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An Addendum to Cox and Posner: A Visa to 'Snitch'

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ESSAY
AN ADDENDUM TO COX AND POSNER: A VISA TO “SNITCH”

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Abstract

Cox and Posner’s landmark contribution is the first article to have highlighted the challenges of information asymmetry in immigration screening. While Cox and Posner have undoubtedly made a significant contribution, there is a critical oversight in their framework: they do not discuss the importance of targeted ex post mechanisms of screening educational elites. This Essay is an attempt to remedy Cox and Posner’s omission. Why is this oversight so problematic? In the post-9/11 world, U.S. immigration policy currently finds itself on the horns of a dilemma. While immigrant educational elites are critical to U.S. economic growth, terrorist networks have stepped up their recruiting among well-trained elites.

In visa application processes, screening out terrorism suspects is notoriously complicated, in part because terrorist networks are typically difficult for outsiders to penetrate. Yet, the same cannot be said of elite networks. Indeed, the term “global elite” is meant to reflect precisely the fact that a network of rich, well-educated persons from developing countries exists, and that members of this network are now bona fide members of the Western elite. Social network theory tells us that these elites are typically only a few degrees of separation apart. Yet while a primary goal of immigration law is screening, the U.S. currently finds itself in the absurd position of screening elite aliens utilizing what this Essay terms “insufficiently networked” information. This screening typically occurs with little reference to the closely-knit elite networks whence these aliens originate, even as these networks are far better placed to access information about their members. A primary goal of immigration law should be to leverage these networks to supply the government with early warning signals when U.S. visa recipients display terrorist sympathies.

This Essay seeks to mitigate the challenges of information gathering about such elites through an under-utilized and under-theorized sanction, namely, visa-revocation. If not as a de jure matter, certainly as a de facto matter, elites typically have access to U.S. immigration privileges that are not easily available to their fellow nationals. Visas are status-conveyers, and their loss may undermine business and
educational opportunities dear to global elites. In a proposal referred to in shorthand as “a visa to snitch,” I impose a “duty to snitch” on elite visa-recipients. Each time that a visa holder commits a terrorist act, the authorities would determine which persons in her network knew of her terrorist sympathies and failed to report them. These persons would face visa cancellation, or at a minimum, a reduced prospect of visa renewal, unless they were able to demonstrate that they had good reason not to know or not to report.
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INTRODUCTION

The legal scholarship has much to say about questions of immigrant “type,” namely, which immigrants, among the millions who seek entry, should be admitted to the U.S. and in what numbers. Yet, while much has been written about these “first-order” questions, the law review literature has little to say about how the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) can ensure that the persons selected actually match its “type” preferences. The scholarship has been neglectful of “second-order” questions of institutional design.

A refreshing exception to this general scholarly inattention is Cox and Posner (2007). They argue that the principal institutional design choice for any state is between ex ante screening, in which an alien is screened on the basis of pre-entry information and denied entry if she does not fit the state’s first-order goals and an ex post system, in which an alien is screened on the basis of post-entry information and deported if she does not meet first-order policy. Cox and Posner’s analysis is enormously important: it provides a compelling explanatory framework for many puzzles in immigration law and policy, including the astronomical increase in federal immigration prosecutions. They argue that this prosecutorial trend reflects an increasing institutional bias for ex post as opposed to ex ante screening.

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2 In the aftermath of September 11, the Federal government was re-organized to create the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). DHS now houses Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), which bears primary responsibility for the federal immigration enforcement function. For a discussion of how DHS was organized to accommodate ICE, see Stephen H. Legomsky and Cristina M. Rodriguez, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy, Ch. 1 (2009).

3 This scholarly neglect is also briefly discussed in a previous contribution by the author. Eleanor Brown, Outsourcing Immigration Compliance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475 (2009).

4 See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 811.

5 Id.

6 See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text

7 See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 813.
Why this ex post bias? A primary reason offered by Cox and Posner is information asymmetry. Even as Congress dictates particular type-preferences, the government is generally not well placed to collect and screen information about potential migrants. For example, a potential migrant will generally know much more about herself, and whether she will abide by U.S. immigration laws, than a consular visa-officer. Post-entry screening mitigates the challenges of information asymmetry since the U.S. is better able to access and screen information about aliens once they are already in the country. Herein lies the primary explanation for the post-entry bias: given minimal access to reliable pre-entry information, DHS expends significant resources “double-checking” that only the right “types” have been admitted to the U.S. and ferreting out and deporting the “wrong” types, particularly among low-skilled aliens who are often unable to provide reliable pre entry documentation.

Post 9/11, there is evidence that the U.S. has also invested significant resources in ferreting out and deporting the “wrong types” even among members of the global elite, namely, the group of persons who

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9 Consular officers are State Department employees stationed in Embassies overseas. They are typically the “on the ground” screeners of visa applications. For a general discussion of their role see LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2, Chapter 1 (2009).

10 See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 813.

11 Id.

12 The new emphasis on federal screening of elites is discussed in Philip Shandon, In the Wake of the Times Square Bomb Case, the Feds Just Issued a Chilling Warning to Pakistani Leaders: Check Your Family and Staff for Terrorist Ties, THE DAILY BEAST (May 21, 2010, 9:47 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-05-21/faisal-shahzad-case-
occupy the apex of their social order, attend the same coterie of Western universities, and work and reside within one degree of separation of their fellow elites in their countries of origin. DHS appears to have been particularly focused on post-entry screening of elites with scientific credentials such as engineers. The information asymmetry rationale has less explanatory power with respect to elite migrants, since issues of information collection and verification are less acute. In contrast to their-low skilled counterparts, elites are well-placed to provide tangible proxies that they will be productive and well-behaved (such as professional certifications). Moreover, given modern advances in information technology, these proxies may be easily verified even halfway across the globe.

Even as they are generally agnostic on U.S. institutional design choices, Cox and Posner emphasize the reduced explanatory power of the information asymmetry rationale in this context and appear troubled by the disproportionate focus on post-entry screening among

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13 See generally P. BOURDIEU, THE STATE NOBILITY: ELITE SCHOOLS IN THE FIELD OF POWER (1996) (for a classic sociological utilization of the term “elite.”) See also JANINE WEDEL, SHADOW ELITE (2009) for a contemporary utilization of the term, which is generally used to refer to a small group of people who control a disproportionate amount of wealth, privilege, and access to decision-making. A recent issue of The Economist also discusses the extraordinary influence of these elites, with a particular focus on elites in the developing world. See The Rich and The Rest: A Special Report on the Global Elite. THE ECONOMIST, 58, Jan. 22, 2011. In social science circles, the term “elite” has long associated with Marx scholars. See generally, T.B. BOTTOMORE, ELITES AND SOCIETY (1964). However, the term has long had broader currency shorn of Marxist connotations, and there have been several landmark studies of economic, political, academic and cultural elites, primarily in the “West” but also more broadly. See generally, C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956); FLOYD HUNTER, COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE: A STUDY OF DECISION MAKERS (1953); M. SCHWARTZ, THE STRUCTURE OF POWER IN AMERICA: THE CORPORATE ELITE AS RULING CLASS (1987); G. WILLIAM DORNHOFF, WHO RULES AMERICA? (1967); ROBERT PUTNAM, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICAL ELITES (1976) (all containing detailed anthropological, sociological or political science studies of how elites function).

14 Cox and Posner use the term “highly skilled.” I will utilize this term interchangeably with “educational elites.”

15 See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 825.
What is the source of their discomfort? For elites in particular, the economic stakes of institutional design choices appear to be high. Why so? There is a real risk that highly talented but risk-averse persons may be deterred from migrating to the U.S. The economic data is unambiguous: the U.S. economy needs educational elites. Microsoft Founder Bill Gates has famously pointed out that Google, Oracle, and Intel were all founded by immigrant computer scientists. Notably, the Blackberry smart phone was also invented by immigrants—in Canada rather than the United States. Gates contends that the U.S. is falling behind in the competitive race for global talent due partly to an anachronistic immigration system. Cox and Posner appear sensitive to these concerns and are disinclined to augment these challenges. Thus, in the context of the highly skilled, they seem to express a preference for ex ante screening.

Cox and Posner have undoubtedly made a significant contribution; they are the only scholars to have weighed the comparative advantages of ex ante versus ex post approaches. Yet, there is a critical oversight in their framework: they do not discuss the importance of targeted ex post mechanisms of screening the highly skilled. Why is this problematic? While elite immigrants are clearly critical for U.S. economic growth, terrorist networks have also stepped up their recruiting among such elites. Among the many aspirants to global notoriety as bombers, it is the elite and well-educated that are most

16 Id. Motomura also seems to share a similar concern. See Motomura, supra note 1 at 869 (noting that “lessons in Second-Order Structure about ex post screening are less convincing for noncitizens who are lawfully in the United States, and especially unconvincing for permanent residents.”).
17 See infra text accompanying notes.
20 I should point out that Cox and Posner do not specifically mention Gates’ testimony. However, they clearly share a similar concern. See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 813.
21 Id.
likely to be chosen by Al Qaeda’s leadership. Indeed Al Qaeda’s own leadership has been populated by such elites. Among recent terror attempts, the most highly publicized was that of the Pakistani would-be Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, who was previously a recipient of elite student and professional visas and was undoubtedly a member of the global elite. Profiles of famous terrorism suspects reveal this theme repeating itself. Moreover there is another critical omission in Cox and Posner’s analysis: ex ante screening is complicated because elites have resources which allow them to obscure “red flags.” Additionally, some persons undergo extreme radicalization only after they receive their visas. For such subjects, ex ante screening would hardly suffice; ex post screening is critical.

Indeed, this was one of the justifications offered for the FBI’s large-scale questioning of students and scientists of Middle Eastern origin after 9/11. Although the FBI’s dragnet has generally withstood judicial review, such action is arguably ineffective. There needs to

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23 Id. Several members of Al Qaeda’s current leadership originate from such backgrounds. Most famously, Osama Bin Laden is the son of a monied and influential Saudi contractor. His deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri is a doctor from an affluent and prominent Egyptian family, with several distinguished academics.

24 At the time of the attack, Shahzad was a naturalized American citizen. However, prior to naturalization he had been the recipient of several visas, including an F1 student visa to study at an American university and a highly selective H1B visa for skilled foreign nationals. Faisal Shahzad, Times Topics, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/faisal_shahzad/index.html?scp=1&sq=Shahzad%20&st=cse (last visited Jan. 17, 2011). While Shahzad had recently fallen on hard times, by virtue of his advantages of birth and Western education, he was undoubtedly a member of the global elite.


be a narrow and targeted mechanism of double-checking that elite aliens meet U.S. type preferences. This Essay offers one such mechanism. Congress should leverage highly desirable visas to elicit valuable information about potential terrorists. To accomplish this goal, it should impose an explicit requirement on certain U.S. visa holders to inform on family and friends who may harbor fanatically dangerous hatred of America – or risk losing their highly coveted access to the U.S. I will refer to this proposal in shorthand as “a visa to snitch.”

Notably, several of Shahzad’s family and friends, including his father – a retired high ranking Pakistani military officer - noticed his extreme radicalism. And yet no one among Pakistani elites – presumably with U.S. visas and ready access to both Pakistani and U.S. law enforcement – appears to have snitched. Consider the contrasting behavior of the father of the “Underwear Bomber,” Umar Farouk

27 The question of what precisely constitutes Islamic fundamentalism is a controversial one. In “Western” public political discourse, the phrase has come to be used interchangeably with Islamicism and generally refers to the group of religious ideologies advocating a return to the “fundamentals” of Islam as embodied in the Quran (the holy book) and the Sunnah (the practices of the Prophet Muhammad). See generally, GRAHAM FULLER, THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM (2003); OLIVIER ROY, FAILURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM (1994). Central tenets include the obligation of Muslims to obey sharia (Islamic law); pan-Islamic political unity; and the removal of non-Muslim (particularly Western) political, cultural and military influences from the Muslim world. Yet others indicate that Islamicism has been erroneously conflated with fundamentalism. They argue that it consists of a continuum of more fluid ideologies that emphasize Muslim identity, authenticity, the unity of Muslim peoples, and the general revitalization of Muslim community. See generally, FRED HALLIDAY, ISLAM AND THE MYTH OF CONFRONTATION (1996); JOHN ESPOSITO, VOICES OF RESURGENT ISLAM (1983).

28 Since then there have been media reports that several other well-heeled Pakistanis – including some with U.S. visas - are well-known among Pakistani elites to harbor terrorist sympathies. Yet, this information is not being shared with U.S. intelligence. See Philip Shandon, supra note 12.

Abdul Mutallab (“Abdulmutallab”), a prosperous Nigerian engineering student and a repeated recipient of multi-entry, multi-year U.S. visitors’ visas. As a well-known banker and philanthropist, Father Mutallab was undoubtedly a member of the global elite and was also a recipient of a multi-year, multi-entry U.S. visitors’ visa. (henceforth “Umarmutallab”). He repeatedly alerted the American authorities to his son’s trips to Yemen, an atypical destination for a member of Nigeria’s jet-setting elite. This was a rare red flag. Parents generally do not turn in their children.

Notably, Umarmutallab, was the only one to report his son—though as appears to be the case with Shahzad, a much broader circle noticed young Mutallab’s disturbing radicalism. In one sense, this is

http://www.freep.com/print/article/20091226/NEWS05/91226035/Attempted-attack raises-airport-security-concerns

In particular, at the time of the attempted terrorist attack, he had a multiple-entry, multiple-year visitor’s visa (also known as the B-2 visa). Duncan Gardham, Stephen Adams & Martin Evans, Detroit Terror Attack Profile of Abdulmutallab, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 28, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/6896128/Detroitterror-attack-profile-of-Umar-Farouk-Abdul-Mutallab.html. (referring to trips to both the U.S. and the European Union and implying that he received several visas from these jurisdictions to travel).


This point has been made by several commentators including prominently by Adam Cohen, the chief legal correspondent at the Atlantic Monthly, in his blog. See his Dec. 30, 2009 posting, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/01/why-heads-should-roll/33175/.


Dowd makes precisely this point, supra note 34. Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins, and Ethan J. Leib also discuss the difficulties inherent in the decision of whether to inform on a family member in Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, 1147 U. ILL. L. REV. (2007).

Id.

Id. Indeed, media reports were filled with stories from Nigerians of similar social station who knew Abdulmutallab and his family, discussing signs of his
unremarkable; many societies have a metaphorical equivalent of the biblical Judas Iscariot narrative, signifying a deep aversion towards “snitches.” But against this prevailing wisdom — and despite the perceived damage snitching could do to his son, his family, his community, and his country — the interests of the elder Mutallab and the U.S. converged. Father Mutallab, a paradigmatic member of the Nigerian Muslim elite, assumed the classic role of “snitch” and turned in his son. Hence the subject of this Essay: How do we create incentives for elites to snitch on one another? By articulating a duty to snitch, the U.S. would essentially be codifying the behavior of the elder Mutallab.

What do I mean by a duty to snitch? This proposal is not concerned with criminal sanctions. Rather, it is concerned with another under-
utilized and under-theorized sanction, namely, visa-revocation. Elites value their U.S. market access and the revocation of such access is a serious sanction. Under this proposal, each time that a visa holder commits a terrorist act, the authorities would determine which persons in her network knew of her tendencies and failed to report them. These persons would face visa cancellation, or at a minimum, a reduced prospect of visa renewal, unless they were able to demonstrate that they had good reason not to know or not to report.

This Essay is deliberately provocative. Even in the absence of criminal sanctions, the imposition of a duty to “snitch” rightly causes discomfort. It has a bad odor about it, recalling an earlier Cold War era when aliens had their visas revoked for suspected Communist associations (as demonstrated by their refusal to snitch on suspected American communist associates) and raising uncomfortable First Amendment questions.41 For this reason, even with technical fixes, the proposal may not only be un-implementable but also undesirable. It bears emphasis: the point of this Essay is not to offer a feasible proposal, but instead to throw a metaphorical bomb and to raise uncomfortable “what if” questions.42 In so doing, I hope to provoke the sort of response that might typically be elicited by a thought experiment and to cause readers to think more deeply about the power of association to expose valuable information.

Part I includes a more detailed discussion of Cox and Posner. In Part II, I focus on my primary subject, Abdulmutallab, assembling a rough reconstruction of what his visa-file might have looked like. Why Abdulmutallab? Through background interviews with national security experts, I learned that Abdulmutallab is an ideal subject to explore the challenges of ex post screening since he was radicalized after his visa was approved. Moreover, it appears that the U.S.’s information

the U.S. could impose such criminal sanctions on U.S. citizens in U.S. territory, absent affirmative collaboration in planning a terrorist attack.

41 This history is summarized in John Scanlan, Aliens in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Government, the Academy and the McCarran-Walter Act, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1481 (1988). As a later footnote makes clear, First Amendment challenges are likely to fail.

42 For this reason, it is not within the scope of this essay to address many other practical issues that might arise in the administration of this proposal, including questions of standards of proof and so forth.
concerning Abdulmutallab was what this Essay will term “insufficiently networked.” In the future, this deficiency may be remedied through the simple threat of strategic revocation of the visas of elites, who may be the peers of would-be terrorists. Notably, the U.S. is already strategic in visa revocation when pressing foreign policy goals are at stake, as evidenced by its revocation of the visas of Honduran elites in the aftermath of a Honduran coup. Additionally, this section also lays out two critical portions of the “duty to snitch,” namely the information-screening and sanctioning components, drawing on the literature on collective sanctioning, and more broadly on network theory.

In Part III, I shift from the primary subject, Abdulmutallab to the “snitch,” namely, the elder Mutallab. Although motives are notoriously difficult to ascertain, it is important to consider the elder Mutallab’s potential motives—precisely because we hope to create incentives for similar behavior in others. I include an analysis of his potential decision-making matrix incorporating insights from the Nigerian blogosphere and other sources. In a departure from most accounts, I suggest non-traditional motives. A somewhat cynical game theory-inspired view would note that the elder Mutallab is a quintessential “repeat game” player with the U.S. As a banker, he is necessarily dependent on U.S. market access to conduct his business; snitching may be viewed as a pre-emptive mechanism of protecting his financial interests. Yet another view of Umarmutallab’s motives is nobler. Nigerian society famously puts great stock on honor as a value. Shame has been a prominent motif in the communal retelling of Abdulmutallab’s narrative. Snitching may be conceived as a pre-emptive mechanism of mitigating an anticipated blow to familial, tribal and national honor.

Notably, in this particular instance, communal norms appear to have already been working in the U.S.’s favor. The U.S. may strategically deploy this prioritization of family honor as a mechanism for motivating persons to share important information. How does this insight apply in practice? Prominent Islamic-American groups have highlighted prosecutorial overkill namely, such as dragnets of Muslim
student visa-recipients conducted after 9/11. The key is to keep the community on the side of the authorities. If terrorism is viewed as antithetical to family honor, soft sanctions such as a threat of visa-revocation may be more effective than heavy-handed approaches.

In Part IV, I discuss the metaphorical elephants in the room. Writing in the racially charged context of the civil rights movement, Malcolm X famously warned of the dangers of placing affirmative duties (i.e., to prevent harm) as opposed to negative duties (simply not to cause harm) on certain subsections of the society. Although Malcolm X was speaking specifically in reference to African-American Muslims, his point was much broader, namely, that such actions may alienate precisely those portions of the population whose support the law enforcement authorities need.44 There is also a concern regarding the McCarthyite penumbra associated with a duty to snitch. Moreover, the U.S. will need to guard against corruption of the process more generally, particularly given the dangers of elite capture. For example, elites may deliberately share inaccurate information to discredit competitors. Finally, I address the implications of all of the foregoing insights for U.S. immigration law and policy.

Part I: Setting Up the Theoretical Problem

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43 This point has been made by several members of the umbrella advocacy group, the American Muslim Political Coordination Council, including the Muslim Public Affairs Council, the American Muslim Alliance, the American Muslim Council and the Council on American Islamic Relations. The Council on American Islamic relations, the largest Muslim lobby group has been particularly vocal in this regard. See, generally, COUNCIL ON AMERICAN ISLAMIC RELATIONS, THE STATUS OF MUSLIM CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: STEREOTYPES AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (2002), http://www.cair.com/CivilRights/CivilRightsReports/2002Report.aspx; see also PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIMS IN AMERICA (2007), http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf; see also Omar Sacibey, Muslims look to blacks for civil rights guidance, RELIGION NEWS SERVICE, May 16, 2006, http://pewforum.org/news/display.php?NewsID=10521 (documenting the concerns of Muslim lobby groups regarding prosecutorial heavy-handedness).

44 BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY: SPEECHES, INTERVIEWS, AND A LETTER BY MALCOLM X. (George Breitman (ed.)) (1970), see also MALCOLM X THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (with the assistance of Alex Haley) (1992); MANNING MARABLE, ON MALCOLM X: HIS MESSAGE & MEANING (1992).
Historical context for institutional design choices: Why ex post screening has been neglected

Congress has charged the Executive branch with screening for a dizzyingly large spectrum of alien “types,” from highly skilled computer scientists, to wealthy investors, to aliens of “extraordinary ability” to low-skilled guest workers. Screening millions of applicants for a wide range of specific types should typically require institutions that are finely tuned to such goals. However, a primary source of what one scholar has termed immigration “dysfunction” is that institutions are poorly designed for a primary function – namely, screening. Cox and Posner’s exploration of the comparative advantages of ex ante versus ex post screening in institutional design has the potential to alleviate such dysfunction.

This is not an obscure academic issue. The importance of Cox and Posner’s work can hardly be overstated: their institutional design focus has enormous consequence for real-life questions of how immigration law has historically been enforced. Indeed, it is precisely because their work is so important that their failure to appreciate the importance of ex post screening in the context of the highly skilled is so troubling.

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46 See 8 U.S.C. §1153(b)(5) (1994) (providing for visas to be issued to immigrants who invest at least one million dollars in a start-up business that generates full-time jobs for ten United States citizens or lawful residents; these are generally known as “E” Treaty Investor Visas).
47 See 8 U.S.C. §1153(b)(1)(A)-(B) (providing for visas to be issued to immigrants of "extraordinary ability" or who are "outstanding" with a significant likelihood of making innovative contributions to the American economy); and §1153(b)(2) (providing for visas to be issued to immigrants with advanced academic training or who possess "exceptional ability").
49 An excellent discussion of how what he terms systemic “dysfunction” in the immigration system is augmented by the challenges of screening is contained in Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The Political Economies of Immigration Law (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
50 See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 811.
51 A good summary of the implications of institutional design for “real life” decision making is contained in also contained in Cuellar, supra note 49.
But in at least one sense, this oversight is also unsurprising. The federal government only began to restrict immigration in the late 19th century and even then, there were no provisions making immigrants deportable for post entry conduct.\(^{52}\) These provisions were only introduced in 1907 and significantly expanded over the last century.\(^{53}\) However, as a matter of practice, ex post screening was focused on the poor and low-skilled, as opposed to elites.\(^{54}\)

To support this point, some broad historical context is in order. Zolberg’s landmark historical study of migration contends that prior to the development of modern transportation and communications, typically, very few persons left their countries of origin.\(^{55}\) Even these migrants customarily had some pre-existing connection to the country of migration. Moreover, migrants generally met relatively little resistance at the port of entry.\(^{56}\) Zolberg notes that great “powers” such as France and Great Britain liberally admitted migrants from their broader colonial empires.\(^{57}\) The overall thrust of his historical analysis is clear: generally, the numbers of migrants were small, and admission policies were liberal. There was little need for a complicated system to determine which migrants merited admission. This was particularly true in the U.S., which has been singularly welcoming to migrants.\(^{58}\)


\(^{53}\) Id.


\(^{55}\) Introduction to Zolberg, supra note 54.

\(^{56}\) It bears emphasis that post-entry, migrants often found significant hostility in adjusting to their new homes. Id at 50.

\(^{57}\) Even other empires that proved more resistant to long-term migration, such as the Germans, liberally admitted short-term migrants according to their economic dictates. The Germans typically denied migrants long-term membership. For a discussion of the historical German approach to migrants, see e.g., Patrick Weil, All or Nothing? What the United States Can Learn from Europe at http://database.gmfus.org/rs/ct.aspx?ct=24F76C1FD6E40AEDC1D180ACD22F921ADCBE5588F8A252DA2349D5444994EE21FC480CCED0D813CA335D773AA95658FE9FEA874847170E4EFF895E528EA32B9BC0599DFB0600D5A3404D276334C62FA51D8F2756E6638A3D1257F04 (German Marshall Fund, last visited January 10, 2011).

\(^{58}\) Zolberg, supra note 54 at 57. Professor Neuman’s historical analysis of American immigration law suggests a different interpretation than Zolberg’s of the development of the rules governing U.S. immigration. His work discusses the
All this changed in the 20th Century. The World Bank has argued that a defining feature of the 20th Century was that people started to move at previously unparalleled levels. With unprecedented levels of migration, came domestic political resistance to new migrants in diverse countries. Social and economic pressures (from the Great Depression to nativist political parties and so forth) culminated in a similar outcome in different states: more stringent rules across the board in an effort to stem the flow of new migrants.

Yet even so, prior to the relatively recent development of the modern state, it was difficult for the state to locate, exclude and deport undesirable migrants. As a practical matter of limited state capacity, overwhelmingly, states focused on ex-ante screening. The U.S. was no different. If deportation was hardly a realistic policy option for a young country with a still poorly developed state, it was much better to determine whether a migrant was inadmissible ex ante.

In the early 20th century, this changed. Why the new focus on ex post screening? Among many possible factors, a structural change in the nature of migration appears to be the primary factor. For most of U.S. history, migrants were overwhelmingly documented entrants who came through seaports. The nature of migration changed with increasing numbers of undocumented migrants from Mexico and Central America crossing at land borders, which were much more

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59 The World Bank has argued in a recent annual report that worldwide labor mobility trends will lead migration to remain at the center of contentious political debates worldwide. See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2006: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF REMITTANCES AND MIGRATION 72 (2009). In the last three decades, the population of migrants in high income countries has doubled, registering an annual growth rate of 3%. WORLD BANK, supra, at 26–27. Migrants now constitute nearly 2.9% of the population worldwide, and 8.3% of the population of industrialized countries. Id. See generally LANT PRITCHETT, LET THEIR PEOPLE COME: BREAKING THE GRIDLOCK ON GLOBAL LABOR MOBILITY (2006).

60 WORLD BANK, supra note 59, at 26–27.

61 Id.

62 Zolberg, supra note 54 at 70.

63 Id.

64 Id.
difficult to police than sea ports. In the face of this type of migration, an exclusive focus on ex ante exclusion became anachronistic.

Ex post screening offered an alternative strategy. However, even after ex post screening measures developed, there was minimal ex post screening of the highly skilled until relatively recently, with a significant spike in ex post screening after 9/11.

b. Ex post screening as the dominant strategy

Ex post screening is no longer just an alternative strategy. It is now arguably the primary mechanism of immigration enforcement. The evidence is significant: immigration authorities currently expend more resources on ex post screening than on ex ante screening. Consider, for example, the burgeoning federal law enforcement focus on “crimmigration,” that is, the prosecution and deportation of aliens who commit crime. Immigration cases now constitute the majority of all federal criminal prosecutions. Additionally, the increased emphasis

65 The landmark work in this regard has been conducted by Douglas Massey at the Office of Population Research at Princeton University, who has analyzed Mexican migratory patterns over the last century. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, JORGE DURAND & NOLAN J. MALONE, BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (2002); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, BORDERLINE MADNESS: AMERICA’S COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IMMIGRATION POLICY, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 129 (CAROL SWAIN, ed. 2008).

66 See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 811.

67 This point is well made in a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. See “Security Controls on the Access of Foreign Scientists and Engineers to the United States,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Commission on Scientific Communications and National Security (http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,1921).


69 Cox and Posner do not utilize the word “crimmigration,” which has gained greater currency since the publication of their article. However, they clearly reference the increasing utilization of federal enforcement resources to identify and deport aliens who have committed relatively minor crimes. See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 813. For an excellent summary of the data concerning the significant increase in federal immigration prosecutions, see David Sklansky, CRIME IMMIGRATION AND AD HOC INSTRUMENTALISM (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
on post-entry screening is reflected in the fact that immigration law often treats post-entry criminal behavior (in the U.S.) much more harshly than equivalent pre-entry behavior criminal behavior (in a migrant’s country of origin). Indeed, a conviction that is not a ground for excluding a first-time arriving alien may well constitute grounds for deportation of a long-time permanent resident.

Cox and Posner’s singular contribution is to offer a “macro” bird’s eye view that provides critical context for this trend. In their view, a primary reason for this institutional bias for post-entry as opposed to pre-entry screening is information asymmetry. An alien must typically commit in her visa application to abide by the rules governing the visa in the event that she is eventually approved. A potential migrant will generally know more about herself and whether she will abide by the rules than a consular officer. The disproportionate focus on post-entry screening reflects the fact that the U.S. is often better able to access reliable information about aliens once they are in the country.

Questions of information asymmetry are most acute with respect to low-skilled aliens. The typical low skilled migrant lacks the traditional documentary mechanisms of credibly establishing that she is likely to be a law-abiding, productive contributor. She is less likely than the typical high-skilled applicant, to provide traditional and tangible evidence of traits that are proxies for desirable “type” (such as


See generally Legomsky, supra note 68 at 480.

Id.

See e.g., DS-156: Department of State Visa Application, available at https://evisaforms.state.gov/ds156.asp.

See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 811. I also discuss this issue in detail in a previous contribution. See Brown, supra note 3, at 2488.

Id.

Id.

Brown, supra note 3, at 2499.
graduation certificates). Moreover, the typical low-skilled migrant comes from a developing country with poorly-resourced and sometimes corrupt public institutions. Thus, individual-level constraints are augmented by nationwide resource and governance constraints, which undermine a potential migrant’s efforts to provide evidence (such as credible police reports) from the authorities of her inclination to play by the rules. Thus, the resource challenges of the developing world augment the challenges of information collection. In summary, ex post screening mitigates these challenges.

c. Cox and Posner’s oversight

Cox and Posner’s analysis is generally positive as opposed to normative. That is, they are generally concerned with illuminating which factors lead to immigration screening choices, as opposed to criticizing these choices. Thus, they are generally agnostic as to whether a state should typically pursue ex ante or ex post screening. However, they come closest to critiquing the disproportionate focus on ex post screening when it comes to migrants with elite credentials. The information asymmetry rationale is less compelling for skilled migrants.

In contrast to their low-skilled counterparts, the educational elite are well-placed to provide tangible proxies that they have been law-abiding, productive community members in their country of origin, such as university diplomas, professional affiliations and evidence of business ownership. Indeed, this is precisely why other jurisdictions such as Canada and Australia have been able to develop “points” systems, which reward highly skilled migrants with expedited visa access. Not only are highly skilled migrants able to provide

77 Id.
78 The World Bank annual report details the relevant characteristics of this population that pose difficulties in screening. See WORLD BANK, supra note 59, at 57–58.
79 Id.
80 See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 815.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id
documentary evidence of their academic, professional, and business credentials. In the modern age of information technology, the DHS, working with the State Department, can easily verify an elite applicant’s credentials, even thousands of miles away in India or China. Consequently, the U.S., like its other developed-country counterparts has access to highly detailed, fine-grained information about the highly skilled, irrespective of where they live. Accordingly, the U.S. has less justification for their ex post focus.87

There is another reason that Cox and Posner are disturbed by the disproportionate ex post focus. Historically, U.S. migration has involved an implicit long-term contract, which has been termed “immigration as contract.”88 If persons are well-behaved, they are generally viewed as “Americans in waiting” and are eligible for long-term membership through naturalization. An emphasis on ex post screening (with the corresponding “sanction” of deportation)90 implies that the U.S. may later revoke this implicit contract. Herein lies the dilemma: risk-averse, but talented high-skilled persons who are ideal migrants may decline to migrate to the U.S. More bluntly put, why should a computer programmer invest in migration to (and assimilation into) the U.S., when she may later be found to be an...

85 Id.
86 Id.
87 The phrase “immigration as contract” has been heavily utilized by Motomura. See generally HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING (2006). See also Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 815.
89 Id.
90 One might question the basis on which deportation might reasonably be construed as a sanction. If an alien does not abide by the terms of her visa, and the host country deports her, why is this not simply an enforcement of a contractual obligation that the alien agreed to (as a condition of her visa) in the first place? Indeed, there is a longstanding debate in the immigration law literature as to whether deportation should in fact be viewed as a punishment. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (holding that “an order of deportation is not a punishment for crime”); cf. Legomsky, supra note 68(arguing that theories of deportation overlap so substantially with those of criminal punishment that deportation should at least sometimes be regarded as a form of punishment).
inappropriate “type” and subject to deportation? Why not go instead to Canada?

There is significant evidence that skilled migrants contribute disproportionately to U.S. economic growth. Additionally, their children are also likely to be highly productive. For example, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman discusses the children of skilled immigrants who dominate the Spelling Bee and Intel Science competitions, and ultimately go on to work and form high tech companies. While a broad array of lobby groups agree that successful global recruitment of the highly skilled is essential to long-term U.S. economic growth, an institutional framework not well-suited to such recruitment continues to undermine efforts to recruit highly skilled immigrants.

Cox and Posner appear sensitive to these concerns; they are conscious of and disinclined to contribute further to this poor institutional framework. Thus, they express a preference for ex ante screening in the context of the highly-skilled. In their words, “the main

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92 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 19.
93 This point is made by Cuellar. See Cuellar, supra note 49.
94 See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 815.
95 Id.
advantage of the ex ante system is that it reduces the risk faced by potential immigrants that they will be deported, so that risk-averse noncitizens are more likely to enter and invest in the country than they are under the ex post system.”

This Essay points out a critical oversight in Cox and Posner’s framework: they do not discuss the importance of targeted ex post mechanisms of screening the highly skilled. Why is this problematic? U.S. immigration policy currently finds itself on the horns of a dilemma. While the highly skilled are clearly critical to U.S. economic growth, terrorist networks have stepped up their recruiting among the highly skilled. Moreover, the highly skilled are also most likely to gain access to the U.S. They are also singularly well-prepared to execute terrorist attacks.

The bottom line: While Cox and Posner are correct in stating that ex ante screening may be more appropriate for elites, ex post screening is still critical. What is needed is a targeted mechanism of ex post screening that meets U.S. security concerns, while not undermining efforts to recruit the best and the brightest. In the next section, I consider how this goal might be accomplished through the lens of Abdulmutallab and other highly skilled terrorist subjects.

Part II: Abdulmutallab

a. A Note on Methodology

A word on methodology is in order. In this section, my primary subject is Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian “Underwear” bomber, and elite engineering graduate who received a multiple-year, multiple-entry visitor’s visa. As a Nigerian national, Abdulmutallab would have been required to submit his visa application at a U.S. consulate in Nigeria. This requirement is stipulated by the State Department Visa Rules. See http://nigeria.usembassy.gov/non-immigrant_visas.html

96 Id.
97 This requirement is stipulated by the State Department Visa Rules. See http://nigeria.usembassy.gov/non-immigrant_visas.html

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Nigeria on both an ex ante and ex post basis? I consider how the consular authorities might have “filled in the blanks.”

Typically, visa-files are not available for public view. Moreover, for obvious reasons, subsequent law enforcement interviews with terror suspects are classified. Thus, I am only able to create a rough re-enactment of what a subject’s visa-file might have contained. In an effort to find an ideal subject, I created a narrow list of potential subjects, including only elites who had either carried out or attempted to carry out a terrorist attack. In order to further narrow down this list, I interviewed persons with national security expertise. While Abdulmutallab was not a long-term migrant, repeatedly, he was recommended by such experts as a subject choice.

This recommendation primarily arises from the fact that Abdulmutallab was the subject of extensive reporting, by not only the Western press, but also the Nigerian press. It appears that Nigerian journalists were able to access on-the-ground sources, which were more difficult for foreign correspondents to find. Why is this relevant? Notably, it was the Nigerian (as opposed to the U.S.) press, which first reported that Abdulmutallab’s father had visited the U.S. consulate repeatedly to raise concerns about his son. Nigerian journalists have been essential to Western media outlets (and indeed to this Essay). In comparison to other countries from which elite terror suspects have originated, such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt, Nigeria is more highly ranked on indices of press freedom. This perhaps enabled more rigorous on-the-ground reporting, particularly in the subject’s tightly-

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98 It bears emphasis: Abdulmutallab was not admitted as a long-term immigrant. Cox and Posner’s primary focus is on mechanisms of screening immigrants (that is, persons who are admitted for long-term residence and possibly citizenship). However, they point out that their analytical framework is also applicable to the challenges of admitting temporary guests such as Abdulmutallab. Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 813–14.
99 See e.g., Dora Akunyulim, Mutallab is a Stranger, NEXT (an online Nigerian news consolidator), Dec. 28, 2009, http://234next.com/csp/cms/sites/Next/News/5503108-147/Mutallab_is_a_stranger, Dora_Akunyili.csp. (consolidating a variety of Nigerian newspaper outlets which reported that Father Mutallab had visited the U.S. consulate repeatedly to voice his concerns).
knit Muslim community. This has typically not occurred in other terror suspects’ home countries.

Moreover my research was also aided considerably by extensive reporting by European news outlets. What accounts for their interest? Although Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate a bomb on a U.S. bound flight, he could just have made a similar attempt in the European Union (“E.U.”) given his easy access to several E.U. countries. Indeed, Abdulmutallab boarded the U.S. bound flight in the Netherlands. Moreover, he had previously received multiple E.U. (Schengen) visas, which authorized admission to many E.U. member states. Abdulmutallab had also previously received a U.K. student visa. It appears that only one state – the U.K. – rejected his application for visa renewal (presumably on the basis of ex post screening, since he had previously received a visa). Thus, in several different jurisdictions, journalists were seeking to determine why their own immigration authorities had failed to successfully screen him. This accounts for the availability of detailed news accounts which allowed me to assemble a rough reconstruction of information that might have been missing from his visa file.

b. Abdulmutallab’s Visa Application

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100 See the 2009 Index of Press Freedom published by Reporters without Borders. While Nigeria is still in the bottom half, it is clearly more highly ranked than all the other countries mentioned. See Reporters Without Borders, 2009 Press Freedom Index at http://en.rsf.org/spip.php?page=classement&id_rubrique=1001.

101 The Netherlands is a signatory to the Schengen Agreement, a treaty (signed near the town of Schengen in Luxembourg), between five of the ten member states of the European Economic Community. The Treaty created the Schengen Area through the complete abolition of border controls between Schengen states, common rules on visas, and police and judicial cooperation. Thus, in order to gain admissions to the Netherlands, Abdulmutallab needed a Schengen visa. See European Commission: Home Affairs, Schengen Area at http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/borders/borders_schengen_en.htm.

102 Additionally, his family’s extensive ties to the U.K. enabled particularly detailed reporting by the British press. In contrast to the family and friends of other would-be bombers, Abdulmutallab’s network of family and friends appear to have been more cooperative with the press.
A consideration of Abdulmutallab’s network is enlightening. He went to one of Africa’s most exclusive private schools, the British School of Togo, to which very few Africans gain admission, and which even fewer can afford to attend. He studied there for the prestigious International Baccalaureate examination. While he was denied admission to Stanford University, he did well sufficiently well in his high school examinations, to attend the University of London’s highly selective engineering program. While there, he achieved an honors engineering degree. In London, he lived in a family apartment in one of the city’s chicest districts. He was surrounded by relatives and friends who were part of a tightly knit group of rich Nigerian expatriates in London.

Abdulmutallab had a multiple-entry, multiple-year visitor’s visa, also known as the B-2 visa. Although this visa-category is in principle available to any Nigerian national who is not a visa-overstay or security risk, in practice the documentary requirements are so stringent that only a tiny minority of elite Nigerians are typically eligible. In the Nigerian context, Abdulmutallab achieved what a...

103 Gardham et al., supra note 30.
105 Id.
106 Id.
108 Gardham et al., supra note 30.
109 A B-2 visa is granted to a foreigner seeking to enter the U.S. for tourism purposes. See INA § 214 (b). The Nigerian Information Minister noted that he “sneaked into” Nigeria, implying that the Nigeria security forces were on alert and would have detained him if he had stopped in Nigeria. See Akunyulim, supra note 99.
110 While approximately 68% of Nigerian applicants for non-immigrant visas are approved, against a background in which most Nigerians express positive views of the U.S. and a desire to travel to the U.S., very few Nigerians actually apply for visas suggesting that either that the airplane and visa application fees are prohibitive or the documentation requirements are widely perceived to be difficult. See summary Pew poll of Nigerian attitudes to the U.S. at http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=264. The percentage of...
former Ambassador has termed an exclusive badge of honor – namely a U.S. visa.\footnote{111}

In the aftermath of Abdulmutallab’s attempted bombing, DHS was accused of having missed important clues while screening.\footnote{112} The U.S. presumably had many mechanisms of verifying Abdulmutallab’s bona fides. His ties to formal institutions were well documented, his family was prominent, and he was well known at his schools.\footnote{113} He appears to have had a detailed paper trail.

The centrality of contesting claims regarding the ease of screening the young Mutallab obscures an important point - in this particular

Nigerians with non-immigrant visas is miniscule. See a summary of the figures, STATE DEPARTMENT, ADJUSTED VISA REFUSAL RATES at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/FY08.pdf. In 2008, 31,000 Nigerians received non-immigrant visas. See STATE DEPARTMENT, NON IMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/FY08AnnualReportTableXVII.pdf. This is a tiny percentage of the general population. Approximately 0.03% of Nigerians applied for non-immigrant visas and 0.02% were approved. To provide some context as to what a miniscule percentage of the Nigerian population has non-immigrant visas, consider the similar rates for Jamaica, another developing country. Although Jamaica is a much smaller country with 1.7% of Nigeria’s population and has similar visa-approval rates, a much higher percentage of Jamaicans apply for (and thus receive) non-immigrant visas. For example, in 2008, approximately, 64% of non-immigrant Jamaican visa applicants received non-immigrant visas. STATE DEPARTMENT, ADJUSTED VISA REFUSAL RATES. http://travel.state.gov/pdf/FY08.pdf. 45,000 Jamaicans received non-immigrant visas. See STATE DEPARTMENT, NON IMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED, http://travel.state.gov/pdf/FY08AnnualReportTableXVII.pdf. However, since Jamaica only has a population of 2.7 million people, 1.6% of Jamaicans were recipients of non-immigrant visas in 2008. See generally, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, NO COYOTE NEEDED (2006) at http://www.cis.org/us_visas_still_easy_to_get.html.

This view was expressed by the Former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, John Campbell. See infra text accompanying note 151 (“Nigerian elites relish the opportunity to travel to the U.S. and to own property there.”)


Stolberg, supra note 112
context, screening raises peculiar concerns. Since even applicants for temporary tourist visas are presumed under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) to have immigrant intent, the burden is on the average applicant to prove that she is coming to the U.S. temporarily and does not intend to abandon her country of origin. As such, the typical visa recipient must successfully demonstrate significant ties to her country of origin and financial assets to support herself while visiting the U.S.

As evidence of home-country ties, Abdulmutallab’s visa application would typically have noted his extensive family in Nigeria. As evidence of his ability to support himself while in the U.S., it would undoubtedly have noted his family’s significant asset base, including major shareholdings in several companies and valuable real estate in the E.U. and the U.S. Further evidence of non-immigrant intent would be his history of travel without visa-overstays. Moreover, his previous studies at an elite boarding school and at an elite engineering program would also be relevant since it would typically be difficult for well-educated persons to work as undocumented aliens in the U.S.

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114 See INA §§ 101, 214 (a)(1) (“The admission to the United States of any alien as a nonimmigrant shall be for such time and under such conditions as the Attorney General may by regulations prescribe . . . to insure that at the expiration of such time or upon failure to maintain the status under which he was admitted, or to maintain any status subsequently acquired under section 248 , such alien will depart from the United States. . . . ]; (b) Every alien 10/ (other than a nonimmigrant described in subparagraph (L) or (V) of section 101(a)(15), and other than a nonimmigrant described in any provision of section 101(a)(15)(H)(i) except subclause (b1) of such section) shall be presumed to be an immigrant until he establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer, at the time of application for a visa, and the immigration officers, at the time of application for admission, that he is entitled to a nonimmigrant status.”)

115 See also U.S. Department of State, Visitor Visa- Business and Pleasure, available at http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/types_1262.html, (“The presumption in the law is that every visitor visa applicant is an intending immigrant. Therefore, applicants for visitor visas must overcome this presumption by demonstrating that: The purpose of their trip is to enter the U.S. for business, pleasure, or medical treatment; That they plan to remain for a specific, limited period; Evidence of funds to cover expenses in the United States; Evidence of compelling social and economic ties abroad; and That they have a residence outside the U.S. as well as other binding ties that will insure their return abroad at the end of the visit.”)
Indeed, on the basis of a typical ex ante screen, Abdulmutallab would not have looked substantially different than any other well-educated and wealthy Nigerian. As one interview subject pointed out, without the benefit of hindsight bias, Abdulmutallab’s profile is not substantially different than that of Adebayo Ogunlesi, another well-educated Nigerian national who first came to the U.S. as a young man. He subsequently went on to graduate from Harvard Business School, become an Editor of the Harvard Law Review, a Supreme Court clerk and Vice-Chairman of Credit Suisse. Indeed, Ogunlesi is precisely the sort of elite that Cox and Posner are worried about deterring. Moreover, Abdulmutallab’s profile is not discernibly different from many other well-educated Nigerians who now constitute the largest group of foreign-trained doctors in the U.S. How could a visa-officer be reasonably expected to differentiate Abdulmutallab from this pool?

Moreover, Abdulmutallab reminds us that the profiles of elite visa-recipients may change in critical ways after they first receive their visas. What the consular offer could not have anticipated is Abdulmutallab’s time at a religious training institute in Yemen run by an American imam, whose role in training terrorists is apparently so significant that his assassination has been authorized by President Obama. A consular officer would also not have anticipated his leadership role of a student Islamic society that was well-known for inviting radical speakers to his London university campus.

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116 See infra text accompanying note 168.
117 This point was made to me in an interview with the Nigerian-American journalist and Daily Beast contributor, Dayo Olapode who herself wrote about Abdulmutallab. See http://www.time.com/time/2002/globalinfluentials/gbiogunlesi.html (discussing the elite credentials of Adebayo Ogunlesi).
118 Nigerian nationals have now surpassed Indian nationals as the largest number of foreign trained doctors in the U.S. Source: Speech of Nigerian Finance Minister, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala to the Bank of Nova Scotia, February, 2006.
Although elites are typically in a much better position than non-elite visa applicants to submit detailed paper trails, screening on an *ex ante* basis is complicated by the fact that their resources allow them to obscure “red flags,” such as travel to countries on terrorist watch lists. For example, Abdulmutallab’s passport bore no Yemeni entry stamp although he traveled there repeatedly, presumably because he had the resources to bribe Yemeni immigration officials.\(^\text{121}\) He is likely to have omitted this information from any application for U.S. visa-renewal. Indeed, this was also true of the would-be Times Square bomber, Shahzad. He was able to obscure another clear “red flag,” namely, his repeated trips to an al Qaeda stronghold in Pakistan.

The bottom line: These facts reinforce the critical nature of Cox and Posner’s omission. Aliens, like all people, are not static personalities. Both Abdulmutallab and Shahzad’s profiles changed such that they no longer matched the US visa “types;” they underwent extreme radicalization only *after* they received their first U.S. visas. Thus, they would probably not have been excluded through ex ante screening.

Arguably it is precisely because of this challenge that in the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. panicked and “overreached,” in its ex post screening of elites.\(^\text{122}\) In addition to plentiful stories of Muslim elites whose visa-applications were delayed or denied, there emerged myriad narratives of revocations of the visas of elites *subsequent* to their acceptance of positions in the U.S.\(^\text{123}\) Indeed, U.S. universities

\[^{121}\text{Lipton and Shane, supra note 112.}\]
\[^{122}\text{For the best summary of this data, see B. Lindsay Lowell, et. al, Foreign Students Coming to the U.S., The Impact of Policy, Procedures and Economic Competition, , INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY (2007), available at http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/isim/Publications/SloanMaterials/Foreign%20Students%20Coming%20to%20America.pdf; see also Center for Strategic and International Studies, supra note 71.}\]
\[^{123}\text{While there were several cases, the most prominent case was that of Tariq Ramadan, the Swiss-Egyptian scholar who accepted an endowed Chair at Notre Dame, prior to the revocation of his visa. A good summary of the exclusion of several Muslim elites including Ramadan is included in George Packer, Comment: Keep Out, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 16, 2006, at 59, available at http://www.newyorker.com/printables/talk/061016ta talk packer (discussing the visa-revocation of several prominent Muslims including Ramadan whose visa was}
asserted that they were losing recruits, because scholars were unwilling to subject themselves to the stigma of potential visa revocation, a problem that they also experienced during the McCarthy era. Such criticism of the post 9/11 dragnet reinforces the point that screening must be narrow and targeted. Mohammed Atta is one engineer of Middle Eastern origin. Another is Pierre Omidyar, the Founder of eBay. It is unclear that such dragnets distinguish between the Attas and the Omidyars of this world. With these sorts of screening techniques, could the next immigrant Nobel Laureate would end up elsewhere?

What is needed is a targeted mechanism of ex post screening that meets U.S. security concerns, while not undermining efforts to recruit the best and the brightest. The question then becomes, how could the authorities have accessed the relevant information? This is the subject of the next section.

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125 In the aftermath of 9/11, the then competent immigration authority, the Immigration and Naturalization service provided information to the FBI which allowed them to detain university students of Middle Eastern origin for additional inspection in what was widely viewed as a “dragnet.” See Lowell et al., supra note 122.

126 Indeed, one paper contends that domestic restrictions on civil rights have been shown to reduce elite migration to the U.S. See David Karem et. al, “A Gravity Model Analysis of International Migration to North America,” APPLIED ECONOMICS, 32(13): 1745-55 (2000).
c. The Situation Then and Now

In the months following 9/11, detailed hearings laid bare the historical difficulty that the U.S. had in penetrating terrorist networks. 127 Much was made of the failures of human intelligence. 128 Most disturbing was the fact that many of the 9/11 hijackers appeared to be operating in the clear light of day. These young engineers were widely recognized in their universities, their mosques, and more broadly in their communities. Although they were typically described as middle-class Saudis, there was little doubt that they were educational elites. They had graduated from elite Saudi universities with highly technical engineering degrees. Many people had reason to know their tendencies towards radicalism and notably, no one had snitched.

Fast forward to the present. Nearly ten years after 9/11, it is apparent that Al Qaeda and its affiliates have attempted to move “up” the food chain by attracting even more elite participants. 129 The list of recent high profile suicide bombers reads like a “who’s who” of elites in their countries of origin. Consider, for example, the following persons.

Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi, the Al-Qaeda affiliated suicide bomber who killed several CIA operatives in Afghanistan, was a highly regarded doctor who placed very well in the Jordanian national exams. 130 His wife was a Turkish author of some repute. 131 Indeed, he

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128 See Editorial, Eight Years Later, supra note 127.
129 However, it is appears that Abdulmutallab was a shadow of Mohammed Atta, the central 9/11 bomber, in his effectiveness.
was sufficiently well-known to Jordanian elites, to have a working relationship with the highest level of Jordanian intelligence, including a member of the Jordanian royal family.\textsuperscript{132} His radical tendencies were well known.\textsuperscript{133}

Omar Sheikh, the mastermind of the beheading of Wall Street Journal reporter, Daniel Pearl and a financial supporter of the 9/11 attacker Mohammed Atta, was from a rich Pakistani-British family.\textsuperscript{134} He studied at a prestigious British boarding school.\textsuperscript{135} Indeed, he represented Britain in the International Athletic World Championships, achieved top grades in the Cambridge-administered high-school exams and studied at the prestigious LSE.\textsuperscript{136} As with the other subjects, the signs were there.\textsuperscript{137} Again, no one snitched.\textsuperscript{138}

The key is to provide incentives for persons with better information and access to accomplish U.S. goals. The U.S. already does this in a competent manner when critical foreign policy goals are at stake. As the next section contends, it’s simply a matter of motivating the right people, namely, repeat-game players who need to visit the U.S.

\textit{d. Outsourced Diplomacy: Motivating the Right People}

On June 28, 2009, President Manuel Zelaya of Honduras was exiled following an internal coup. In the months subsequent to the coup, the U.S. repeatedly expressed the view that the coup was inconsistent with

\begin{itemize}
\item[133] Id.
\item[135] Id.
\item[136] Id.
\item[138] Id.
\end{itemize}
the constitutional obligations of the Honduran government. The U.S. refused to recognize the interim government, and encouraged the interim President Roberto Micheletti (and presumed coup-plotter) to come to the negotiating table. For months, the Micheletti administration refused to negotiate, and failed to respond to a series of U.S. efforts to ratchet up the pressure, including the cancellations of the visas of government ministers.

Then suddenly, members of the Honduran business elite found that their visas had been revoked. Even a cursory network map confirms that the subjects of the visa-revocations were all businesspersons with close relationships to Micheletti. The revocations were targeted and strategic. The implicit message was clear. They should utilize their influence to bring their government to the negotiating table or face the prospect of having their visas revoked indefinitely.

The visa revocations appear to have stung particularly hard, causing some shame among Honduran elites. These Honduran businesspersons are quintessential “repeat game” players with the

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140 Id.
142 Letter from Honduras, supra note 139; see also Gone South, supra note 141.
143 Letter from Honduras, supra note 139 (reporting that Honduras government is reportedly heavily influenced by ten business families, all of which appeared to be critics of Zelaya and, as such, implicit supporters of the coup).
144 See Gone South, supra note 141 (“[T]he coup leaders seemed privately stunned by the firmness of the American reaction . . . [t]hey seemed especially hurt by the revocation of their U.S. visas. This would not have happened if Republicans were still in power, they seemed to feel. After all, they had overthrown Zelaya partly in the name of anti-Communism . . . Did the U.S. no longer recognize its friends? The coup regime’s first foreign minister called Obama, in a TV interview, “that little black man who doesn’t know anything”—and that is a bland translation”), but see Letter from Honduras, supra note 46 at 42 (in which a prominent Honduran business leader takes pains to make clear that his visa has not been revoked.)
U.S.\textsuperscript{145} Their businesses export to the U.S.\textsuperscript{146} They utilize U.S.-based correspondent banks. Their children often study in the U.S.\textsuperscript{147} Given these extensive business and familial networks in the U.S., visa-revocation effectively curtailed their ability to accomplish important personal and commercial objectives. It could not have been lost on them that the U.S. had the ability to make their lives substantially more difficult if the Micheletti government did not negotiate. Again using game theoretic analogies, individuals with a high degree of dependence on the U.S. have maximal incentives to comply with U.S. diplomatic objectives, since the costs of defection are obviously high.

Indeed, the U.S. has utilized similar techniques to accomplish diplomatic goals with respect to Cuba. For example, prestigious hotel chains were operating hotels on properties, which were the subject of legal proceedings following their expropriation from Cuban-Americans by the Castro regime.\textsuperscript{148} Although the hotel chains were not parties to the legal proceedings and simply tenants on the properties now “owned” by the Cuban government, the U.S. revoked the visas of the hotels’ principals.\textsuperscript{149} The hoteliers quickly terminated their leases, thereby depriving the Cuban administration of needed lease revenue.\textsuperscript{150} Since these hoteliers were multinational chains that were heavily dependent on American tourists in other markets, they understood that their business model could have been greatly compromised if they continued to do business with Cuba. That is, they too had minimal incentives to counter the U.S.

\textsuperscript{145}This relationship calls to mind a classic iterated prisoners’ dilemma, in which the game is played repeatedly. In contrast to a conventional prisoners’ dilemma, in which defection is always more beneficial than cooperation, in an iterated prisoners’ dilemma, which is played over several games, each player has an opportunity to sanction the other player for prior non-cooperative behavior. Cooperation may arise as an equilibrium outcome since the incentive to defect may be outweighed by the threat of sanction. See JOEL WATSON, STRATEGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY ch. 1 (2002) (providing a good summary for the nontechnical reader).

\textsuperscript{146}See Letter from Honduras, supra at 139 (describing the business successes of elite Honduran families).

\textsuperscript{147}Id. at 42 (describing how many rich Hondurans panicked in the chaotic aftermath of the coup, and sought to send their children to the U.S.)


\textsuperscript{149}Id.

\textsuperscript{150}Id.
In Honduras, the U.S. succeeded. In Cuba, the U.S. did not (although it did accomplish the more modest goal of depriving the Cuban administration of needed revenue). Honduras came to the bargaining table quickly. The process was undoubtedly accelerated by the intervention of businesspersons who had better information about their government than the U.S. and were better placed to apply pressure to their President. The U.S. effectively “contracted out” their diplomatic functions.

Admittedly, there are clear differences between the Cuban and Honduran instances of “outsourced diplomacy” and this proposal. In both the Cuban and Honduran cases, the target group was small. The threat of visa revocations pressured specific visa holders to take a specific action. That is, there was a direct and non-nebulous connection between the goal in question and the visa holders in question. Additionally, even though this Essay’s proposal is focused on a relatively small group of elites who inhabit the apices of their societies, it clearly involves a much broader target group (i.e., associates of as-yet-unidentified elites who may carry out terrorist acts). Thus, the connection between the target group and the desired outcome is clearly more tenuous.

Notwithstanding these differences, the central lesson of outsourced diplomacy is still germane to the challenge of identifying which elites with U.S. visas may carry out a terrorist attack. Individuals care what their peers think about them. Visas not only facilitate travel, they are status conveyers, and visa denial may undermine the status of the person who loses her visa.151 Thus, persons can be influenced to achieve U.S. goals by the strategic allocation and denial of visas. This is the subject of the next section.

151 Indeed, this view was expressed by John Campbell, Former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria and Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations with respect to members of the Nigerian elite. See testimony of John Campbell at a recorded hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb. 23, 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201002240888.html (last visited January 10, 2011) (“The power of the U.S. government to revoke visitors’ visas is particularly potent personal leverage with members of the Nigerian elite.”).
The U.S. currently finds itself in the absurd position of screening elite aliens utilizing poor information. Consular officers may have the standard information: curriculum vitae, bank records, professional affiliations, university diplomas. However, consular officers lack the nuanced information needed to read between the lines. For example, why was Abdulmutallab often missing classes at university? Given his strong academic performance, there would be nothing in his paper trail to indicate that he missed classes to frequent mosques that were known for radicalism.\textsuperscript{152} And why did he drop out of the elite business program in Dubai?\textsuperscript{153} Did he remain in Dubai or did he travel to Yemen? With the benefit of a few conversations with classmates and friends, the authorities would potentially have had access to credible information about his unusual behavior, even after they granted his visa.

Herein lies the paradox. Although terrorist groups are typically difficult for Westerners to penetrate, the same cannot be said of elite networks. Indeed, popular networking websites for elites such as “A Small World” are dedicated precisely to this idea.\textsuperscript{154} Yet, the information utilized to process visa applications is what I would term “insufficiently networked.” It is garnered with little reference to the networks in which aliens typically occupy, including networks of family, friends, high school classmates, university peers, business associates and tribal members. This is even as these network members are generally better information collectors than the U.S. government. After all, they are “on the ground” with the persons in question.

There is precedent for creating incentives for associates of would-be terrorists to share information. Indeed, this is precisely why Congress created the S visa, which provides long-term visas to those who offer

\textsuperscript{152} For a description of the dangers of extreme Islamic student societies, which often serve as a gateway to radicalism, see Venetia Thompson, \textit{supra} note 120.


\textsuperscript{154} \textbf{A Small World}, www.asmallworld.net (“a small world is a private community of internationally minded people from around the world” typically featuring stories about elites in business, education, government, the non-governmental sector and cultural from all five continents).
valuable intelligence information. But the S visa is not well-targeted to elites and it is elite cooperation that is essential. Given their privileged status in their own countries and their generally easy access to U.S. visa privileges, they are less likely than others to be attracted by the prospect of an S visa authorizing a long-term U.S. stay. Elites need a different kind of incentive. The U.S. has to threaten to take away something that they value.

Herein enters the power of association. Although the idea of social networks appears to be a modern concept, human beings have always

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155 One might wonder why this essay argues for a penalty rather than a positive incentive to encouraging informing. Such a positive incentive already exists. Thus, it is worth distinguishing this proposal from the S visa. This visa is awarded to persons who provide invaluable information to the U.S. government. The proposal in this essay is completely different, namely, a disincentive for not snitching rather than a reward for snitching (which is what the S visa provides). See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2 at 830-31 (2009). ("INA 101(a)(15)(S) authorizes nonimmigrant visas for certain individuals who are willing to share or have shared 'critical reliable information' about either a general criminal organization (so-called S5s) or a 'terrorist organization' (so-called S-6s). . . . Although the S-category had been a temporary program and had expired just two days after the September 11 attacks, Congress soon thereafter passed legislation to make the program permanent. Pub. L. 107-45, 115 Stat. 258 (Oct. 1, 2001). On Nov. 29, 2001, Att'y General Ashcroft wrote a memo launching the "Responsible Cooperators Program," in which he officially encouraged various Justice Department personnel to make liberal use of S-visas in "appropriate cases." In those instances in which a person who is willing to share important terrorism-related information is ineligible for an S-visa, the Att'y General urged the officials to consider parole or deferred action as an incentive for cooperation. See 78 IR at 1816-17 (Dec. 3, 2001).") There are also other visas that incentivize "snitching" including the following: the U and T visas. For a discussion of the U visa see LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2 at 411 ("The U-visas are for those who have 'suffered substantial physical or mental abuse' as the result of . . . rape, torture, trafficking, incest, domestic violence, sexual assault, prostitution, female genital mutilation, involuntary servitude, abduction, felonious assault, and several other criminal acts. The person must possess information concerning that criminal activity and must help law enforcement officials to investigate or prosecute. INA § 101(a)(15)(U).") For a discussion of the T visa see LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2 at 411 ("T visas are for victims of a 'severe form of trafficking in persons' who are physically present in the United States or a port of entry as a result of that trafficking. If age 18 or over, the person must comply with any reasonable request for assistance in the investigation or prosecution of the trafficking. INA § 101(a)(5)(T)")
been social creatures; we live, work and play in groups.¹⁵⁶ This basic intuition underlies much of modern life. Facebook’s extraordinary success is simply a manifestation of this intuition.¹⁵⁷ And yet, although this seems obvious, we have failed to take account of this intuition in how we grant and revoke visas to enhance national security.

The “visa to snitch” proposal is based on two major arguments, which will be succinctly referred to as the information-screening component and the sanctioning component. The information screening component argues that network members who are proximate to visa recipients may be motivated to share with officials inside information as to which persons are likely to be terrorist threats. The sanctioning component contends that astute officials can utilize soft rules, which leverage the ties within networks to send signals to network members about the costs associated with not sharing information that may be relevant to terrorist investigations.

The information-screening component contends that the U.S. should motivate network members to aid in both _ex ante_ and _ex post_ screening. That is, network members should be incentivized to share information in the initial screening process, that is, before visas are issued. But as importantly, they should also be provided with incentives to share such information even _after_ visa issuance. Thus, an elite visa-recipient would be sanctioned essentially for failing to report evidence of the transgressions of his peers even if these transgressions occurred _after_ the person had already received a visa. Why is this important? Some of Abdulmutallab’s associates admitted that although they found his behavior troubling, they had not raised an alarm since they took his student visa to constitute evidence that he had already been screened by competent authorities. Under this proposal, excuses such as these would not be acceptable.

### f. What’s the Appropriate Sanction?

¹⁵⁶ Granovetter’s landmark work popularized this concept. Mark Granovetter, _The Strength of Weak Ties_, 78 AM. J. OF SOC 1360 (1983).
Of course a “duty to snitch” must necessarily be accompanied by a sanction. Under “a visa to snitch,” the U.S. would penalize network members by revoking their visas (or at a minimum reducing the likelihood of visa renewal), if they cannot account for their failure to share pertinent information about a network member’s terrorist sympathies that it appears that they had reason to know. If not as a de jure matter, certainly as a de facto matter, elites typically have access to immigration privileges that are not normally available to their fellow nationals. In exchange for this privilege, recipients of elite visa access should understand that there are implicit duties.

This proposal has clear resemblances to collective sanctioning systems, where community members are sanctioned for the sins of their communal peers. Historically collective sanctions have been employed effectively to improve compliance in a variety of informal arenas in which formal structures for the collection of information were either not present or insufficient. Although such resemblances are thin as opposed to thick, this point should be conceded. Collective sanctioning systems have generally been criticized for failing to abide by the principle that individual wrongdoers should pay for their individual transgressions and, thus raise significant justice concerns.

158 The support for this claim with respect to Nigerian nationals is included in footnote 110.

Beyond the law review literature, the economics literature also has an extensive discussion of functional rationales for collective sanctioning. For example, economic historians credit collective sanctioning for facilitating a commercial revolution in late medieval times by allowing long-distance commercial exchange between parties who had no prior knowledge of each other. See Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 525 (1993); Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. Econ. Hist. 857 (1989).
Thus, the question of the appropriateness of the penalty is delicate, particularly given that the signs of terrorist sympathies are often nebulous. Hence, the sanctioning principle emphasizes that sanctions should be “soft.” In so doing, I contrast it with sanctions that are typically experienced as “hard.” For example, the U.S. decision to subject all Nigerian travelers to significantly increased scrutiny (following Abdulmutallab’s bomb attempt) was understood by Nigerians as an affront to their national dignity and arguably qualifies as a “hard” sanction.\footnote{Akunyulim, supra note 99.}

It bears emphasis: signs of terrorist activity are often nebulous. Again, the case of the younger Mutallab is instructive. Take for example, his leadership of a university Islamic society that has been called a “hotbed of radicalism.”\footnote{Thompson, supra note 120.} With the benefit of hindsight commentators argued that this was a clear warning sign.\textsuperscript{162} However, it is not clear that this warning sign would have been evident to the average observer. Indeed, given historical context, the very designation of Abdulmutallab’s membership in a student group as a “red flag” may cause our antennas to go up. During the McCarthy era, many students were denied First Amendment protection as “radicals.”\textsuperscript{163} Anti-Vietnam student groups were investigated precisely because they were perceived as “hotbeds of radicalism”\textsuperscript{164} by the Nixon administration. Historians have subsequently judged such investigations to have been motivated by paranoia.\textsuperscript{165} Thus, there is a fine line between vigilance and paranoia. Leadership of a controversial student group does not necessarily signify a tendency to violence (although an Islamist

\footnote{For a summary of First Amendment challenges to McCarthyism in universities see E. SCHRECKER, NO IVORY TOWER: McCARTHYISM AND THE UNIVERSITIES , Introduction at 1-25 (1986); see also D. RAVITCH, THE TROUBLED CRUSADE: AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1945-1980 (1983) and D. CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR (1978) (all discussing the targeting of “radical” students and professors by different federal and state investigations)}

\footnote{Richard Nixon was famously of this view. See CHARLES EDWARD STEWART, INSIDE THE NIXON WHITE HOUSE 138 (2005).}

\textsuperscript{164} Id.\textsuperscript{165}
society is arguably of a different character than a Vietnam protest group).

Was his leadership of an Islamist student group relevant? Since several leaders of this particular student group have been indicted on terrorism charges, it appears that the answer is yes. Should his friends have subsequently been accountable for failing to alert the authorities to his leadership of this group? There is clearly a potential issue of hindsight bias: research on human judgment suggests that the typical subject has difficulty ignoring a known outcome when assessing an event's likelihood. Moreover, there is also the issue of what behavior we may reasonably expect the average non-expert network member to consider suspicious. While Abdulmutallab’s leadership of an Islamist society might have appeared relevant to an expert eye, this might not have been clear to a reasonable (but non-expert) network member.

This is precisely why prior to visa-revocation, the visa-recipient (who is suspected of not having shared pertinent information) should clearly have an opportunity to explain herself. Moreover, a soft approach in sanctioning is counseled by the fact that rather than simply imposing negative duties not to cause harm, the authorities would be imposing affirmative duties to prevent harm. The aim is to impose a soft sanction, that is, a penalty that is sufficiently tough to deter non-compliance, but not so tough as to undermine precisely the cooperation that one is trying to encourage.

166 Detroit Terror Attack, supra note 30.
167 Id.
169 I should note that most visa-holders would not typically be entitled to due process. “... [A]n unusual provision in the INA 104(a) exempts individual visa determinations from the supervision and control of the Secretary of State. [ . . . ] There is no procedure . . . that permits the applicant to appeal a visa refusal to some higher administrative authority.” T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP PROCESS AND POLICY 651 (2008).
Indeed, the INA already allows the authorities discretion to deny visas to individuals who are believed to have weak connections to terrorist networks, without providing them any opportunity to disabuse authorities of such suspicions. This proposal appears more reasonable, in that persons will be given an opportunity to explain themselves. The point is that there is an obvious line-drawing issue here, but it hardly different than the type of line-drawing issue that law enforcement officials regularly deal with in the course of many investigations. Given the inherently imprecise nature of terrorist sympathies, it will be incumbent on an official will take this into account in determining whether an associate of a suspect should reasonably have known or have reported her suspicions.

Notably, visa applications do not typically ask applicants to list associates. This is an interesting omission. During the Cold War, U.S. visa applicants were regularly asked to name their affiliations with Communist persons. The point is not to ally this proposal with the misguided methods of the McCarthy era, but simply to point out that this omission in the visa application could easily be remedied. In any event, it is unclear that the government would necessarily want to rely on references provided by the applicant. Savvy applicants would simply fail to list associates who might raise alarm. Moreover, even in the absence of associates provided by the applicant, modern network analysis (the subject of the next section) will allow the government to generate its own network list.

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170 See INA § 212 which declares that a person is not eligible for admission to the United States if they “commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support, including a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training . . . for the commission of a terrorist activity” INA § 212 (a) (3) (B). See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2 at 851 for a discussion of the controversy surrounding this provision.

171 See, e.g., John Scanlan, supra note 41 (discussing pre-emptive screening of visa-applicants for those with Communist affiliations); see also Application for Advance Permission to enter as a non-immigrant at www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-192instr.pdf (“Do not file this form if you are a visa applicant who is inadmissible under INA section 212(a)(4) (including “communist or other totalitarian party member.”)
g. Why the Solution Can Work

Given recent lessons from social network theory, finding the right people to shed light on potentially problematic visa-applicants is entirely practical. Although social network theory has only recently gained currency in the popular imagination as a consequence of the ubiquitousness of social networking sites, its insights are not new, drawing as they do from long-established precepts of sociology, anthropology, computer science and organizational behavior.

We can understand social network analysis as:

map(ping) and measur(ing) formal and informal relationships to understand what facilitates or impedes the knowledge flows that bind interacting units, viz., who knows whom and who shares what information and knowledge with whom by what communication media . . . Because these relationships are not usually readily discernable, social network analysis is somewhat akin to an “organizational x-ray.”

Network theory coupled with modern technology provides an easy mechanism of verifying which persons are members of a network. Again, Abdulmutallab is a case in question. Notably, he had 287 Facebook friends the day before his terrorist attack. Notably, after the incident, “the number (of Facebook friends) appeared to be falling

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172 Olivier Serrat, Social Network Analysis, KNOWLEDGE SOLUTIONS (a publication of the Asian Development Bank), Feb. 28, 2009, http://lrs.ed.uiuc.edu/TSE-portal/analysis/social-network-analysis/ (Social networks are defined as “[n]odes of individuals, groups, organizations, and related systems that tie in one or more types of interdependence: these include shared values, visions and ideas; social contacts, kinship, conflict; financial exchanges, trade, joint membership in organizations; and group participation in events, among numerous other aspects of human relationships.”)


fast.\textsuperscript{175} The point is that people care about which networks they are perceived to be a part of. Clearly, his Facebook friends did not want to be perceived as part of his network. However, ex post opportunistic electronic behavior could not eliminate the pre-existing electronic tracks. From reports in the blogosphere, it appears likely that many of these individuals have since been subject to questioning, whether they “unfriended” Abdulmutallab or not.\textsuperscript{176}

However, there is the problem of information overload. Who precisely is elite? The elite by definition are a group of relatively small size, occupying a position of privilege within a much larger society. But the question remains: which elites precisely should be targeted? There must be thousands (if not more cases) where persons exhibit troubling behaviors, which are unconnected to terrorist tendencies. Verifying the information provided will increase the time and expense required to process visas, but without verification the process seems pro forma. It would be difficult to sort out the truly useful information from the sea of not-so-useful information. How is the U.S. government going to sort through this potential flood of information?

I have resisted the inclination to identify, which particular categories of elites the proposal would apply to. This question is best left to technical experts with national security expertise. Even without the benefit of inside information, some mechanisms of classifying elites to reduce information overload are immediately apparent.\textsuperscript{177} For example, elite terrorists appear to be disproportionately likely to have science and engineering backgrounds. Similarly, elite terrorists seem to be disproportionately likely to come from particular regions of the world. The authorities might impose the obligation to snitch only on elites from those regions, in the interest of mitigating the problems of information overload. However, this would feed into a perception that the obligation falls disproportionately on Muslims or those of Middle Eastern origin. In the interest of not alienating precisely those elites

\textsuperscript{175} Id.
\textsuperscript{176} Id.
\textsuperscript{177} For example, in the Honduran context the persons who lost their visas were recipients of B 1 business visas, which enabled ease of targeting. The B-1 visa applies to non-citizens who are visiting the United States temporarily for business. \textit{See} INA 101(A)(15)(v); 22 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(1) (2006).
where cooperation is most needed, DHS might resist the tendency to categorize publicly, imposing the obligation on a much broader category of elites, even if they later focus on information provided by elites of particular nationalities.

Part III: Why did the elder Mutallab Snitch?

Background

A more detailed consideration of the elder Mutallab’s network is instructive. Umarmutallab was a former Nigerian Cabinet Minister and Chairman of one of Nigeria’s largest banks. He was a member of the Board of Directors of several publicly traded Nigerian firms. He was also particularly prominent in the Muslim community as the primary patron of a well-known mosque.

Umarmutallab is described as someone “whose friends cut across states, religion and sex.” In the words of a Nigerian commentator, “the older Mutallab benefitted from his deft positioning across an immense network of family, geo-ethnic and professional layers of interests. Consequently, the man has had a near permanent presence on Nigeria’s economic landscape as government official, banking

179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
investor, facilitator or shareholder –working the levers of power– all through civilian and military governments in Nigeria for more than 35 years.”183

a. Rational Motives

With the benefit of hindsight, Umarmutallab’s behavior appears to have been well thought out and highly planned. Irrespective of whether his larger strategic goals might have been to save his son’s life, maintain his mobility, protect his financial assets, or preserve his familial honor, tactically, he took several steps to achieve his broader goals.

Firstly, he utilized his private networks to signal disapproval of his son’s behavior. For example, the elder Mutallab withdrew financial support from his son.184 He did not hide this information; he shared his decision with family and close associates.185 In so doing, he made clear to his private networks that he disapproved of Abdulmutallab’s decision to relocate to Yemen while implicitly communicating that anyone else who offered support would incur his disapproval.

But notably, the elder Mutallab moved beyond these quintessentially private actions taken in private networks. Importantly, he took the much larger step of signifying his disapproval to the public authorities by snitching. He met with the Nigerian security officials at the highest levels.186 He sought their assistance in curtailing his son’s travel overseas and arranging his return to Nigeria.187

Thirdly, through Nigerian security officials, Umarmutallab arranged meetings with their American counterparts. He met with Embassy officials repeatedly, providing evidence of his son’s increasing radicalism including details of his travel to Yemen.188 He expressed particular concern that his son indicated in a telephone call that he did

183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Nossiter, supra note 31.
not expect to see his family again.\textsuperscript{189} Furthermore, the elder Mutallab reportedly met with a senior officer at the CIA.\textsuperscript{190} Through all these efforts, Umarmutallab indicated very clearly whose side he was on. Not only was he not providing support to a terrorist network, he also underlined that he was willing to help disrupt it.

Why did Umarmutallab snitch? Although commentators emphasized the heart-wrenching nature of the father’s decision to report his child to the authorities, the emotional nature of the decision does not preclude strategic behavior. Speculation as to the father’s motives in subsequent analyses has been rife. Motives are notoriously difficult to ascertain. Indeed, two millennia after Judas Ischariot snitched to the Romans,\textsuperscript{191} we are still speculating about what made him do it! Yet in this instance ascertaining potential motives may be fruitful to the extent that it helps us to provide incentives for similar behavior in the future.

Some may have a rather cynical view of Umarmutallab’s actions. As a very wealthy man with assets in many countries, he could hardly afford for these assets to be frozen simply because of the wayward actions of his son. As one relative noted, “[t]his is somebody who has investments in the Western world since before the boy was born . . . [h]e’s got a £4 million house in London. Now the boy is jeopardizing everything,”\textsuperscript{192} Moreover, he was necessarily dependent on global mobility to conduct his business. Snitching may have been a pre-emptive mechanism of protecting his mobility and his assets.

On this view, one could posit what might be broadly characterized as rational choice or welfarist accounts of Umarmutallab’s behavior. Simply put, on this account, Umarmutallab is a rational utility maximizer who has decided that he is most likely to maximize his welfare by snitching on his son. That is, when faced with the prospect of visa revocation and the potential freezing of his assets if the authorities suspected that he had provided financial support for his son’s attempted terrorist attack, he decided that he was simply better

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\textsuperscript{189} Id.
\textsuperscript{190} Nwangwu, \textit{supra} note 183.
\textsuperscript{191} \textit{Matthew} 27:3-8 (King James Bible).
\textsuperscript{192} Nossiter, \textit{supra} note 31.
off reporting his son. (It is precisely such a view that is reflected in the quotation from a relative in the preceding paragraph.)

The larger point is that it is helpful to view his behavior through a game theoretic lens. That is, like the aforementioned Honduran businesspersons, as a wealthy international banker, the elder Mutallab may be conceptualized as engaging in a series of repeat-game arrangements with overseas actors. For example, if Umarmutallab engages in transnational banking transactions, with intermediary U.S.-based banks, these repeat-game arrangements are necessarily contingent on the cooperation of the U.S. government. Indeed, Umarmutallab may be quite reasonably conceptualized as engaging in a series of repeat game arrangements with the U.S. government itself. The future consequences of non-cooperative behavior may give him good reason to pre-emptively snitch.

There is a broader point here. Can the U.S. expect network members to reliably meet their informational sharing function? Utilizing game theoretic analogies, this Essay contends that the answer will generally be yes. In a competitive globalized context in which elites value the access that they have to the U.S., the repeated nature of their interactions with the U.S. increases the likelihood that they will share information.

Yet, this recommendation is not dependent on whether elites "generally" snitch rather than risk withdrawal of their visa privileges. Using the previous game-theoretic analyses, if a player does not perceive that she will suffer in the long-term from non-cooperative behavior with the U.S., she may well defect early in the “game.” Perhaps her U.S. visa is not particularly valuable, particularly if she does not believe that U.S. visa revocation will trigger other Western countries to revoke her other visas. Thus, if a potential snitch has other valuable visas (such as visas to Canada or the E.U.) which provide her Western market access and she does not perceive these visas to be at risk, she may be willing to put her U.S. visa at risk.

\[193\] That is, a potential snitch may not believe that Western governments would act cooperatively and collectively revoke her visas. Indeed, this would not be an unreasonable perception since even after the British immigration authorities denied Abdulmutallab’s visa application, other countries including the U.S. did not revoke his visa.
Moreover, there are many reasons that she might hesitate to snitch. She might feel there is not really enough evidence to justify her suspicions. Moreover, she might fear that the U.S. itself will act uncooperatively by failing to keep her cooperation confidential. In so doing undermine, the U.S. would undermine her status in the group or even provoke her expulsion from the group. She might also have concerns about the personal safety of family members in her home country who are not able to travel and as such may be quintessential “hostages.” Furthermore, even if the consequences are not so extreme, she might be concerned that community members will question her motives. Rather than being perceived as honorable, she might be branded as a U.S. lackey. Moreover, she might remain silent out of a belief that the U.S. government is very unlikely to discover that she had this information. Thus the case does not rest on an acceptance of the prediction that elites will "generally" snitch. It should be enough to posit that elites will snitch in some significant number of cases. Whatever that number is, the benefit of this proposal to the U.S. national interest is considerable, given the terrible potential toll of even a single terrorist act.

b. Norms-based Motives

Word is, on the streets in Nigeria and abroad, that the name ‘Mutallab’ is now a bonafide word in the English dictionary! As a noun, it means 'someone who brings shame to his family, to others or to his country.'

Traditional deterrence theory posits a relationship between the perceived certainty and severity of legal sanctions and the likelihood that a rational individual will abide by a rule. Conceptualizing man as a rational calculator of potential costs and rewards from potential acts,

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legal sanctions are viewed as a cost that would accompany a potential illegal act. Given this view of “rational man,” we should mandate information sharing and enforce tough penalties to motivate network members who suspect terrorist activities to share information. Yet, there is an alternative view. In norm-driven cultures, shame is a primary mechanism of social control and may be utilized to motivate persons to share critical information with the government. Indeed, a less traditional view of effective deterrents (namely successful disincentives to anti-social behavior) is based primarily on this view of social control.

For example, the sociologist Dennis Wrong decried the disproportionate focus on formal sanctions in traditional theories of deterrence and contended that informal sanctions in the form of social disapproval were potentially as effective deterrents, since man is “especially motivated by the desire to achieve a positive image of self by winning acceptance or status in the eyes of others.” 196 Since Wrong’s landmark paper, considerable empirical evidence has emerged from the behavioral sciences to support the notion that the withdrawal of esteem is an effective mechanism of sanctioning. 197

Wrong’s supplement to traditional deterrence theory proves relevant to theories of normative deterrence such as the one posited here. Of course, communal norms do not always reinforce U.S. law enforcement goals. For example, some communities appear to celebrate suicide bombing as a legitimate means of political statement. 198 It would be difficult to stimulate community members to withdraw esteem as an effective method of sanctioning if the very behavior that the U.S. is seeking to deter is instead celebrated. 199

197 For a summary of such studies, see, e.g., Donna Bishop, Legal and Extra-legal Barriers to Delinquency: A Panel Analysis, 22 CRIMINOLOGY 403 (1984). For a summary of more recent work, see HERBERT JACOB, DETERRENT EFFECTS OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL SANCTIONS IN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 69 (2004).
198 See, e.g., ADAM L. SILVERMAN, Just War, Jihad, and Terrorism: A Comparison of Western and Islamic Norms for the Use of Political Violence, 44 J. OF CHURCH AND ST. 73 (2002).
199 Id.
However, this is unlikely to be true of elite communities, which the sociological literature tells us generally share an inclination to avoid unwelcome attention. Indeed, although official sanctioning might play some role in the individual decision-making matrices of Umarmutallab, a potentially more relevant factor is that his elite community perceives terrorist violations to be unattractive because they draw unwanted attention to the community. Under a social deterrence framework, Umarmutallab’s action may be viewed against the background of such an elite culture, which prioritizes shame avoidance and honor restoration.

Given this background context, it is perhaps unsurprising that in the Nigerian blogosphere, the younger Mutallab’s actions were widely perceived as bringing shame not only to the family, but also to the nation. One blogger on a popular Nigerian diaspora blog decried the failure of Nigerian elites to defend their country’s name publicly in the face of the Obama administration’s decision to put Nigeria on a “high risk” terror list, declaring, “the Mutallab effect seems to be shutting us all up. The shame is collectively shared. The collateral damage is resulting in embarrassment and self-doubt.” As if to extirpate such shame, a headline in a major Nigerian newspaper appropriated the words of a Nigerian Minister to capture the sentiments of the entire country: “[h]e is not one of us.”

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200 Bottomore, supra note 14.

201 Indeed, precisely this point is captured in two classic works of literature from Nigeria which share similar themes: the Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka’s Death and the King’s Horsemen and the Nobel nominee Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart. Death and the King’s Horsemen is inspired by a famous incident in Nigerian colonial history. See Bernth Lindfors, A Last Shot at the Twentieth Century Canon in Ernest Emenyonu, New Directions in African Literature (2006) (noting that in both Soyinka and Achebe’s texts, the protagonists go to great lengths to extirpate shame and restore family honor, even by committing ritual suicide).


204 Akunyulim, supra note 99.
A noble view of the older Mutallab’s motives highlights the potential disgrace to the family name that would, and did, result from his son’s actions. In anticipation of the monumental blow to the family’s honor, the father’s decision to snitch might be viewed as a pre-emptive attempt to restore honor. While the son has sullied the family and the nation, the elder Mutallab’s actions have been perceived as a valiant attempt to restore the dignity of his family and the broader Nigerian society.

It bears emphasizing that these constructs are not peculiar to Nigeria, and, as such, the broader insight has larger applicability. Shame has been a historical mechanism of sanctioning in a wide range of cultures from the Hebrew nation, to indigenous tribal groups on all five continents.\(^{205}\) Even biblical prophets were subject to shame when they transgressed widely understood social rules.\(^{206}\) The Israelite King David was shamed repeatedly for committing adultery in violation of biblical laws, despite his elevated status. David’s narrative is simply a biblical antecedent to that of the Mutallab family;\(^{207}\) many societies have their own Davids. Communal shame-based sanctioning has a long heritage (and surely a longer heritage than law-based sanctioning!).\(^{208}\) Although much has been made of the decline of shame as an effective mechanism of sanctioning in modern society, in


\(^{206}\) The following text in Jeremiah is understood to be a warning to prophets who would transgress social rules. Jeremiah 8:9 (King James Bible) (“The wise men are put to shame. They are dismayed and caught; Behold, they have rejected the word of the Lord, And what kind of wisdom do they have?”).

\(^{207}\) The narrative of David’s transgression and punishment by God, including public shaming, are contained in the Old Testament at 2 Samuel 11-12 (King James Bible).

many societies, shaming is still an effective mechanism of social control.209

c. What are the Implications of a Norms-based Analysis?

Given this background recognition of a shame-based approach to motivating compliance with legal rules, the U.S. government may be better served by a soft, as opposed to a heavy-handed approach. Hence, the focus on visa-revocation. The revocation of such a privilege, which is typically done privately by the State Department (and as such, is not a matter of the public record), is a quintessential “soft” approach.

By articulating a duty to snitch and reinforcing extant communal norms in a subtle as opposed to heavy-handed manner, the U.S. government will potentially reduce the likelihood that network members will fence-sit. The aim is for the government to motivate network members to signal clearly which side of the fence they fall on. In so doing, they may even motivate network members to withdraw esteem from any other network member who had reason to know valuable information and failed to snitch.

A final point may be in order. The emphasis on norms/communal based sanctioning derives in part from an appreciation of the clear differences between the manner in which the state functions in less-developed states such as Nigeria and the traditional understanding of state function in the Anglo-American legal tradition. In many developing countries, the state is not a reliable provider of public goods; it is functionally irrelevant.210 Rather, the individual will rely


210 This point is made particularly well in the literature in context of post-conflict societies. See e.g. Donald L. Horowitz, Constitution Drafting in Post-
on extended tribal and familial ties for the protection of life, liberty, and property, and even “public goods” (e.g. roads, public utilities etc.) will often be provided through extended tribal and familial networks. In such a context, it becomes particularly important to leverage extant tribal/communal based norms. Thus, a duty to snitch may be perceived as an attempt to “nudge” the elder Mutallab off the proverbial fence to report behavior that is already in violation of communal-based norms.  

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**Part IV: The Dangers**

I now turn to discussing a few of the elephants in the room. First, there are concerns about the dangers of alienating sub-sections of society that are critical to law-enforcement efforts by placing affirmative obligations upon them that are not perceived to apply more broadly to other sections of the society. Second, there is a concern regarding the McCarthyite implications of imposing a duty to snitch. Third, there is a concern regarding the dangers of corruption of the process more generally. Moreover, there may be major due process and equal protection concerns among immigrants and Muslim-Americans. If these concerns are left unaddressed, Muslim

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212 Although the policy proposal undoubtedly raises some of the concerns of this earlier era, First Amendment challenges to perceived exclusion on the basis of certain ideological commitments (or even more tenuously association with those bearing certain ideological commitments, since this proposal specifically targets “associates”) are unlikely to be successful. See infra note 241 and accompanying text.

213 Although this is undoubtedly a serious concern, it bears emphasizing that this is not a primary topic of this paper. Indeed, this has been dealt with ably elsewhere. See, e.g., Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and
American advocacy groups have argued that such perceived targeting of communities will undermine intelligence sharing.  

Writing in the racially charged context of the civil rights movement, Malcolm X famously warned of the dangers of placing affirmative duties (i.e. to prevent harm) as opposed to negative duties (simply not to cause harm) on certain subsections of the society. Malcolm X argued that the imposition of such obligations on blacks and black Muslims in particular (even implicitly) threatened to alienate precisely those portions of the population whose cooperation is critical to law enforcement efforts.

The applicability of this critique to this proposal is obvious. Indeed, among public intellectuals, there has been considerable disquiet about the distinction between “moderate” and “other” Muslims. There also appears to be an implicit obligation that seems to attach to Muslims to display their moderate bona fides. To the extent that this proposal is formulated specifically in response to Al Qaeda’s penetration of Muslim elites, and might appear to disproportionately impact Muslim elites, critics might reasonably argue that obligations are yet again, attaching to Muslims to prove their “moderation” in a manner that is not expected of non-Muslims. Such actions potentially undermine faith in law enforcement.

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See Footnote 43 for references containing a discussion of these concerns.


Id.
Moreover, Natapoff217 has written convincingly of the dangers that an excessive reliance on snitching will undermine faith in law enforcement in the context of another community, namely poor African-American urban communities:

The policy (of disproportionate reliance on snitching) presupposes a community filled with criminals that need to be infiltrated in order to be saved. It is a community with reduced privacy interests in which it is permissible for the state to use informants to penetrate the most private zones in pursuit of prosecutorial goals. It is, in essence, a community with lessened dignitary interests in the eyes of the state . . . (a community that), is treated as having relinquished some of the basic rights to privacy and to be let alone.218

Some of these concerns are unavoidable. Nevertheless, they can be mitigated. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that I have taken pains to emphasize the “soft” nature of the sanctioning for non-compliant persons. Notably, the Department of Justice has been criticized for what has been characterized as prosecutorial overreaching in relation to the communities of terrorist suspects.219 The concern is that law enforcement targets community members even when they play no role in attacks, for unrelated and relatively minor immigration transgressions, thus undermining the likelihood that communities will share intelligence with the authorities.220 Moreover, these communities are now transnational.221 If an immigrant is deported for

217 Natapoff, supra note 38.
218 Id. at 695.
219 See, e.g., Ashar, supra note 214 at 1193 (“the DOJ, working on less-than credible tips, has effectively disrupted individual lives, families, and communities”).
220 Id.
221 The transnational nature of the alien population is a major theme in the sociological literature, but the law review literature generally appears not to have incorporated this insight. For a summary of the transnationalism research, see Peggy Levitt, Salsa and Ketchup: Transnational Migrants Straddle Two Worlds, in THE CONTEXTS READER, AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (Jeff Goodwin & James Jasper eds., 2008). The sociology literature generally refers to transnational persons as migrants who maintain strong connections to their countries of origin. The only person who seems to have incorporated this insight in the legal scholarship is Kim Barry. See Kim Barry, Home and Away: The Construction of Citizenship in an Emigration Context, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 11 (2006).
a minor immigration infraction, she will take the animosity she feels towards the U.S. back to her community and country of origin, thereby undermining the likelihood that her broader circle of family and friends will cooperate with the U.S.

This point is particularly relevant in light of the earlier point about the distinction between the manner in which the state has traditionally been conceptualized in the Anglo-American legal tradition, and the limited utility of the state in developing countries such as Nigeria. If developing countries are not well-placed to be reliable intelligence partners, it is especially important to keep the communities within these countries on the side of the U.S. Hence, the necessity for a more flexible approach to sanctioning that allows one to leverage these communal ties.

a. The Dangers of the Imposition of an Affirmative Duty More Generally

The critique is augmented by the proposal’s imposition of affirmative duties as opposed to the traditional negative duties on elites. In the traditional liberal philosophical conception of moral personhood, all persons are moral agents who have varying moral duties. Yet not all duties are created equal. That is, there is a moral and conceptual distinction between affirmative and negative duties.

Negative duties restrict actions; they set limits of behaviors that we may not pursue without infringing on the rights of others. Negative duties follow from liberalism’s prioritization of individual autonomy and rights. On a traditional conception of negative moral duties, it would be understandable if visa-recipients have a duty not to harm. This proposal however, goes further. Not only do visa-recipients have

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222 This may be the case even if the state is well-intentioned; its unreliability may simply due to its limited reach. Indeed, this point is made particularly well in a New York Times article on Nigeria’s intelligence failures. Adam Nossiter, Security Flaws in Nigeria Are Now Drawing Notice, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2010, at A10.

223 An accessible summary of the difference between the two types of duties is H.M. Malm, Directions of Justification in the Negative-Positive Duty Debate, 27 AM. PHIL QUARTERLY 315 (Oct. 1990).

224 Id.
a duty not to harm, they have a duty to share such information to prevent such harm, to the extent that information, which may prevent terrorist threats is accessible to them. They have an affirmative duty to take action. Such a duty is bound to be more controversial, because it arises from an affirmative conception of human obligation. Although positive duties are more likely understood to hold generally (that is, we have a general duty to help others), how we fulfill that duty is typically left up to us. In this proposal, an obligation is imposed on the individual to help the authorities. The individual appears to have little say in the matter.

The imposition of affirmative duties is a logical extension of an emerging consensus (certainly post 9/11) that we have affirmative obligations to prevent terrorist attacks. We are all familiar with the injunctions in airports and train stations to report strange behaviors, strange bags etc. Typically, for American nationals, there are rarely legal consequences for a failure to report suspicious activity.

However, the same cannot be said for non-citizens. For example, at least one friend of the would-be Times Square bomber, Shahzad was deported for a minor visa infraction although he was never charged and no evidence was presented publicly that he had specific knowledge of Shahzad’s nefarious activities. The reason for the deportation was clear. The FBI was clearly sending a message to the community of Pakistanis. If you suspect something, speak up. Otherwise, your own visa privileges may later be at risk. Yet while it was clear that the authorities were sending a message, the FBI refused to confirm reporters’ suspicions. But why the subterfuge? If as a de facto (if not de jure) matter, certain aliens are subject to visa-

225 Id.
227 The term “subterfuge” in legal scholarship has been popularized by Calabresi. Policy makers often employ “subterfuges,” that is, fictions to shield the tragic nature of their choices that offend deeply held values from public view. GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND THE LAW 88 (1985).
revocation for failing to report behavior that the authorities believe that they had reason to know, shouldn’t DHS be forthright about precisely what their reporting obligations are?

b. The Dangers of Corruption in Social Networks

In most visa-allocation programs, typically, the number of qualified applicants will exceed the number of visa slots. Therefore, the potential rent-seeking problems are apparent. In this particular proposal, the corruption concern is arguably augmented. How so? Projects that are reliant on leveraging social networks are particularly prone to corruption because they are necessarily reliant on friendships and familial relationships.228 This project suffers from the same deficiency that characterizes projects that are similarly reliant on social networks.

What is the implication of this insight for this proposal? One could imagine that members of one tribal group may receive preferences not available to members of another tribal group. The implication of this is that certain elites may be inclined to receive the benefit of the doubt with respect to potentially suspicious behavior in relation to other elites. Thus, repeated travel to Yemen may be perceived as problematic for members of one elite group but not for members of another elite group.

228 As one commentator has said “there is an important cultural component to corruption. Many corrupt officials do not seek to transgress social rules; rather, the rules of their society demand that they help family and friends before they see to the general public interest. In many ways, nepotism is one of the most natural of human impulses.” Francis Fukuyama, Address at the Conference on Social Capital and Poverty Reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean: Towards a New Paradigm, Santiago, Chile (Sept. 24–26, 2001), in Francis Fukuyama, Social Capital and Development: The Coming Agenda, in Social Capital and Poverty Reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean: Towards a New Paradigm 45 (Raúl Atria et al., compilers (2004)).
McCarthyite Tendencies: Undermining Social Trust

There is also the question of whether the spirit (if not the letter) of the First Amendment is being breached.\(^{229}\) Decisions during the Cold War era to exclude aliens for their associations with suspected American communists (and implicitly for their unwillingness to “snitch” on these communists) have withstood judicial scrutiny; it seems clear that we may set aside constitutional concerns.\(^{230}\) However, even if we are able to get around the constitutional questions, aspects of the proposal rightly offend our deepest moral intuitions.

Indeed, the reliance on a culture of snitching that is reminiscent of the McCarthy era, in and of itself raises serious concerns. For example, detailed ethnographic studies of the impact of an informant culture in East Germany illuminate the dangers of an over-reliance on snitches to the social fabric of the broader society.\(^{231}\)

> With husbands snitching on wives and neighbors snitching on neighbors, a widespread atmosphere of distrust developed in the broader society. Indeed, one author described the “indirect harm” of a widespread societal “malaise” or societal

\(^{229}\) Supreme Court jurisprudence makes it clear that any First Amendment challenges to immigration restrictions are likely to fail, even when the First Amendment interests of American citizens are at stake. This jurisprudence is summarized in *Kleindienst v. Mandel*. Although American citizens have the right to associate with and receive information and ideas from aliens whom the government desires to exclude, this right will generally not outweigh "Congress' 'plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden.'' *Kleindienst v. Mandel*, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); see also *American Academy of Religion v. Napolitano*, 573 F.3d 115, 117 (2nd Cir. 2009); *Bustamante v. Mukasey*, 531 F.3d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008), *Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft*, 303 F.3d 681, 682 (6th Cir. 2002), *Price v. U.S. I.N.S.*, 926 F.2d 836, 842 (9th Cir.1991).

\(^{230}\) Notably the duty will apply only to foreign nationals on foreign soil who would typically have difficulty pressing First Amendment claims. Indeed as the cases in the previous footnote illustrate, even American citizens who seek to associate with or benefit from the ideas of such excluded foreign nationals have had difficulty pressing First Amendment claims.

\(^{231}\) The most comprehensive work in this regard is Barbara Miller's. *BARBARA MILLER, NARRATIVES OF GUILT AND COMPLIANCE IN UNIFIED GERMANY: STASI INFORMERS AND THEIR IMPACT ON SOCIETY* (1999).
“schizophrenia.” 232 In the words of one East German intellectual, “[t]hese informers determined my life . . . [i]n one way or another—because they poisoned us with mistrust.” 233

A similar culture of suspicion is said to pervade the Palestinian territories, partly because of the widespread suspicion that Israel is highly reliant on Palestinian informants. 234 Palestinians who are perceived to be beneficiaries of elite privileges (such as access to travel permits) are often the targets of suspicion. 235 Similar stories also emerge from Northern Ireland, again because of the perceived reliance of the authorities on informants. 236

Of course, the diffuse utilization of snitches in diverse elite networks on different continents is not equivalent to the concentrated efforts of the East German secret police. Yet, one need not go so far to recognize the dangers to the communities from which the snitches originate. The effect that the McCarthy era had in cultivating a culture of suspicion in targeted communities (such as the artistic and academic communities) provides plentiful examples. 237 Thus, if visa revocations are too widely utilized, those who retain their visas will necessarily become the targets of suspicion in their communities (not unlike the aforementioned Palestinians).

Moreover, the dangers of reliance on informant institutions are exacerbated because we often cannot know the motives of the persons who are snitching. In addition to the previously-discussed corruption problem, there are also dangers of elite capture. 238 Given the highly

232 Id. at 133.
233 Id. at 101 (quoting an East German intellectual).
235 Id.
238 A good summary of the challenges of elite capture is included in P. Bardhan and D. Mookherjee, Capture and Governance at Local and National
competitive nature of some elite networks, consider the following example. One could imagine that an elite entrepreneur might share inaccurate information about a competitor in a deliberate effort to discredit her and even have her removed from the U.S.

Although generally we hope that the persons who come forward to share information will be “good” types who have sincere concerns regarding a peer who may be a terrorist threat, there may be either “bad” types or “mixed” types who proffer information. These would include individuals who purposely utilize this process to tarnish the reputation of someone who is not a terrorist threat. They could also use the process to curry favor with the authorities for their own purposes, including motivating the authorities to forgive their own criminal behavior.  

However, these concerns can be mitigated if it is made clear that information will not be taken at face value, but rather will be subject to rigorous verification. The best deterrent to such behavior is to make clear that individuals may compromise their visa privileges if it later turns out that they knowingly shared false information for nefarious motives. The goal is to provide incentives for persons to share information that they reasonably believe to be troubling, while providing disincentives for them to share information that they have good reason to believe is false.

CONCLUSION

In contexts beyond Nigeria, the U.S. may strategically deploy both the revocation of privilege and this cultural valuation of family honor as a mechanism for motivating persons to share important information. By

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239 “Mixed” types include individuals who may not harbor ill will towards other elites who have visas. Nevertheless, they share information for motives other than a general affirmative duty to prevent harm, without taking reasonable efforts to verify such information even if they have reason to believe that such information may not be accurate.
articulating a duty to snitch, which reinforces communal norms, the U.S. can nudge the Umarmutallabs of the world in the right direction. Importantly, the “nudge” should be sufficiently soft so as to be constructive. Moreover, if communal norms are already working in the U.S.’s favor, soft sanctions such as a threat of visa-revocation may be more effective than heavy-handed approaches.