigation and so are
borne directly by the parties.29 Filing fees in the PRC are calculated as a fraction of the amount
in controversy, with plaintiffs usually required to pay such fees up front before acceptance of the
action.30 Moreover, law firms usually require a retainer of over half of the total predicted fees.31
While these up-front payments may pose few difficulties for a corporate plaintiff of reasonable
size, individual shareholder plaintiffs might find them difficult to make.32

Another way of funding derivative litigation is through the contingency fees. In the post-
Mao era of legal system construction, contingency fees in the PRC have been frowned upon.

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26 See, for example, the Zhejiang Golden Bridge CLS 2003 case (court distinguishes between a
“representative” lawsuit brought by 4 plaintiffs on behalf of 165 other shareholders (for which there is a
legal basis) and a “derivative” lawsuit seeking remedy for harm to the company (for which there is, at the
time, no explicit legal basis)).

27 See Milhaupt (2004); Tang (2008), pp. 153-4; and Wallace Wang Wen-yeu and Wang-Ruu
Tseng’s chapter on Taiwan in this volume.

28 On issues of funding for derivative suits in China, see generally Zhang (2008).

29 See State Council (2007), Arts. 6, 29.

30 See Civil Procedure Law, Article 107; Supreme People’s Court (1989); see also Zhang (2008),
pp. 559-561, and Hong and Goo (2009), pp. 392-3.


Over the past several years, however, they have come to be accepted in practice. In 2006, the central government issued a regulation specifically allowing contingency fees of up to 30%, but not in specified class of cases including unpaid wages, spousal support, inheritance, marriage, and—most pertinently for our purposes—multi-plaintiff lawsuits, underscoring once again the state’s particular concern with, and desire to discourage, this type of litigation. As noted above, derivative suits need not in form be multi-plaintiff lawsuits; a single initiating shareholder will suffice. But assuming the state’s concern is with the substantive spectacle of numerous interested parties and not with the mere form, it is reasonable to suppose that the policy might be applied to derivative suits involving widely-held companies as well.

It should be noted that to state the formal rule is not necessarily to describe actual practice, and therefore the system has more flexibility than might at first appear. Contingency fees have been allowed at a time when they were formally prohibited, and we show in this chapter that derivative suits themselves were allowed before they were formally sanctioned in the 2006 Company Law. By the same token, even in the absence of specific statutory authorization, courts have on occasion shown hospitality to fee-shifting in favor of winning plaintiffs, at least in consumer cases. In preliminary research on this issue, one of us found that in more than half the cases in which plaintiffs asked for attorneys’ fees and won their case, the courts were willing as a matter of law to award attorneys’ fees. Thus, it appears that in practice the rule against awards of attorney’s fees is not an insuperable obstacle. The real question is whether courts will be willing as a practical matter to do so.

III. Derivative Actions Before 2006

Despite the absence of a firm statutory basis in law, derivative actions were accepted and heard in Chinese courts before 2006 and the entry into force of the 2006 Company Law. The history of derivative actions before their formal recognition in law shows that when they desire to do so, Chinese courts in both their rule-making and adjudicatory capacities can readily create and apply rules on their own even when they run counter to formally superior rules.

In this section, we find a pattern that is quite common in other fields of Chinese law: a central-level policy disfavoring a practice, limited experimentation with the practice at sub-central levels (often through the courts), and eventual formal incorporation into central-level norms. We further find lower-court practice occasionally overstepping the bounds laid out by apparently “superior” statute, higher courts and regulatory authorities.


In the absence of enabling legislation from the center, before 2006 local governments and non-legislative bodies were not idle. In January 2002, the China Securities Regulatory

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33 See SDRC and MOJ (2006), Art. 11.

34 See the discussion in Clarke (2009), pp. 253-255; see also Tu (2009).

35 In the cases reviewed here, we find evidence only of court-mandated sharing of litigation filing fees, etc., and no recitation of how attorneys’ fees were allocated. See infra notes 95 and 96 and accompanying text.
Commission ("CSRC") issued its “Principles of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies,”
which stated at Article 4:

The directors, supervisory board members, and managers of the company shall
bear liability for compensation in cases where they violate law, administrative
regulation or the Articles of Association and cause damage to the company during
the performance of their duties. Shareholders shall have the right to request the company to sue for such compensation in accordance with law (emphasis added).

As authorization for a derivative lawsuit in China, the Principles have several defects. First, and most obviously, they are not legislation. They are in effect suggestions from the CSRC as to how companies should organize their internal governance. They provide no legal basis for shareholders to bring, or courts to accept, derivative pleadings. Second, they merely authorize the shareholders to request that the company sue. But shareholders did not need the Principles to authorize them to communicate with directors and officers about desired corporate action. What is special about demand in derivative actions is that typically it is a required step, and a condition precedent, not simply an authorized one. Indeed, shareholders wishing to sue on behalf of the company might be happier without it.

Less than a year later, in December 2002, a senior Supreme People’s Court judge stated publicly that courts should accept derivative suits. A lower court subsequently found these remarks inadequate as a basis for accepting a derivative suit, calling them “for reference” only. Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that the remarks were a sign of internal conversations taking place within the court system. From late 2002 to 2004, for example, the Higher-Level People’s Courts (one level below the Supreme People’s Court and responsible for courts at the provincial level) of Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Beijing all issued “Opinions” permitting the use of the derivative suit mechanism in courts under their jurisdiction, and describing their implementation in great detail. For example, the Shanghai Opinion affirms the inclusion of controlling shareholders and third parties as potential defendants; identifies the participation of the company as a “third party”; authorizes judicial determination of whether the company has been harmed, the causal connection between the defendants’ actions and the harm, any good faith defenses available to the defendants, and the degree of control exercised by the controlling shareholder defendant over the corporate entity inhibiting the underlying action; forbids settlement that will disadvantage the real parties in interest (minority shareholders in the

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36 CSRC (2002).
37 See Anon. (2002).
38 See Anon. (2003b); see also Qian (2003).
39 Chinese courts below the Supreme People’s Court level and governmental bodies often issue documents labeled “Opinions” (yijian) setting forth proposed rules on various issues. Opinions can be binding in varying degrees. They should not be confused with the term “opinion” as used to indicate a court decision in a particular case, or “Explanations: (jieshi) or “Regulations” (guiding) issued by the Supreme People’s Court.
empowers the court to annul offending transactions; and allows for damage awards against not only the defendants but also the company. This level of detail is strong evidence that local-level courts were in fact accepting and adjudicating derivative lawsuits well before 2006. In fact, one pre-2006 case report in our sample actually cites to the Beijing Opinion (Article 8) as the basis for a derivative claim, which fails because of no demand.

The Supreme People’s Court also demonstrated its approval in a more formal way than through casual remarks by senior judges. As early as 1994, in connection with the Zhangjiagang Fibre Company 1994 case noted immediately below, it had issued a document approving a derivative-type action by the Jiangsu courts. And in 2003, with significant PRC academic input, it distributed for comment a draft regulation (the “Omnibus Regulation”) for lower courts that substantially re-wrote the Company Law and, inter alia, provided for a derivative suit mechanism.

Finally, in 2005—and on the eve of the coming into effect of the 2006 Company Law with new Article 152 in it—the Supreme People’s Court approved a decision of the Beijing Higher-Level People’s Court recognizing a derivative action.

b. Pre-2006 Cases

Several cases arising before 2006 show how the derivative suit mechanism was implemented in practice, sometimes in accordance with the documents and regulations described above, sometimes by the PRC courts acting entirely autonomously.

i. Genesis of the 1994 SPC Approving Response and Other LLC Cases

Case collections and opinions show that well before January 1, 2006, PRC plaintiffs brought derivative pleadings to court, and Chinese courts accepted derivative pleadings or affirmatively restructured claims to allow pleadings on behalf of corporate entities. There are of course limits to the conclusions we can draw from these opinions; we do not know, for example, whether such accepted cases, or the cases that actually went to trial and produced an opinion, represent a large or a small proportion of attempts to file such suits.

The first acknowledgement of the derivative mechanism after promulgation of the 1994 Company Law came in the Zhangjiagang Fiber Company 1994 case, which gave rise to the Supreme People’s Court Approving Response noted above. This case was in the limited area of foreign direct investment, and, initially at least, apparently relevant only to Chinese-foreign equity or cooperative joint ventures where the foreign investor was also the technology licensor/transferor to the same joint venture. However, as we show immediately below, the same case, the permitted derivative action, and the Approving Response were all used to support a post-2006 judgment (on pre-2006 facts) concerning an entirely domestically invested venture.

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41 A concern in one of our reported cases, which apparently made it to the Supreme People’s Court before being settled, see Tonghe Investment 2009.

42 Beijing Taiqun Technology 2006.

43 See Supreme People’s Court (2003b) (hereinafter “Omnibus Regulation”). The draft regulation never made it to the stage of formal issuance, and was made moot by the 2006 Company Law.

44 China Zhongqi Futures 2004-6.

In the **Zhangjiagang Fiber Company 1994** case, the Jiangsu Higher People’s Court asked the Supreme People’s Court for guidance on the question of whether a factory, the Chinese investor in a Chinese-foreign equity joint venture (the “JV”), could represent the JV in suing a vendor to the JV (and a related party to the foreign investor in the JV). The Supreme People’s Court responded that the Chinese factory could indeed exercise the litigation rights of the JV, but in this particular case would not be able to do so because of a pre-existing arbitration agreement in the contract between the JV and the vendor.

This was a first specific acknowledgement by the apex of the PRC judiciary of the legitimacy of a derivative action, although hedged with so many conditions as to make it appear of limited broader applicability. However, the Approving Response quickly proved useful in non-FIE-related cases. For instance, it was cited as a legal basis in the pre-2006 CLS-related **Zhejiang Wu Fang Zhai 2001** case. And, in a second important case — the largest derivative action-related award to date in the PRC—the Guangdong Higher-Level People’s Court used the 1994 Supreme People’s Court Approving Response as the basis for ordering damages of 400 million yuan to an entirely domestic enterprise.  

This **Guangzhou Tianhe Scitech 2003** decision is noteworthy not only for its use of the 1994 Supreme People’s Court Approving Response where FIEs were not involved, but also because the Guangdong court issued its judgment after January 1, 2006. This means it could have applied newly-effective Article 152 of the 2006 Company Law to the facts of the case (as our latter discussion of straddling will make clear), but chose not to do so. The 1994 Supreme People’s Court Approving Response also proved immensely useful to the plaintiff shareholder in the Guangzhou case, as it allowed the court to reject defendant’s sensible assertion that the derivative pleadings should be thrown out because the plaintiff shareholder had not complied with the pre-suit demand requirements of Article 152.

After the 1994 Supreme People’s Court Approving Response, there is evidence of other derivative pleadings in the Chinese courts in a number of cases from 1996 through 2005. Most interesting for this chapter is the fact that in these cases, Chinese courts on their own reasoned their way to the derivative action in order to provide plaintiffs with a remedy. As the report of the **Xiamen Xinda 1997** case stated:

If the infringement suffered by the shareholder is to the rights of the company, then the shareholder should first present a written application to the organ of power of the company requesting that the company take action or bring litigation against the party.

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46 See **Guangzhou Tianhe Scitech 2003**.

47 As described infra, straddling actions are those which use the post-January 1, 2006 Company Law to adjudicate facts arising before January 1, 2006.

48 This is a defense which works very well in a number of the post-2006 cases noted here, such as **Shanghai Peieryou 2006, Shunde Zhaoyu Electronic Hardware 2007, Beijing Dingyu Cable 2008, and Kunming Kangpaili Technology 2009** (but see contra **Beijing Golden Century 2009** and **Huangshan Fenghua Real Estate 2009**).

inflicting the harm and pursue its legal liability. Where the company does not take any action, the shareholder may in its stead bring a lawsuit.\textsuperscript{50}

Or, as the opinion in the \textit{Unknown Beijing Parties 2001} case reasoned:

In the present case, because [Defendant A] is the chairman of the board of directors of the company and because by law and under the company’s Articles of Association he convenes the board meeting and presides over it, he should be responsible for calling a board meeting so that the board can make resolutions regarding major issues that arise in the course of company operations. [Plaintiff] believes that board chairman [Defendant A] and general manager [Defendant B] have taken actions which injure the interests of the company. In this situation, there is no way that [Defendant A], as a conflicted party, will convene a board meeting to address his own actions, just as there is no way he can represent the company in bringing litigation [against himself]. Thus, [Plaintiff], as a shareholder of the company, has the ability to represent the company in appropriate litigation, with the goal behind the litigation being to protect the lawful rights and interests of the company and its [other] shareholders.\textsuperscript{51}

Perhaps most importantly, the Supreme People’s Court itself implicitly affirmed a derivative action before 2006 – and in an actual case decision,\textsuperscript{52} not in an “approving response” like the 1994 instruction engendered by the \textit{Zhangjiagang Fibre Company 1994} case. In affirming a lower-court judgment allowing a derivative-type action, on December 18, 2005 the Supreme People’s Court also implicitly affirmed the viability of derivative pleadings in the Chinese courts.\textsuperscript{53}

\textbf{ii. Widely-held Companies}

Almost all of the successful cases involving derivative pleadings from before 2006 involve close corporations—usually LLCs. There is, however, evidence that Chinese courts accepted at least a few derivative cases involving CLSs, and even publicly-listed companies.\textsuperscript{54}

A remarkable pre-2006 case involving a CLS\textsuperscript{55} indicates some of the stakes involved in CLS-related cases, publicly-listed or not. The case arose from the promotion of a CLS just as

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{50} Xie and Chen (2001), p. 24.
  \item \textsuperscript{51} Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court (2005), pp. 362-363. The (unidentified) second-instance court hearing the appeal, and even the Beijing intermediate court judge commenting on the case, do not take issue with this derivative claim apparently constructed out of whole cloth.
  \item \textsuperscript{52} \textit{China Zhongqi Futures 2004-6}.
  \item \textsuperscript{53} Albeit after promulgation of the new (2006) Company Law form, which included Article 152 that would become effective just thirteen days later. The lawyers representing the plaintiffs wryly note that the Beijing Higher People’s Court rendered its judgment without once invoking the idea of, or legal basis for, “derivative” or “shareholders’ representative” actions, and seemed to accept without comment the idea that these shareholders are allowed to plead a cause of action on behalf of the corporation they are invested in. See Zhao & Wu (2007), p. 274.
  \item \textsuperscript{54} See \textit{Zhejiang Wu Fang Zhai 2001}, \textit{Henan Lianhua MSG 2004 (listed company)}, and \textit{Shanghai Lujiazui 2005}.
  \item \textsuperscript{55} See \textit{Zhejiang Golden Bridge CLS 2003}.
\end{itemize}
China’s 1994 Company Law went into effect, and the receipt—on trust—by a company run by the Shaoxing County government of 35 million yuan from more than 160 public investors for the capitalization of a future CLS, in which the trustee was to also be a 30% shareholder. The trustee company never forwarded the funds to the CLS after it was established, and so upon liquidation the public shareholders sued the trustee company on behalf of the CLS. The case and the opinion resulting are remarkable because of the politically powerful parties involved as defendants, the impleading of the Shaoxing County government as a named defendant on what resembles a piercing theory to be jointly and severally liable with its alter ego, the acceptance of a case involving a widely-held CLS (and almost 170 irate investors), and the sophisticated reasoning which permits a shareholder derivative action despite the lack of statutory basis for it at the time. As the judges in the case state:

[A]lthough the party directly harmed by inappropriate action by the controlling shareholder is the company, it is extremely difficult for the company to defend its rights in its own name when it is under the control of the party acting inappropriately. . . . We do not agree with [the defendants’] responsive assertion that the plaintiff has no power to represent the company to bring the litigation. . . . To protect the rights and interest of the company, the listing of the [company] as a third party in this case is not in violation of Article 56 of the PRC Civil Procedure Law.  

This kind of case, involving a widely-held CLS with a large number of shareholders as plaintiffs and with government-controlled corporate entities and government departments as defendants, will be very rare even after an unambiguous statutory basis is provided in the 2006 Company Law.

IV. The 2006 Company Law and Statutory Authorization for Derivative Actions

The derivative lawsuit mechanism authorized in Article 152 of the 2006 Company Law is distinct from the derivative action received from the Anglo-American or continental traditions, including the systems in place for the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Japan.

Article 152’s rule cannot be simply stated, because it makes several distinctions not found in the systems of other countries. First, the procedural rules distinguish between LLCs and CLSs. Second, the substantive claims that may be brought on behalf of the company allow claims against both (i) traditional corporate fiduciaries (directors, officers and supervisors) and (ii) what are called “others” which includes controlling shareholders and third parties (with the basis of the underlying claims against each also differing slightly).

The rule may be summarized as follows:

1. **Defendants and associated causes of actions:** Initiating shareholders may bring a derivative lawsuit against (i) directors, supervisory board members, or senior management who have violated law (falü), administrative regulations (xingzheng fagui), or company Articles of Association in the course of performing company

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57 In this context, “law” and “administrative regulations” are terms of art, referring respectively to norms promulgated by (i) the National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee, and (ii) the State
duties, thereby causing damage to the company (gei gongsi zaocheng sunshi), and (ii) “others” who violate the company’s lawful rights and interests, thereby causing damage to the company.

2. Standing: In CLSs, initiating plaintiffs must collectively satisfy a one percent shareholding requirement and must have held their shares for 180 days. There are no comparable requirements for plaintiffs in LLCs.

3. Demand requirements: Before bringing an action against directors or senior management, shareholders must first make a written demand on the board of supervisors (or individual supervisors in case there is no supervisory board). Before bringing an action against supervisors, shareholders must first make a demand on the board of directors (or the executive director where there is no board of directors). The plaintiff may proceed with the suit if (i) the demand is rejected, (ii) the demand is not acted upon within thirty days, or (iii) the company would suffer irreparable damage if the suit could not proceed immediately.

We discuss each element of the rule in more detail below, but first note the following two contextual points about other new parts of the Company Law introduced in 2006: First, this new action in law must be distinguished from a separate cause of action—similar in philosophy to direct actions under the 1994 Company Law and the 1999 Securities Law —accruing directly to shareholders for unlawful acts by directors or senior management violations (but not supervisory board members) that “damage the interests of shareholders” (sunhai gudong liyi). Second, aside from the innovative derivative action embodied in Article 152, the 2006 Company Law is noteworthy for its expanded list of permitted claims against directors, senior management, and supervisory board members, as well as compensation obligations directed to the company as a potential beneficiary, including breach of duty of care and duty of loyalty; compensation for corporate losses arising from board action that is in violation of law, administrative regulation, the company Articles of Association, or shareholders’ resolutions (except where a director has affirmatively dissented); restitution of ill-gotten gains arising from specific duty of loyalty breaches; and compensation for losses arising from related-party transactions (apparently whether or not disclosed and approved). The derivative action added in 2006 is thus, at least potentially, the procedural vehicle for a much expanded roster of substantive claims.

a. Standing

As noted above, there are special standing requirements for shareholders of companies limited by shares. First, they must have held their shares for at least 180 consecutive days. The statute does not stipulate that the shareholders bringing the demand must have been shareholders

Council. Regulations issued by central government ministries, for example, would not count as “administrative regulations” (xingzheng fagui). See Keller (1994).

58 2006 Company Law, art. 153.
59 2006 Company Law, art. 148.
60 2006 Company Law, art. 113.
61 2006 Company Law, art. 149 (final paragraph).
62 2006 Company Law, art. 21.
at the time the cause of action arose and thus rejects the first prong of the U.S.-origin “contemporary ownership rule” (“COR”). It seems unlikely that the failure to specify the first prong of the COR is an oversight; the 2003 Omnibus Regulation made this rule explicit, showing that experts were aware of the issue. An alternative rule proposed in the 2003 Omnibus Regulation—that the six-month holding period be satisfied before the cause of action arises—was also rejected, making the promulgated Article 152’s rule the least burdensome on plaintiffs of those that were apparently under serious consideration.

Interestingly, Article 152 does not explicitly state that those initiating the suit must by shareholders at the time of making the demand, although it would strain the statutory language to read it any other way: after all, it states that “shareholders” must make the demand. It seems fairly clear then that those initiating the suit must be shareholders when they bring the suit to court; it is a basic rule of Chinese civil procedure that plaintiffs must have a direct interest in the matter to be litigated, and it is hard to see what the interest of non-shareholders (other than corporate creditors, of course) could be in a corporate recovery. And a separate interpretive document issued by the Supreme People’s Court also suggests (albeit with less than perfect clarity) that the holding period (discussed below) must extend to the date that the lawsuit is brought. In no case that we have reviewed for this chapter is the initiating plaintiff not a shareholder at the time of the lawsuit.

Other civil law systems tend to require that a shareholder seeking to initiate a derivative lawsuit (i) be a shareholder at the time of demand, and (ii) have been a shareholder for a set period of time prior, ignoring the question of whether the demanding party was a shareholder at the time the cause of action arose. For example, the Japanese Commercial Code requires only that the demanding party have been a shareholder for six months prior to the demand; in Germany the period is three months, and in Taiwan one year.

The second standing requirement for shareholders in CLSs is that they must collectively own at least one percent of the CLS’ outstanding shares. There is no ownership threshold for LLC shareholders. As with the holding period requirement, Article 152’s approach is more plaintiff-friendly than the 2003 Omnibus Regulation, which duplicated the requirement for CLS shareholders but imposed a ten percent requirement for LLC shareholders. By comparison, U.S. state and Japanese corporate law systems do not stipulate a minimum percentage of holdings before a demand may be made, although some U.S. states allow courts to order the posting of a bond before the demand is made if the shareholding percentage (or value) is deemed too low. Civil law systems do generally stipulate minimum shareholder percentages—for example, ten percent in Germany and five percent in France. Influential adjacent systems such as Taiwan and South Korea also provide for minimums: one percent and five percent respectively. As we note in this chapter, the minimum shareholding requirement for CLSs threatened to defeat at least one high-profile derivative action attempted after the 2006 Company Law.

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63 See Delaware General Corporation Law, Section 327.
64 See Supreme People’s Court (2003b) (Omnibus Regulation), art. 44.
66 This is the Sanlian Shangshi 2009 case, which was finally accepted by the Shandong Higher People’s Court (situs of the defendant controlling shareholder) in December 2009.
b. Demand

The 2006 Company Law explicitly requires that a demand be made in writing to the appropriate body. This requirement is a nod to the principle of exhaustion of intra-corporate remedies, a concept we see raised frequently in Chinese pleadings and opinions. In reality, however, intra-corporate remedies seem irrelevant; the only thing that can stop the plaintiff from bringing suit is the corporation’s bringing suit itself. Unlike many other derivative lawsuit mechanisms internationally, there is no room for the corporation to argue that a lawsuit would not be in the corporation’s interest, or that it has obtained adequate non-litigious remedies for the wrongdoing.

Although Article 152 improves on the 2003 Omnibus Regulation formulation by generally specifying on whom demand must be made, it does not specify on whom demand should be made when seeking corporate action not against traditional fiduciaries, but against non-insider “others”. One PRC writer opines that in such cases demand should be made first on the Legal Representative, then on the board of directors, and finally on the board of supervisors, in each case waiting thirty days for a response. In general practice however, it seems that courts have not been so demanding when faced with cases involving derivative claims against “others”.

Finally, we note that, read closely, the part of Article 152 which declares the “plaintiff may proceed with the suit if ... the company would suffer irreparable damage if the suit could not proceed immediately” does not appear to mean that demand may be excused (although that may have been intended). As worded, the statute requires demand to be made even in such urgent situations; what it allows to be waived is the waiting period. This strict interpretation, however, does not seem to be how the Chinese courts normally understand the provision, as they regularly permit demand waiver in “urgent” or “emergency circumstances.”

c. Defendants and Associated Causes of Action

One of the very important – and relatively unique—aspects of the Chinese derivative action is that Article 152 divides potential defendants into two classes: insiders (directors, senior managers, and supervisors) and “others” (taren), with the cause of action stated differently for each class. This additional prong (corporate actions against “others”) is aimed at two situations: (i) where a third party (but very often a related party) has injured the corporation and conflicted corporate directors or the Legal Representative will not pursue remedies against the third party; and (ii) where controlling shareholders abuse the corporate form to disadvantage or oppress minority shareholders in the company as understood under Article 20(2) of the 2006 Company Law.

67 See Supreme People’s Court (2003b) (Omnibus Regulation), art. 45.
69 See Tonghe Investment 2009 (demand on the board of directors was adequate).
70 See Huangshan Fenghua Real Estate 2009 (demand is excused because the company is already in liquidation) and Beijing Golden Century 2009 (Article 152 is invoked with no mention whatsoever of the demand requirement).
71 “Where a company shareholder abuses its shareholder rights and causes losses to the company or the other shareholders, it shall be liable for compensation according to law.” This is the equivalent of
(company v. corporate fiduciaries) and the “horizontal” sense (company v. controlling shareholders for oppression or breach of controlling shareholders’ fiduciary duties). As noted in the introduction to this chapter, given the capital structures and dysfunctions resulting from China’s corporatization program, this ability to use the derivative lawsuit against controlling shareholders for a remedy against oppression makes very good sense. This inclusion of third parties is a significant expansion of the scope of possible defendants when compared with Taiwan’s Company Law and the Japanese Commercial Code. It remains unclear, however, why the 2006 Company Law drafters did not choose a unified cause of action for traditional insiders and for “others.” Pursuant to Article 152, insiders may be sued when they have damaged the company through breaches of law, administrative regulations, or the company’s Articles of Association in the course of performing company duties (“Cause 1”); others may be sued when they have damaged the company by violating its lawful rights and interests (“Cause 2”). If Cause 2 reaches acts not covered by Cause 1, why should insiders be exempt from it? And yet the structure of Article 152 suggests they are not intended to be co-extensive.

There is ample evidence in our sample of the derivative lawsuit being used to go against “others” – both contract parties with the injured company and controlling shareholders. Some cases – e.g., *Shanghai Yuanji International 2006, Shanghai Taiwu Real Estate 2008, and Beijing Puren Hospital 2009* – contain mixed claims, with third-party (but often related-party) or controlling-shareholder defendants as well as defendants who are traditional fiduciaries. In these cases, Chinese courts seem less sensitive to the differences in the required breaches and damages.

**V. The Reality of Derivative Actions in the PRC After January 1, 2006 to Date**

After January 1, 2006, and with the new derivative action mechanism in place, the Chinese courts at all levels have accepted derivative pleadings and rendered judgments on them.

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72 Taiwan Company Law, Article 214; defendants are limited to “directors” only.

73 The scope of defendants is limited to promoters, directors, supervisors, senior management and liquidation committee members. Japanese Commercial Code, arts. 280 & 196.

74 See *China Zhongqi Futures 2004-6, Chongqing Coal Mine 2006, Shanghai Decheng Real Estate One 2006, Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Three, Shanghai Yuanji International 2006, Beijing Puren Hospital 2009,* and *Tonghe Investment 2009*.

75 See *Zhejiang Golden Bridge CLS 2003* (public shareholder suit against a controlling 30% government-backed shareholder), *Henan Lianhua MSG Co., Ltd.* (minority shareholder suit against controlling shareholder of a publicly listed company), *Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Two 2005* (suit against a 50% Chinese-foreign joint venture partner to comply with its capitalization obligations), *Shanghai Peieryou 2006* (suit by 49% shareholder against a 51% corporate shareholder which has deprived the company of a corporate opportunity), *Shanghai Taiwu Real Estate 2008* (20% shareholder *cum* supervisor sues two other shareholders holding 54% of the equity in a three-person LLC), and *Beijing Puren Hospital 2009* (defendant is a 90% shareholder).
a. Absence of CLS or Publicly-listed CLS-related Cases

Derivative suits involving CLSs, listed or unlisted, are striking by their virtually complete absence.\(^{76}\) This is a tragedy of sorts, as the derivative action was written into the 2006 Company Law precisely to give minority shareholders in widely-held CLSs a way to bring claims against corporate fiduciaries, controlling shareholders, and 3rd party obligors seemingly immune from performance or enforcement by related party-dominated companies.

The only example we have found in the post-2006 period of a case involving a listed CLS is one that is still sub judice.\(^{77}\) Plaintiffs are attempting to sue derivatively on behalf of Sanlian Shangshe Company, Ltd. against the former controlling shareholder of that listed company, Sanlian Group. We feel relatively certain this is the only listed CLS-related case in the PRC courts as of early 2010 because it is noted as such in the January 21, 2010 brief/request (filed by the CLS itself) for transfer of the case away from the Shandong Higher People’s Court to the Supreme People’s Court in Beijing. The request states, “[T]his case is the first shareholders’ representative suit [regarding] a listed company in China’s capital markets[.]”\(^{78}\)

There are several possible reasons of varying plausibility for this absence of CLS-related cases. First, it is possible that CLSs are on the whole better managed and do not see the same kind of abuses that give rise to the LLC cases. We find this explanation implausible and not even remotely supported by the data issuing forth from the CSRC and its enforcement division. Even if it were largely true, it could not account for almost complete absence of CLS-related cases. Second, it is possible that the various obstacles to litigation and transaction costs that we have described above weigh especially heavily on prospective plaintiffs in CLS-related derivative suits. This explanation has much more plausibility. The formal law is tougher on plaintiffs in CLS-related suits, and the practical barriers are also higher in the sense that the cost-benefit analysis for a small shareholder in a CLS is much less likely to be favorable than for a large minority shareholder in an LLC or a closely held CLS. Nevertheless, this reasoning is also wanting as an explanation for the near-total absence of CLS-related suits. Surely occasionally there could have been holders of large minority stakes in a CLS who wished to bring a derivative suit (as there is in the Sanlian Shangshe 2009 case). A third possible explanation is that for some reason CLS-related derivative suits are being settled invisibly to us in the shadow of the law, as it were, either after filing (case filings are not reported nearly so well as case judgments) or even without any filing at all. As with the second explanation, however, this one does not help us understand why CLS-related suits should be so utterly absent from our sample. We cannot think of any reasons why CLS-related suits should settle disproportionately early, relative to LLC-related suits, unless perhaps the courts have a different attitude to them. Moreover, we surmise

\(^{76}\) For the pre-January 1, 2006 period, we found only a few cases. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. After 2006, we found only a few cases involving an unlisted CLS or larger numbers of shareholders in an LLC (e.g., Nanchuan Chemical Industry 2006 (28 shareholders), Shanghai Zhongjian Enterprise 2008 (40 shareholders), and Shizaishan Hengyuan 2009 (21 shareholders)). Of course, these latter cases do not rise to the level of truly public companies owned by thousands of shareholders.

\(^{77}\) Sanlian Shangshe 2009. This case was accepted by the Shandong Higher People’s Court on December 11, 2009 (after a large minority shareholder and one independent director were able to convince 1.56% of the listed company’s shareholders to join the action). See Anon. (2009).

\(^{78}\) See Anon. (2010). As of the date of this paper, we have found no other cases.
that settlement is probably easier in the close corporation context where all of the litigants have better information, as contrasted with the information deficit traditionally experienced by small shareholders in widely-held companies.

We are thus led to a fourth explanation: that courts do not accept CLS-related shareholder litigation, whether on their own initiative or by instruction from superior levels of the judicial bureaucracy. One of us has noted how the Chinese courts, on their own, will essentially stop accepting politically or technically complex cases. We have set forth above certain well-known instructions from the Chinese court bureaucracy inhibiting or forbidding acceptance or adjudication of cases involving large numbers of plaintiffs. One of us has described elsewhere specific public instructions delivered to local level courts commanding them not to accept certain kinds of public company corporate law cases (in one case, shareholder actions to invalidate shareholder meeting resolutions at publicly-listed companies), and an internal instruction forbidding acceptance of all listed CLS-related cases. We have both speculated elsewhere as to the reasons for this rejectionist stance or these prohibitions from on high, and noted above the keen hostility to judicial proceedings involving many parties. Suffice to say here the lack of derivative lawsuits involving CLSs is a starkly evident fact.


As noted above, the 1st Company Law Regulations issued by the Supreme People’s Court allowed judges to apply new rights from the 2006 Company Law in cases involving transactions occurring before it came into effect. In our sample, where the facts occur before 2006, there is not one court that rejects the subsequent derivative pleadings simply on those grounds. Indeed, most such cases permit the derivative suit explicitly “with reference to” the 2006 statute.

c. Avoidance of Derivative Pleadings

Several cases in our sample show judicial competence, but an overly technical reading of Article 152 which allows the courts involved to avoid the bother of implementing the derivative

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79 Howson (2010), pp. 332-3, 404 (regarding the nationwide refusal to accept or adjudicate cases seeking enforcement of bank non-performing loans transferred to asset management companies and then sold (at a discount) to commercial buyers).

80 Howson (2010), p. 406 (allegedly to deter “vexatious shareholder litigation”).

81 Howson (2010), p. 405 (disclosed to the author by the President of one of Shanghai’s busiest and most expert District People’s Courts).


There are only two slight deviations from this pattern: China Zhongqi Futures 2004-6 (May 2006 affirmation of pre-2006 lower-court judgment, but not referencing 2006 Company Law) and Guangzhou Tianhe Scitech 2003 (November 2006 judgment in case brought in 2003, but not referencing 2006 Company Law).
action. Judicial practice is certainly not uniform in this regard, as shown by the sometimes equally aggressive acceptance of derivative pleadings described in the next section.

For instance, *Shunde Zhaoyu Electronic Hardware 2007* saw a derivative action on a “straddling” claim permitted by a district-level court overturned by the intermediate-level court on appeal and re-hearing, because the initiating shareholder did not make a demand strictly in accordance with Article 152. The court may have noticed that the complaining shareholder was also the Legal Representative, and thus had the power to act for the company in bringing suit. Nevertheless, we see the same denials of derivative lawsuits, even with apparently strong underlying claims, because of the failure to “undertake legally-stipulated procedures” (conforming demand) from courts around the country. *Beijing Dingyu Cable 2008* demonstrates a very unforgiving reading of the demand requirement, rejecting a derivative lawsuit for failure to make a proper demand even though there was no corporate organ or actor in existence that could have received the demand.

We distinguish these highly technical and prohibitive adjudications of derivative claims from other cases that deny the derivative lawsuit on better grounds. In the *Kunming Kangpaili 2009* case, for example, both the Kunming Wuhua District People’s Court and the Kunming Intermediate People’s Court block derivative pleadings with strong underlying substantive claims against a shareholder/Legal Representative of an LLC because the initiating parties are so-called “hidden shareholders” (*yiming gudong*): contributors of capital to the LLC, but not registered as such in public documents. Both Kunming courts decline to rule that a private document reciting true shareholding interests should trump the publicly registered shareholding interests, and find that even if the initiating plaintiffs are deemed “shareholders” in law, they have not met the demand requirements of Article 152. This outcome seems reasonable, if only to make commercial actors in China take public documents more seriously and to assert the primacy of filing and procedural requirements under law.

In the *Shanghai Tianguang 2009* case, the Shanghai Higher People’s Court properly upholds a lower court dismissal of derivative pleadings for demand failure (called a “procedural defect” and “failure to exhaust internal remedies”) but still allows plaintiffs a direct action against co-shareholders (in substance, partners). This also seems a justified redirection of derivative pleadings on behalf of the company to a more doctrinally appropriate arena.

d. Autonomy and Acceptance

While some courts have used technical readings of the law to avoid taking derivative suits, others have gone out of their way to welcome them.

The “straddling” *Beijing Aeronautical 2006* case – responding to a shareholder’s suit regarding a 35% shareholder-controlled LLC that had already entered liquidation—shows a remarkably aggressive use of the derivative lawsuit. Unlike *Beijing Dingyu Cable 2008*, this case allows the suit even though there exists no corporate body that can receive the demand.  

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83 See Shizaishan Hengyuan 2009 (Ningxia Autonomous Region), Kunming Kangpaili Technology 2009 (Yunnan Province), Beijing Glory Project 2009, Beijing Weishite 2009, and Beijing Dingyu Cable 2008 (Beijing), and Shanghai Peieryou 2006 and Shanghai Tainguang Medical 2009 (Shanghai).

Moreover, the court allows the derivative action to defeat a statute of limitations defense: the alleged defaults occurred between 1999-2002 and the case was initially accepted in 2004. The court held boldly that because the derivative claim was not even available until January 1, 2006, the two-year limitation period did not lapse until January 1, 2008.

In Tonghe Investment 2009, the Zhejiang Higher People’s Court permitted the derivative lawsuit to go forward notwithstanding a possible technical defect in the related demand and refusal: where the defendant was an “other” (i.e., not an insider) demand was made on, and refusal issued in writing by, the board of directors, not the supervisory board. As we note above, the 2006 Company Law is unclear in such cases as to where demand is to be made. A more cautious court might have used the failure to make demand on the supervisory board as grounds for rejecting the suit. The same tolerant approach to the precise addressee of the demand may be seen in Beijing Puren Hospital 2009, a complex related-party “borrowings” case, where demand served on the Legal Representative of the looted company was deemed sufficient to let the action proceed.

In Henan Golden Mango Property 2009, the first- and second-instance courts allowed a derivative action to proceed even though the complaining shareholder had not formally served demand on the company that it sue a construction contractor. Both courts noted that originally the company had sued on the contract, but had later withdrawn its action. This, said the second-instance court, “may be seen as a refusal to bring the action” (ke shiwei jujue tiqi susong).

Courts have also liberally used the notion of urgent circumstances (Article 152 collapses the thirty-day waiting period where “the company would suffer irreparable damage if the suit could not proceed immediately”) to effectively excuse the demand requirement and to bring otherwise non-conforming actions into court.85

Indeed, in some cases the Chinese courts appear almost overly lax in accepting derivative pleadings with no real requirements or analysis at all. In the only domestic corporate litigation arising from the highly contentious Danone-Wahaha dispute86 that went to judgment, the Hangzhou Wahaha 2007 opinion rendered on December 11, 2007, the court did not even comment on the derivative nature of the pleadings, and yet allowed the case to proceed and made its own determination on the merits.

85 See Weihai Yinghai 2008 (emergency situation), Beijing Dingyu Cable 2008 (no emergency situation), Huangshan Fenghua Real Estate 2009 (company is in liquidation, so lack of demand not an issue), Beijing Golden Century 2009 (company is not able to operate when ousted director, Legal Representative and General Manager will not give up corporate chops and licenses in defiance of unanimous shareholders’ resolution), and Beijing Puren Hospital 2009 (plaintiff shareholder is notified that dominating shareholder and allegedly breaching fiduciary will apply for bankruptcy of the company as a strategic response to the fiduciary lawsuit). See also the published views of a Sichuan Province county-level judge confirming the availability of a direct action without demand in “emergency circumstances” at Peng (2009).

86 The dispute is described in Perkowski (n.d.) and Anon. (2009b).
e. Technical Competence

PRC judicial officials have shown an impressive level of competence in understanding and implementing the derivative mechanism.87

A small number of “straddling” cases show lower level courts refusing derivative pleadings before 2006 because there is no legal basis; these denials are then overturned on appeal. The “straddling” Chongqing Coal Mine 2006 case exemplifies this. While the first-instance court denied the derivative suit for lack of a legal basis, the second-instance court reversed because the 2006 Company Law had since come into effect.

The Shanghai Kouweier 2008 case sticks closely to the derivative action offered in the 2006 Company Law, rejecting a “double derivative” lawsuit. The plaintiff was a shareholder in a company that was the sole shareholder of the allegedly damaged entity; the court ruled that he could not bring an action on behalf of a remote subsidiary. Regardless of policy, this is the technically correct solution under Article 152, which does not seem to allow for the “double derivative”/”multiple derivative” action.88

There are also several cases applying the derivative lawsuit mechanism of Article 152 to FIEs, or foreign-invested enterprise legal persons established under and governed by the separate system of FIE laws and regulations.89 In no case do we find a Chinese court refusing a derivative lawsuit on the grounds that the relevant entity is an FIE and therefore not governed by the Company Law.

A number of opinions show real technical competence in denying derivative pleadings because the underlying injury is in reality suffered by one partner/shareholder, and not the jointly-invested LLC. We see that in Beijing Jindao Hongping Advertising 2008, where first-instance court (affirmed on appeal) dismisses somewhat spurious derivative pleadings in what is really a dispute between 50/50 LLC shareholders, and where the company has already entered into liquidation and there is no injury to the corporation. The Beijing Glory Project 2009 case takes much the same line in denying derivative pleadings—formally for lack of conforming demand on the company, but in our view really because the dispute is between two parties to a real estate development contract where the money-investing partner sues the party holding the development licence for defection. In each of these cases and several others in our sample,90 the

87 We do not discuss here the many cases where the derivative action is implemented without issue, such as the Shanghai Zhongjian Enterprise 2008 case, where a mere 2.86% shareholder brings a suit on behalf of the company against a negligent or disloyal Legal Representative on a loan, and the Legal Representative is ordered to compensate the company for the loan.

88 Other jurisdictions allow for such actions: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Singapore all allow them by statute, and Hong Kong allows them as a matter of common-law extension of existing derivative suit doctrine.


90 See, for example, Shanghai Tianguang Medical 2009 (Shanghai Higher People’s Court overturns first-level denial of derivative lawsuit but then directs re-pleading based on plaintiff’s (not company’s) injury).
Chinese courts effectively channel what are pled as *corporate* and thus derivative lawsuits into the more appropriate arena of direct claims *between partners*.

### f. Difficulties Regarding Underlying Substantive Claims

Our research shows that while Chinese courts may increasingly accept derivative pleadings, they can encounter difficulties in adjudicating the underlying substantive claims. Indeed, only rarely do we see really robust application of the underlying substantive claim against a traditional corporate fiduciary. One rare example is the *Beijing Xiankou Food and Beverage 2009* case, where a Legal Representative who had misappropriated corporate revenues was found to have violated the “duty to properly use company assets” (*zhengdang shiyong gongsi caichan de yiwu*), which was in turn explicitly deemed a part of the 2006 Company Law Article 148 and 148 duties.\(^91\)

Far more common are case opinions where Chinese judges fumble or avoid adjudication of the underlying substantive claims. For example, in *Nanchuan Chemical Industry 2006*, the court allowed a derivative lawsuit even though the acts complained of occurred before 2006. But it rejected the underlying substantive claim against some of the defendant directors and officers of the company, reasoning (bizarrely, in our view) that “… even though the other defendants may have been in breach of their duty of care,” the breach of that duty and resulting liability to the company [for damages] is a separate legal relationship (*lingwai de falü guanxi*).”\(^91\)

We see a similar misstep on the substantive claim in the *Weihai Yinghai 2008* case, at least at the first level of adjudication. There, the court accepts derivative pleadings, but then finds the actions of the defendant as not actionable either because they are authorized by a corporate resolution (use of the company chop) or because they “pertain to issues of the company’s internal administration” (*shuyu gongsi neibu guanli shiyi*) (disclosure to company shareholders of financial records).

The same problem is apparent again in *Huangshan Fenghua Real Estate 2009*. In that case, the Anhui provincial-level court affirms the lower court’s allowance of the derivative action, but also upholds its dismissal of the underlying cause of action because it relates—in the words of the defendant’s brief—“merely to internal shareholder disputes” (*jinjin shi gudong neibu jiufen*), and because the underlying contracts challenged as harmful to the company are subject only to the principles of contract formation described in the PRC Contract Law. The opinion goes so far as to say that the derivative action is applicable *only* to asserted breaches of Article 150 of the Company Law by corporate directors and senior management. Thus, when faced with nine land sales contracts at below-market value entered into by the company already in liquidation as represented by the defendant, the court refuses to look at potential breaches by the defendant and instead affirms the validity of the contracts under the PRC Contract Law.

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\(^91\) See also *Shanghai Kouweier 2008*, where the court dismisses the “double derivative” action but then nonetheless addresses the underlying breach of duty of care.

\(^92\) The opinion uses both “*qinmian yiwu*” from the 2006 Company Law and “*zhuyi yiwu*” – a form used in Chinese-language academic writing and Taiwanese corporate law.
We find a number of cases where the courts accept the derivative action but seem reluctant to find fiduciary duty violations. Shanghai XXX Electric 2009 shows an inability to apply fiduciary duty law colored by misunderstanding of the logic behind the derivative action. The court rejects the underlying cause of action on grounds which include the failure of the plaintiff to show losses by the company, and then proceeds to subvert the rationale behind the already-accepted derivative pleadings, noting that “the lent funds can be recovered via a lawsuit by the company and other methods against director Zhang [the defendant].” The court fails to understand that the defendant director, as executive director and Legal Representative of the LLC, can block the company entirely from seeking this remedy.

g. Confusion Between Derivative and Representative Lawsuits

In some cases we see overly aggressive and technically flawed application of the derivative lawsuit, or the use of Article 152 in situations that do not warrant it. One good example of this phenomenon is the Beijing Huayuya Real Estate 2009 case, in which the court invokes Article 152 to force a dissident shareholder to fulfill the terms of a shareholders’ resolution. In that case, a father shareholder in a three-shareholder LLC dies, whereupon his 72% interest in the LLC passes to his wife and three of his children, and all of the shareholders resolve to appoint the surviving wife as Legal Representative and executive director of the LLC. The two pre-existing shareholders (the deceased father’s child and someone probably his or her spouse) do not implement the shareholders’ resolution, and take no action to register the surviving wife’s appointment as the new Legal Representative and executive director. The new shareholders sue, in their own names and to remedy injury to themselves, to cause performance of the shareholders’ resolution. In allowing the suit to proceed under Article 152, the court states, “Shareholders who suffer injury to their rights can bring a shareholders’ representative suit (quanli shou sun de gudong keyi tiqi gudong daibiao susong).” This is incorrect as applied to this case. If the court really means “representative suit,” then it is wrong because the plaintiff shareholders do not seek to represent any other shareholders. If it means “derivative suit” under Article 152, it is equally wrong because the shareholders are not suing over an injury to the company.

h. Judge-made Direct Litigation Right for Supervisors

Our review of cases shows an interesting example of judicial initiative: the judge-made creation of a legal right for supervisors to sue on behalf of the injured company without any prodding from a shareholder demand. We speculate that PRC courts have created this direct

93 See, among others, the following cases with alleged duty of loyalty breaches: Shanghai Decheng Real Estate 2006, Beijing Yuannian Culture 2009, Beijing Wanpeng Management 2010, Shanghai Ninghui 2008, and Shanghai Yuanji International 2006.

94 See the same misconception in the Dongfang Construction Group 2009 case.

95 See Shanghai Shixing Real Estate 2005 (failing to set forth any legal or statutory basis for this power, other than to say that the supervisor plaintiff “has the power according to Company Law stipulations” and that such a lawsuit “conforms to stipulations of law”), Beijing Kejie Window 2009 (stating that the plaintiff need not specifically use Article 152’s derivative action mechanism because he is both a shareholder and a supervisory board member), Shanghai Taiwu Real Estate 2008 (permitting a 24% shareholder in an LLC to sue two co-shareholders holding in the aggregate 54% “as a supervisor acting for the company”), and Beijing Xiangkou Food and Beverage 2009 (seeming to hold that supervisors have not only the right but the duty to sue when management is conflicted).
litigation right in order to avoid technical obstacles to implementation of the derivative lawsuit mechanism, while allowing themselves to invoke its terms and spirit. Importantly, this direct right of action seems only effective with respect to closely-held LLCs and when the office of supervisor is coupled with a shareholder interest.

i. Allocation of Court Fees and “Loser Pays All”

Court fees in our sample of cases are generally allocated to the loser both before and after January 1, 2006. Unfortunately, the case reports we have reviewed do not generally reveal how attorneys’ fees are allocated between the parties, although one imagines the case opinions would describe any variance from the alleged norm in Chinese litigation—that each party pays its own attorneys’ fees. In the derivative action context, this would mean that initiating shareholders would have to pay their own attorneys’ fees.

Of the forty-four analyzed cases listed in Appendix 1 of this chapter, eighteen adhere to the “loser pays all” principle, nineteen are silent on the court fee allocation question, and seven show a variation from the alleged “loser pays” norm. Only one case in our sample appears to internalize the logic of the derivative action: *Beijing Tonghua Online 2009*. In that case, shareholder plaintiffs bringing suit on behalf of the company are successful in derivative pleadings, but unsuccessful on the underlying claim of breach of duty of loyalty, and so the “third party” (the company that has allegedly been injured) is assessed 8,109 yuan in court fees.96 Although the loser still pays, the “loser” is deemed to be the company, not the shareholders who initiated the derivative claim on behalf of the company.

There are some cases going the other way.97 Unfortunately, the case reports and opinions do not provide sufficient data for us to know why these occasional departures from the “loser pays all” principle occur. We can speculate that departures are more likely to occur when a plaintiff has won a significant damage award from defendant(s), as we see in the *Shanghai Shixing Real Estate 2005* case, where the defendant was ordered to pay 272,000 yuan back to the company.

VI. Critique of Article 152 and Reform Suggestions

The preceding sections have noted various problems with the Article 152 mechanism. In this section, we summarize our critiques and suggestions for reform.

96 The same logic is vindicated but in a case which does not adhere to the “loser pays all” principle, *Chongqing Coal Mine 2006*, where the plaintiff shareholders are successful in the derivative action, but the LLC whose interest is being protected is assessed almost one third of the court costs.

97 These include (in chronological order): *Shanghai Shixing Real Estate 2005* (supervisor successfully sues on behalf of company but is assessed 96% of court fees), *Chongqing Coal Mine 2006* (plaintiff shareholders successful in derivative action, but the LLC whose interest is being protected is assessed one-third of court fees), *Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Three 2006* (partially successful plaintiff/appellant and company itself pay part of court fees), *Beijing Dingyu Cable 2008* (derivative action denied, yet court orders return of the plaintiff’s litigation fee deposit), *Weihai Yinghai 2008* (successful plaintiff assessed 348,000 yuan in court costs, losing defendant assessed only 200 yuan), *Beijing Kejie Window 2009* (initiating supervisor/shareholder permitted to sue on behalf of company, but ordered to pay 0.75% of the first-instance court’s fees and 33.7% of the second-instance court’s fees), and *Beijing Xiangkou Food and Beverage 2009* (initiating supervisor *cum* shareholder pays 2,389 yuan in court costs; losing defendant assessed only 171 yuan).
First, the Company Law should state clearly that the initiating shareholder of a derivative action must be a shareholder of the affected company at the time the suit is brought.

Second, the Company Law currently lacks any standards for, or even a concept of, justified refusal by the board or supervisory board to satisfy the demand. Read literally, the statute makes the demand requirement virtually meaningless, because if the company does not bring suit upon demand the shareholder may always do so. No doubt the drafters were concerned about structural bias and demand futility when boards are conflicted. Yet making demand irrelevant, or not allowing a board of supervisors or directors to make a justified, good-faith, refusal is no answer, and may result in abuse of the derivative lawsuit. In addition, the badly-drafted mechanism does not acknowledge the supervisors’ and directors’ duties under Article 148 to act in the best interests of the corporation, much less any judicial role in evaluating whether their refusal of the demand conforms to that duty. The options for statutory remediation here are many, including a mandated “independent committee” or an affirmative basis for judicial evaluation of a board refusal (or shareholder allegation of demand futility), and recognition of something akin to the directors’ “business judgment.” One Supreme People’s Court judge has made just this suggestion: “[W]e must stipulate effective conditions for any resolution [by the board refusing demand]: first, that the resolution is conditioned on prior appropriate investigation [of the claim] by the supervisory board or the independent directors; second, that the directors who vote on the resolution do not include defendants in the derivative action; and third, that the resolution be made in the best interests of the corporation (weile gongsi de zuidade liyi).”98 The third prong suggested for justified refusal implies significant participation by the judiciary in evaluating whether the refusal is in conformity with the directors’ fiduciary duties, raising the question of whether Chinese judges, who are unlikely to have any significant business experience, are up to the task.

Third, the Company Law should stipulate upon whom demand must be made when the action demanded is against a non-insider “other.” Failure to do so risks allowing conservative judicial institutions to stymie meritorious derivative lawsuits on a technicality.

Fourth, the Company Law should clarify the exact effect of “urgent” or “emergency” circumstances upon demand and the stipulated 30-day waiting period. Is, as most PRC courts rule, demand itself excused, or is it just the 30-day period which is eliminated?

Last in the line of specific critiques, Article 152 makes a distinction between the wrong on the company that triggers the derivative action: insiders may be sued when they have damaged the company through breaches of law, administrative regulations, or the company’s Articles of Association in the course of performing company duties, while “others” may be sued when they have damaged the company by violating its lawful rights and interests. We can think of no good reason for this difference.

More generally, we question the idea of minimum shareholding requirement for CLSs. This makes little sense in the PRC where there remains such concentrated ownership in publicly-listed CLSs, and so many temptations for controlling shareholder malfeasance or minority shareholder oppression. It makes even less sense where there are so many other mechanisms working against minority shareholders bringing what, after all, is a corporate claim (and must be recognized as such during adjudication). There is a persistent (and we believe mistaken) sense in

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the Chinese discourse that the required minimum is tied to the notion that a derivative lawsuit is in fact a “representative” lawsuit, and therefore requires a minimum number of shareholders to “represent” the interests of all or most of the other shareholders.\footnote{For example, PRC Supreme People’s Court Justice Jin Jianfeng justifies minimum shareholder percentages because they “ensure that the plaintiff is sufficiently representative.” See Jin (2008), p. 418. Of course, in a true derivative action, the plaintiff is the company and is not “represented” by anyone, and certainly not by shareholders (who have their own “direct” claims to pursue).} This is a radical misunderstanding of the derivative action: a derivative lawsuit is a corporate claim, merely initiated by one or more shareholders to get around the structural block presented by those who control the corporation and are unwilling to bring suit. In addition, even if there is to be a minimum threshold, the 1% level may well be so high as to discourage otherwise meritorious actions by minority shareholders in widely-held companies.\footnote{Tang (2008), p. 145. The fear of abusive strike suits brought just for their settlement value may well be overblown. See Zhang (2008), pp. 549-50.}

PRC jurisdictional rules generally require derivative lawsuits to be heard where the company has its headquarters (zhuyao banshichu jigou).\footnote{See Jin (2008), p. 423.} For example, the Sanlian Shanghshe 2009 case, China’s first and perhaps only post-2006 publicly-listed CLS case, was docketed (li an) at the Shandong Provincial Higher People’s Court, the situs of the defendant controlling shareholders. This hurts derivative actions, because the insiders of the corporatized state-owned enterprises being sued—or the controlling shareholders of such entities—are often locally powerful government and Party figures who have significant political, administrative, and fiscal control over the local court system.

With respect to the role of the judiciary in evaluating fact and law questions, the language in the statute about “irreparable damage to the interests of the company” (i.e., an emergency) strongly implies some kind of real evaluation role for the PRC judiciary, unless shareholders are simply to plead these conclusions and have them accepted in all cases. We note travesties like the 2008 Beijing Dingyu Cable 2008 case, where derivative pleadings are denied on the theory that there is no emergency situation because the company has already been fully looted. And yet we also see a good number of other opinions where an emergency is found and demand effectively waived.

In addition, the system does not currently take account of demands by shareholders who have previously ratified the allegedly offending actions under conditions of full disclosure, and who then opportunistically turn around and initiate derivative lawsuits protesting those actions. In each of these examples, the only body that can properly evaluate the fact and law questions is the judiciary. Yet it remains to be seen if Chinese courts have the requisite competence and autonomy to make the required evaluations in such complex situations. They might benefit from stronger, more bright-line rules.

The 2006 Company Law and the current Civil Procedure Law remain unclear on the legal position of the company in the newly-authorized derivative lawsuit. The classic Anglo-American derivative action is in fact two suits at equity, one of which is a claim by the company as the “real party plaintiff” against those alleged to have injured it. This structure is important, because it directs any compensation or damages to the company and not to individual
shareholders who may have distinct interests in the litigation. Civil law systems handle this somewhat differently, and again in a way that may be tied closely to the understanding that derivative lawsuits are really “representative” lawsuits. The Japanese system, for instance, holds that the corporation is not a necessary formal party to a derivative lawsuit, and that the court may at its own discretion reject the company’s application to join or include the corporation in the action where the company is unwilling to be joined. The 2006 Company Law of China makes no explicit provision for the formal role of the corporation, and thus judges are left to wonder if the company in a well-pleaded derivative action is (i) not a party, (ii) the plaintiff (with, or alone and to the exclusion of, the shareholders taking the initiative) or (iii) some kind of involuntary “third party” (di san ren), a role permitted under the PRC’s Law on Civil Procedure but only on voluntary application. One influential Supreme People’s Court judge asserted in 2008, for example, that the company should be either “the name plaintiff” or the “third party” (di san ren). Thus, efforts should be made in statute (either the Company Law or the Civil Procedure Law) to clarify the position of the company as the formal plaintiff. This would help derivative lawsuits on a number of fronts, from cost allocation (including up-front payment of attorneys fees and court costs by the usually richer company) and financial incentives, to adjudication of harm and causality, and it would go a long way to clearing up the evident confusion rooted in the term “representative lawsuit” with its implication that the company is being “represented” by the shareholders. The company should be the direct, name, plaintiff, and thus the lawsuit should be pursued in the company’s interest.

We are also concerned about the position of shareholders who are not part of the demand on the company. If it is a true derivative claim, then they are affected equally by the success or failure of the company’s claim. But how are such other shareholders to be protected against colluding shareholders who get control of the Article 152 lawsuit (i.e., those who are first to make a demand)? One idea is to give other non-demanding shareholders the right to join in control of the suit if it proceeds. Another idea is to provide a statutory basis for courts to prohibit settlements between defendants and the shareholders running the derivate lawsuit. Rules on derivative actions in foreign jurisdictions often restrict such settlements without court approval. China’s current civil procedure norms stipulate no such restriction. That is why the pre-2006 sub-national Opinions permitting derivative lawsuits stipulated precisely such a

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104 This has been suggested by Supreme People’s Court judge Jin Jianfeng, although his rationales—first, that this will enable better investigation of defendant malfeasance, and second, that the lawsuit be more “representative”—miss the key concern, which is the prevention of collusion. See Jin (2008), p. 420.

105 In the one case in our sample that is settled (while on appeal before the Supreme People’s Court), Tonghe Investment 2009, the case reports also focus on the caution that must be exercised with respect to any settlement reached in a derivative action, given the risk that the controlled company will agree to terms that are disadvantageous to it.

106 See, for example, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1. The Chinese Law on Civil Procedure provides only affirmation of the ability to settle suits, at Article 51.

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constraint and why one authoritative Supreme People’s Court Justice has urged that settlements in derivative actions be permitted only with court approval.

Finally, given the existing obstacles to the financing of derivative actions in China, we believe it would be unwise for China to impose further obstacles, such as requiring that demanding shareholders post a bond as a pre-condition to bringing a derivative suit. Indeed, Article 47 of the 2003 Omnibus Regulation reproduced one mechanism familiar from Article 267(6) of the Japanese Commercial Code designed to inhibit nuisance suits: providing that if derivative lawsuit defendants can offer evidence that plaintiffs were suing in “bad faith” the court could, upon application of the defendants, require plaintiffs to post security for defendants’ reasonable litigation expenses. This would be counter-productive in the PRC, even if included in some misguided attempt to create an “international (best) standard” derivative lawsuit.

VII. Conclusion

In today’s China, the derivative lawsuit is suddenly viable and increasingly brought to the courts throughout the country. It is unquestionably a step forward in the development of China’s corporate governance that courts are actually hearing derivative suits despite the technical, institutional, economic, and political obstacles we have identified in this chapter. Given the courts’ preference for specific instructions over general statutory authorizations, this is all the more remarkable because the Supreme People’s Court has not yet promulgated implementing rules specifically governing the derivative lawsuit.

Our study of cases shows that the courts will permit derivative pleadings to overcome structural obstacles inherent in the corporate form, and sometimes quite aggressively, as seen in the derivative actions permitted without any statutory basis, the use of a 1994 Supreme People’s Court document facially limited to foreign-party-controlled joint ventures as a legal basis for other derivative suits, the many straddling actions applying the post-2006 derivative action to pre-2006 transactions, the abundant use of the derivative lawsuit “horizontally” against “others” that include controlling shareholders, and the post-2006 allowance for a supervisor’s direct right of action to sue on behalf of the company (at least when the supervisor is also a shareholder). These judgments are strong evidence that the technical defects we have highlighted have not seriously constrained the development or implementation of the derivative action in China, at least with respect to LLCs. In addition, the developments and specific jurisprudence discussed in this chapter also show the courts’ increasing cognizance of, and comfort wielding, complex substantive corporate law doctrines which underpin the derivative lawsuit vehicle (including fiduciary duties, at least as far as the duty of loyalty is concerned). These observations bode well for the elaboration and strengthening of China’s corporate governance regime and the role of the courts in applying corporate law.

107 See, for example, Shanghai HLPC (2003) (Shanghai Opinion): “[W]hen the parties raise a settlement proposal in the course of the litigation, and the People’s Court determines that the proposed settlement will harm the interests of other shareholders of the company, then the settlement should not be approved and the litigation should continue.”


On the other hand, some of the defects and obstacles we discuss in this chapter will provide an easy excuse for courts to avoid hearing derivative suits, thereby leaving certain corporate actors and contract parties unaccountable. Most importantly, we have found almost no cases involving listed or even unlisted CLSs. We have speculated above on the reasons for this absence. Whatever the reasons, it remains true that the virtual absence of CLS-related cases is a misfortune for corporate law and corporate governance in the PRC. For the rapidly expanding number of CLSs and their minority shareholder investors, the derivative suit mechanism of Article 152 is simply not working, or not being permitted to work.

A further problem we observe is that even when the derivative action is successfully implemented, some courts continue to remain wary or uncomprehending of the underlying corporate law doctrines, especially the duty of care. We found virtually no cases involving the duty of care, and other research we have done in non-derivative suit cases yields similar results. Indeed, we found one shocking case which liberally permitted a derivative action but then abandoned application of the substantive fiduciary claim because the latter was deemed part of a “separate legal relationship.” If courts are unwilling or unable to enforce a duty of care, then an important element of the rationale behind allowing derivative suits will remain unrealized.

In sum, China’s mechanism for derivative lawsuits remains insufficient to support good corporate governance and accountability for managers and controlling shareholders in widely-held CLSs. It is not wholly insufficient, or so weak that we would advise abandoning the effort to improve the associated substantive law and to develop the institutions needed to apply it. Indeed, the mechanism’s mere existence is in some sense helping judicial institutions act more autonomously and with greater power in Chinese society. On the corporate governance side, and particularly in the absence of other remedies for shareholder oppression, it is a vital tool for shareholders in both CLSs and LLCs. We believe the derivative lawsuit has a future in China. We also believe, however, that at present it can only supplement, and not replace, state regulatory institutions in the policing of corporate governance and insider action. In China today it remains state regulatory institutions, and not courts, that are likely to have the necessary independence from local political and economic interests, as well as technical expertise, to enforce accountability and expanded legal rights.
Appendix I: Cases

Note: Case citations marked with an asterisk indicate cases for which we have not obtained and reviewed judicial opinions, but relied on secondary reports.


Beijing Puren Hospital 2009: Wu Yongjian v. Xu Wenxing and Zhu Yuxiang re: Beijing Puren Hospital Administration Company Limited (Beijing Municipal Shunyi District People’s Court
(2009) shun min chu zi No. 1065; on appeal Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court (2009) er zhong min zhong zi No. 11811).

**Beijing Taiquon Technology 2006**: Hantang Richeng Co., Ltd. (Taiwan) v. Chen Shihu, Lin Cangmin and Gan Wengi re: Beijing Taiquon Technology Company Limited (unidentified Beijing Municipal District People’s Court (after 2003); on appeal Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court (after 2005)).

**Beijing Taishan 2000**: Described in Zhang & Wang (2004).*

**Beijing Tonghua Online 2009**: Su Zhen and Han Fang v. Rong Chunming re: Beijing Tonghua Jinqiu Shangwang Company Limited (Beijing Municipal Haidian District People’s Court (2009) hai min chu zi No. 32426).


**Beijing Xiangkou Food and Beverage 2009**: Wen Jianguo v. Zhao Limei re: Beijing Xiangkou Xiaojing Nanjinjia Food and Beverage Company Limited (Beijing Xuanwu District People’s Court (2009) xuan min chu zi No. 2625).


**Chongqing Coal Mine 2006:** X. Power Enterprise General Company and Y. Enterprise Company Limited v. Deng, Cooperative Mine, He and Z. Mining Company Limited (Chongqing No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court (2005) yu er zhong fa min zhu zi No. 28; on appeal Chongqing Higher People’s Court (2006) [judgment identifier not provided]).

**Dongfang Construction Group 2009:** Chen Ju v. Dongfang Construction Group Company Limited (Zhejiang Province Zhuji City District People’s Court (2009) shao zhu shang chu zi No. 4058).


**Henan Lianhua MSG 2004:** Described in Anon (2004).*


Sanlian Shangshe 2009: Described in Anon (2009).*


Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Two 2005: Pinghai Development Company Limited v. Shanghai Zhongxing Group Zhencheng Real Estate Company Limited re: Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Company Limited (Shanghai Higher People’s Court (2005) hu gao min si (shang) chu zi No. 1).

Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Three 2006: Pinghai Development Company Limited v. Shanghai Municipal Pan-Asia Law Firm and Zhongxing Group Zhencheng Real Estate Company Limited re: Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Company Limited (Shanghai No.1
Intermediate People’s Court (2005)  

Shanghai Kouweier Clothing 2008:  

Shanghai Lujiiazui Real Estate 2005:  

Shanghai Ninghui 2008:  

Shanghai No. 1 Diangqi 2009:  

Shanghai Peieryou 2006:  

Shanghai Shixing Real Estate 2005:  

Shanghai Taiwu Real Estate 2008:  

Shanghai Tianguang Medical 2009:  

110 Apparently a Japanese CLS-type company.


Shanghai Zhongjian Enterprise 2008: Dong Fengchang v. Fang Yishu re: Shanghai Zhongjian Enterprise Company Limited (Shanghai Hongkou District People’s Court, No. 2 Civil Division, case filed September 26, 2008), case opinion not reviewed, but report by Judge Luo Jianhao of the Hongkou District People’s Court, February 26, 2009.


Zhangjiagang Fiber Company 1994: Described in Supreme People’s Court (1994).*


Zhejiang Wu Fang Zhai 2001: Described in Luo (2004), pp. 335-6; Lu (2001); and Anon (2001).*
Appendix II: Relevant statutory provisions

Company Law, Article 152

Where a director or senior manager is in the circumstances specified in Article 150 of this Law, the shareholders of a limited liability company (“LLC”), or the shareholders of a company limited by shares (“CLS”) individually or jointly holding one percent or more of its shares for 180 or more consecutive days, may request in writing that the supervisory board, or the supervisor(s) of an LLC where there is no such board, bring a lawsuit to a People’s Court; and where a supervisor is in the circumstances specified in Article 150 of this Law, the aforementioned shareholders may request in writing that the board of directors, or the executive director of an LLC where there is no board, bring a lawsuit to a People’s Court.

Where the supervisory board, the supervisor(s) of an LLC where no supervisory board is established, the board of directors, or the executive director refuses to bring a lawsuit after receiving the written request from the shareholders as specified in the preceding paragraph, or fails to bring a lawsuit within 30 days from the date it receives such request, or in an emergency situation where failure to bring a lawsuit immediately could result in damage to the interests of the company that is difficult to remedy, the shareholders specified in the preceding paragraph shall have the right, in their own names, to bring a lawsuit directly to a People’s Court in the interest of the company.

Where others infringe upon the lawful rights and interests of a company and thereby cause losses to the company, the shareholders specified in the first paragraph of this article may bring a lawsuit to a People’s Court in accordance with the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs.

Related Statutory Provisions

Company Law, Article 20

The shareholders of a company shall observe laws, administrative regulations, and the company’s articles of association and exercise the rights of a shareholder in accordance with law. They shall not abuse their shareholders’ rights to damage the interests of the company . . . .

Where the shareholder of a company abuses shareholder rights and thus causes losses to the company . . . , it shall be liable for compensation according to law.

Company Law, Article 54(6)

The supervisory board and the supervisor(s) of a company which has not established a supervisory board shall exercise the following functions: . . .

111 Company Law, Article 150, describes situations where such persons cause losses to the company.

112 Company Law, Article 150, describes situations where such persons cause losses to the company.
to bring a lawsuit against directors or senior managers in accordance with the provisions of Article 152 of this Law.

**Company Law, Article 148**

Directors, supervisors and senior managers shall observe laws, administrative regulations, and the company’s articles of association, and have the duties of loyalty and care to the company.

**Company Law, Article 150**

Directors, supervisors or senior managers who violate law, administrative regulation or the company’s articles of association in the performance of their duties for the company, and cause losses for the company, shall be liable for compensation.

**Other Normative Materials**

*Supreme People’s Court, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan guanyu shiyong “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa” ruogan wenti de guiding (1) (Provisions of the Supreme People's Court about Several Issues Concerning the Application of the Company Law of the People's Republic of China (1)), effective May 9, 2006*

Article 1: With respect to civil cases not yet completed and newly accepted by courts on or after the date of implementation of the Company Law, where the civil act or event occurred prior to that date, laws, regulations, and judicial interpretations from the period in question shall be applied.

Article 2: Where someone brings a lawsuit on the grounds of a civil act or event that occurred before the date of implementation of the Company Law, and there is no clear governing provision in the laws, regulations, and judicial interpretations of the period in question, the relevant provisions of the Company Law may be applied by reference.

Article 4: The holding period of 180 days or more stipulated in Article 152 of the Company Law means the period of holding fulfilled at the time the shareholder brings the suit. The rule stipulating aggregate holdings of at least one percent of the shares refers to the aggregate holdings of two or more shareholders.
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P. Luo, “Qianzhi chengxu quliu kunjing [Difficulties Over Whether to Eliminate or Keep the Precondition Procedure],” *Caijing [Finance]*, 19 (2007), 28


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Supreme People’s Court, Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu renmin fayuan shouli gongtong susong anjian wenti de tongzhi [Supreme People’s Court Notice on the Question of the Acceptance by People’s Courts of Joint Litigation Cases], adopted December 30, 2005, available at www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=149701