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‘They Saw a Protest’: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction

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“They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction

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Danieli Evans,^π & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski[∞]

Cultural cognition refers to the unconscious influence of individuals’ group commitments on their perceptions of legally consequential facts. We conducted an experiment to assess the impact of cultural cognition on perceptions of facts relevant to distinguishing constitutionally protected “speech” from unprotected “conduct.” Study subjects viewed a video of a political demonstration. Half the subjects believed that the demonstrators were protesting abortion outside of an abortion clinic, and the other half that the demonstrators were protesting the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy outside a campus recruitment facility. Subjects of opposing cultural outlooks who were assigned to the same experimental condition (and thus had the same belief about the nature of the protest) disagreed sharply on key “facts”—including whether the protestors obstructed and threatened pedestrians. Subjects also disagreed sharply with those who shared their cultural outlooks but who were assigned to the *opposing* experimental condition (and hence had a different belief about the nature of the protest). These results supported the study hypotheses about how cultural cognition would affect perceptions pertinent to the “speech”-“conduct” distinction. We discuss the significance of the results for constitutional law and liberal principles of self-governance generally.

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The study featured in this paper was funded by the Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fund at Yale Law School, Temple University Beasley School of Law, and George Washington University Law School. We are grateful to members of the Harry Phillips American Inn of Court in Nashville, Tenn., for their generous participation in, and thoughtful feedback on, a pretest conducted to assess the study design. We are also grateful to Kw Bilz, Jeffrey Dunoff, Bill Eskridge, Janice Nadler, Richard Posner, David Sherman, Dan Simon, and Avani Sood for comments.

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Anyone seriously interested in what this case was about must view that tape. And anyone doing so who is familiar with run-of-the-mine labor picketing, not to mention some other social protests, will be aghast at what it shows we have today permitted an individual judge to do.

Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, 512 U.S. 753, 786 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Justice Stevens suggests that our reaction to the videotape is somehow idiosyncratic, and seems to believe we are misrepresenting its contents. See post, at 1783 (dissenting opinion) (“In sum, the factual statements by the Court of Appeals quoted by the Court ... were entirely accurate”). We are happy to allow the videotape to speak for itself. See Record 36, Exh. A, available at http://www.supremecourt.us/opinions/video/scott_v_harris.rmvb and in Clerk of Court's case file.

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 n.5 (2007) (Scalia, J.)

I. INTRODUCTION

In a 1950s social psychology experiment, students from two Ivy League colleges were instructed to evaluate a series of controversial officiating calls made during a football game between their respective schools. Researchers found that the students, from both institutions, were much more likely to perceive error in the penalty assessments imposed on their school’s team than in those imposed on their rival’s. The students’ emotional stake in affirming their loyalty to their institutions, researchers concluded, had unconsciously shaped what they had *seen* when viewing events captured on film.¹ This study is now recognized as a classic demonstration of *motivated cognition*, the ubiquitous tendency of people to form perceptions, and to process factual information generally, in a manner congenial to their values and desires.²

Motivated cognition poses an obvious hazard for law. Sports fans are permitted—even expected—to be partisan. But legal decisionmakers must be neutral. Just as the integrity of a sporting contest would be undermined by unconscious favoritism on the part of the referee, so the legitimacy of the law would likewise be compromised if legal decisionmakers, as a result of motivated cognition, unwittingly formed perceptions of facts that promoted the interests and values of groups with whom they had an affinity.³

This effect could be particularly subversive of constitutional law. The Free Speech, Equal Protection, and Due Process Clauses all mandate governmental even-handedness. Within their respective domains, each forecloses the State from privileging particular affiliations, ways of life, or points of view and mandates that law be justified by its contribution to secular interests—physical security, public health, economic prosperity—valued by all citizens.⁴ But if decisionmakers (par-

¹ See Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, *They Saw a Game: A Case Study*, 49 J. Abnormal & Social Psychol. 129 (1954).

² See generally Ziva Kunda, *The Case for Motivated Reasoning*, 108 Psychol. Bull. (1990); Roger Giner-Sorolla & Shelly Chaiken, *Selective Use of Heuristic and Systematic Processing Under Defense Motivation*, 23 Personality & Social Psychol. Bull. 84 (1997); Emily Balcetus & David Dunning, *See What You Want to See: Motivational Influences on Visual Perception*, 91 J. Personality & Social Psychol. 612 (2006); Anca M. Miron, Nyla R. Branscombe & Monica Biernat, *Motivated Shifting of Justice Standards*, 36 Personality & Social Psychol. Bull. 768 (2010).

³ See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, *The Self-defensive Cognition of Self-defense*, 45 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1 (2008). A number of recent studies examine motivated cognition in law. See Avani M. Sood & John M. Darley, *The Plasticity of Harm in the Service of Punishment Goals: An Experimental Demonstration*, Calif. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012), paper. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641022>; Janice Nadler, *The Psychology of Blame: Criminal Liability and the Role of Moral Character*, 97 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012); [Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance Rape Cases](#), 158 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 729 (2010); Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, *Whose Eyes are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism*, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 837-906 (2009). See generally Dan M. Kahan, *The Supreme Court 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law*, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 59-66 (2011).

⁴ See generally Ronald Dworkin, *Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution* (1999); David A. J. Richards, *Toleration and the Constitution* (1986).

ticularly adjudicators) unconsciously apply these provisions to favor outcomes congenial to favored ways of life, citizens who adhere to disfavored ones will suffer the same array of disadvantages for failing to conform that they would in a regime expressly dedicated to propagation of a sectarian orthodoxy. This distinctively psychological threat to constitutional ideals, which we will refer to as “cognitive illiberalism,”⁵ has received relatively little attention from commentators or jurists.⁶

We performed an experimental study designed to help assess just how much of a threat cognitive illiberalism poses to constitutional ideals. The study focused on a discrete and recurring task in constitutional law: discernment of the line between “speech” and “conduct” for purposes of the First Amendment. Embodied in a variety of doctrines, the speech-conduct distinction aims to assure that coercive regulation is justified on grounds unrelated to governmental or public hostility to disfavored ideas.⁷ Most importantly, the “speech”-“conduct” distinction has historically played, and continues to play, a vital function in preventing the government from invoking its responsibility for maintaining “public order” to disguise suppression of impassioned political dissent.⁸ Our study furnishes strong evidence that this function is indeed highly vulnerable to the power of motivated cognition to shape decisionmakers’ perceptions of the facts that mark the speech-conduct boundary.

The features of the “speech-conduct” distinction that make it susceptible to this influence, moreover, are shared by a host of other constitutional doctrines. The study results thus highlight the need to fortify constitutional theorizing with psychological realism. Normatively ideal standards for enforcing the Constitution are of little value if applying them defies the capacities of constitutional decisionmakers.

Following background discussion, we describe the study design and results. Thereafter, we address the study’s normative and prescriptive implications.

II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The context for our study comprises three elements. The first is the “speech”-“conduct” distinction in First Amendment doctrine. The second is the phenomenon of *culturally motivated cognition*. And the third is the threat the latter poses to the former.

⁵ See generally Dan M. Kahan, [The Cognitively Illiberal State](#), 60 *Stan. L. Rev.* 115 (2007).

⁶ For a provocative and insightful exception, see Sood & Darley, *supra* note 3.

⁷ See generally Elena Kagan, *Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine*, 63 *U. Chi. L. Rev.* 413, 428-29 (1996).

⁸ *Terminello v. Chicago*, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (it is “a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging”); *Texas v. Johnson*, 491 U.S. 397, 408-9 (1989) (First Amendment does not permit speech to be restricted on ground that “an audience that takes serious offense at particular expression is necessarily likely to disturb the peace”).

A. “Speech” vs. “Conduct”

Because the Free Speech Clause confers special protection on *speech*, First Amendment jurisprudence is said to “draw vital distinctions between words and deeds, . . . ideas and conduct.”⁹ These sorts of divisions, however, are notoriously problematic.¹⁰ *Words* are often the key—sometimes the exclusive—instruments of prohibited forms of *conduct*, from price-fixing¹¹ to treason.¹² *Deeds* such as lighting fire to an American flag or to a towering cross—not to mention violently assaulting a person on account of his race or sexual preference—can potently express *ideas*. In short, we “do things with words and say things with actions.”¹³ Insisting that every act be definitively categorized as *either* speech *or* conduct—a position John Hart Ely called the “ontological fallacy”—thus invites sophism and ad hocery.¹⁴

One way to avoid this problem is to adopt instead what Ely referred to as a “teleological” conception of the speech-conduct distinction.¹⁵ Rather than directing courts to determine whether a particular act is “really” expression or “really” conduct, this approach focuses attention on the government’s *goal* in regulating it. The “bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment . . . is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”¹⁶ It therefore makes sense to treat a regulation as abridging *speech* whenever the government’s *purpose* is to attain some good or state of affairs that reflects aversion to a disfavored idea.¹⁷ If, in contrast, a reg-

⁹ *Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition*, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002).

¹⁰ See, e.g., *Barnes v. Glen Theatre*, 501 U.S. 560, 576 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Virtually every law restricts conduct, and virtually any prohibited conduct can be performed for an expressive purpose—if only expressive of the fact that the actor disagrees with the prohibition.”); John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1495 (1975) (“Burning a draft card to express one’s opposition to the draft is an undifferentiated whole, 100% action and 100% expression, and to outlaw the act is therefore necessarily to regulate both elements.”); Louis Henkin, *The Supreme Court, 1967 Term — Foreword: On Drowning Lines*, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 63, 77-80 (1968) (arguing that the “distinction between speech and non-speech has no content” and is “specious”). Thomas Emerson is the constitutional theorist most famously associated with the distinction. See Thomas I. Emerson, *The System of Freedom of Expression* (1970).

¹¹ Cf. *F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n*, 493 U.S. 411, 427 (1990) (boycott conducted to effect increase in prices not protected by First Amendment).

¹² See *R.A.V. v. St. Paul*, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (“[W]ords can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but against conduct (a law against treason, for example, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation’s defense secrets).”)

¹³ Jed Rubenfeld, *The First Amendment’s Purpose*, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 767, 783-84 (2001); Henkin, *supra* note 10, at 79 (“Speech is conduct, and actions speak.”).

¹⁴ See Ely, *supra* note 10, 1494-95.

¹⁵ See *id.* at 1496.

¹⁶ *Texas v. Johnson*, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).

¹⁷ See Ely, *supra* note 10, at 1496-1500; Kagan, *supra* note 7, at 428-32; Rubenfeld, *supra* 13, at 777.

ulation seeks to promote a good that can be defined independently of hostility to a disfavored idea, we can say that a violator, even if she intends to communicate a message, is being punished for engaging in “illegal conduct,” not “*for speaking*.”¹⁸

The Supreme Court has used the teleological strategy to distinguish “speech” from “conduct” across a diverse range of settings. The government can ban sleeping overnight in Lafayette Park to protest homelessness, for example, not because *sleeping* just can’t be “speech,” but because the government’s reason for the ban is “unrelated to suppression of free expression”: “limit[ing] wear and tear on park properties” justifies prohibiting overnight camping there regardless of whether the campers mean to express a message or what it might be.¹⁹

The government can criminalize the burning of draft cards,²⁰ the Court has held, but not the burning of American flags.²¹ The basis for the distinction isn’t that the latter is more “speech like” than the former; indeed, both might be recognized (and were in the 1960s) as cogent statements of opposition to a war. The difference stems from the government’s reasons for regulating them. Preserving ready proof of compliance with selective service laws supplies a justification for prohibiting destruction of draft cards independent of any hostility toward the statement of dissent such behavior might express; accordingly, the government’s interest in prohibiting the burning of them is (once more) “unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”²² The government’s interest in banning the burning of American flags, however, is not. “Preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity” necessarily involves favoring one set of messages over another.²³ Nor can “preventing breaches of the peace” be viewed as a justification independent of hostility toward a disfavored message if the only cause for such disorder is the “serious offen[se]” *onlookers* would take toward the burning of the flag.²⁴

The government’s interest in protecting individuals from “distinct emotional harms” and in averting retaliatory cycles of violence supplies “an adequate explanation” for “hate crime” laws “over and above mere disagreement with offenders’ beliefs or biases,”²⁵ the Court has reasoned. Likewise, protecting individuals from *fear* of physical attack is a constitutionally sound basis for prohibiting dramatic ges-

¹⁸ Rubinfeld, *supra* note 13, at 778.

¹⁹ *Clark v. CCNV*, 468 U.S. 288, 295, 299 (1984).

²⁰ *United States v. O’Brien*, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

²¹ *Texas v. Johnson*, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); *United States v. Eichman*, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).

²² *O’Brien*, 391 U.S. at 377.

²³ *Johnson*, 491 U.S. at 407; *see also Eichman*, 496 U.S. at 316-17 (protection of meaning of flag as “symbol of national unity” cannot be understood without reference to interest in regulating the ideas associated with various uses of flag).

²⁴ *Johnson*, 491 U.S. at 408-09.

²⁵ *Wisconsin v. Mitchell*, 508 U.S. 476, 488 (1993).

tures, such as cross-burnings, intended to intimidate.²⁶ Nevertheless, if the selectivity with which the government prohibits such assaultive behavior reflects a “special hostility towards the particular biases thus singled out,” punishment of such conduct reflects exactly the sort of “disapproval of ideas” that the First Amendment is meant to proscribe.²⁷

In addition to systematizing a diverse body of cases, the teleological conception of the speech-conduct distinction also integrates First Amendment doctrine into a more general theory of constitutional liberty. The prohibition on state endorsement of a partisan conception of the good life—the core tenet of liberal neutrality²⁸—is reflected in the First Amendment injunction that “no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”²⁹ The principle of “liberal public reason,” which requires that law be justified by its contribution to attainment of secular goods of value to citizens of diverse cultural and moral outlooks,³⁰ is advanced when courts scrutinize the asserted basis of regulations to assure that they advance interests “unrelated to suppression” of disfavored ideas.³¹ Decisions construing equal protection³² and due process³³ to forbid imposition of other types of legal disabilities

²⁶ See *Virginia v. Black*, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).

²⁷ *R.A.V. v. St. Paul*, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992).

²⁸ See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, *Liberalism*, in *Liberalism and Its Critics* 60, 63-64 (M. Sandel ed., 1984).

²⁹ *W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); see Dworkin, *supra* note 4, at 237-38 (First Amendment reflects liberal principle that “no one may be prevented from influencing the shared moral environment, through his own private choices, tastes, opinions, and example, just because these tastes or opinions disgust those who have the power to shut him up or lock him up”); Note, *A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws*, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 682, 688 (1988) (arguing that First Amendment implements bar on state endorsement of the good by treating “aversion that some persons feel toward the life choices of others” as a noncognizable harm).

³⁰ See John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* 175, 217-18 (1993) (articulating norm of “public reason” that prohibits political actors in most contexts from invoking “comprehensive views” that “include]conceptions of what is of value in human life, as well as ideals of personal virtue and character” and instead “explain . . . how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by” considerations consistent with “a diversity of reasonable religious and philosophical doctrines”); see also David A. Strauss, *Legal Argument and the Overlapping Consensus* 20-21 (unpublished, July 12, 1998) (arguing that conventional modes of legal reasoning and justification reflect a liberal public-reason norm).

³¹ See, e.g., Kagan, *supra* note 7, at 453-54 (“the strict scrutiny standard . . . is best understood as an evidentiary device” to furnish “assurance that the government has acted for proper reasons” and that the “interested asserted” is not a “pretext” for “antipathy for the speech affected” by regulation).

³² See *Romer v. Evans*, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 633 (1996) (“[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection’ of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a *legitimate* governmental interest.”) quoting (*Department of Agriculture v. Moreno*, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).

³³ See *Lawrence v. Texas*, 539 U.S. 558, 567-71 (2003) (Due Process Clause forbids the “majority [to] use the power of the State to enforce . . . on the whole society” standards of “private conduct” that originate in “religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family”).

solely to promote favored moral and religious norms can be read in like fashion.³⁴ Distinguishing “speech” from “conduct,” then, can be seen as characteristic of the type of judgments courts must make to perfect the liberal underpinnings of the American constitutional regime.³⁵

B. Culturally Motivated Reasoning

Cultural cognition is a species of motivated reasoning that promotes congruence between a person’s defining group commitments, on the one hand, and his or her perceptions of risk and related facts, on the other.³⁶ A variety of mechanisms contribute to this effect. Thus, individuals tend selectively to credit empirical information in patterns congenial to their cultural values.³⁷ They are also disposed to impute knowledge and expertise to others with whom they share a cultural affinity.³⁸ And they are more likely to note, assign significance to, and recall facts supportive of their cultural outlooks than facts subversive of them.³⁹ These dynamics protect individuals’ connection to others on whom they depend for material and emotional support.⁴⁰

At a societal level, however, culturally motivated cognition can be a source of intense and enduring political conflict.⁴¹ Citizens who subscribe to an egalitarian ethic that identifies free markets as fonts of unjust disparity readily credit evidence that commerce and industry are destroying the environment; citizens who adhere

³⁴ See generally Dworkin, *supra* note 4, at 110-12 (arguing that right of individuals “to confront for themselves, answering to their own consciences and convictions, the most fundamental questions touching the meaning and value of their own lives” inheres in “the structure of the Constitution” as well as in various textual provisions of it); Dworkin, *supra* note 28, at 70 (asserting that “the rights encoded in the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution, as interpreted (on the whole) by the Supreme Court, are those that a substantial number of liberals would think reasonably well suited to what the United States now requires . . .”); Richards, *supra* note 4 (using liberal theory to explicate constitutional guarantees of free speech, freedom of religion, equality, and privacy).

³⁵ Cf. Kagan, *supra* note 7, at 511 (suggesting that the First Amendment prohibition on making aversion to ideas a basis for regulating reflects the “principle that the government must treat all persons with equal respect and concern” and that the same “principle may well explain much of equal protection law”).

³⁶ For this reason, we refer interchangeably to “cultural cognition” and “culturally motivated cognition” or “culturally motivated reasoning.”

³⁷ See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, Paul Slovic, John Gastil & Geoff Cohen, [Cultural Cognition of the Risks and Benefits of Nanotechnology](#), 4 *Nature Nanotechnology* 87 (2009).

³⁸ See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, Geoffrey L. Cohen, John Gastil & Paul Slovic, [Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, Who Doesn't, and Why? An Experimental Study of the Mechanisms of Cultural Cognition](#), 34 *L. & Human Behavior* 501 (2010).

³⁹ See generally Dan M. Kahan, Hank Jenkins-Smith & Donald Braman, [Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus](#), 14 *J. Risk Res.* 147 (2011).

⁴⁰ See generally David K. Sherman, Geoffrey L. Cohen & P. Zanna Mark, *The Psychology of Self-defense: Self-Affirmation Theory*, in 38 *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 183 (2006).

⁴¹ See Dan Kahan, [Fixing the Communications Failure](#), 463 *Nature* 296-297 (2010).

to an individualistic ethic that prizes private orderings dismiss such evidence and insist instead that needless government regulation threatens to wreck economic prosperity.⁴² Associating firearms with patriarchy, racism, and distrust, egalitarian and communitarian citizens blame accidental shootings and crime on insufficient regulation of guns; hierarchical and individualist citizens, in contrast, worry that *too much* regulation will render law-abiding citizens vulnerable to predation, a belief congenial to the value they attach to guns as instruments of social roles (father, protector) and symbols of virtues (self-reliance, honor) distinctive of their ways of life.⁴³ Citizens who combine hierarchical and communitarian values believe that the right to abortion demeans those women who eschew the workplace to be mothers; correspondingly, they worry that abortion poses a health risk to women. Citizens who combine egalitarian and individualist values, and who assign status to women as well as men for professional and commercial success, believe that *restrictions* on abortion put women’s health in danger.⁴⁴ Myriad other issues—from the risks and benefits of the HPV vaccine for schoolgirls⁴⁵ to the efficacy of legally mandated medical treatment for (noninstitutionalized) mentally ill persons⁴⁶—divide citizens along lines that correspond to the social meanings these policies connote within opposing ways of life.⁴⁷

Conflicts of this sort expose democratic pluralism to a distinctive threat: *cognitive* illiberalism. Because their perceptions of risk and related facts are unconsciously motivated by their defining commitments, even citizens who are genuinely committed to principles of liberal neutrality are likely to end up persistently divided along cultural lines—not over the proper ends of law (physical security, economic prosperity, public health, and the like) but over the *means* for securing them. Nor is the cultural complexion of these seemingly empirical disputes likely to evade notice by those involved in them. On the contrary, consistent with a dynamic known as “naïve realism,” each side in these conflicts is likely to suspect the

⁴² See Mary Douglas & Aaron B. Wildavsky, *Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers* (1982); Karl Dake, *Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An Analysis of Contemporary Worldviews and Cultural Biases*, 22 *J. Cross-Cultural Psych.* 61 (1991); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, *Cultural Cognition of Public Policy*, 24 *Yale J. L. & Pub. Pol’y* 147 (2006).

⁴³ Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic & C. K. Mertz, [Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception](#), 4 *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies* 465 (2007).

⁴⁴ See *id.*

⁴⁵ See Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, Geoffrey L. Cohen, John Gastil & Paul Slovic, [Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, Who Doesn't, and Why? An Experimental Study of the Mechanisms of Cultural Cognition](#), 34 *L. & Human Behavior* 501 (2010).

⁴⁶ See Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Monahan, Lisa Callahan & Ellen Peters, [Cultural Cognition and Public Policy: The Case of Outpatient Commitment Laws](#), 34 *L. & Human Behavior* 118 (2010).

⁴⁷ See R. Gutierrez & R. Giner-Sorolla, *Anger, Disgust, and Presumption of Harm as Reactions to Taboo-breaking Behaviors*, 7 *Emotion* (2007) (finding that individuals are motivated to impute harm to intrinsically immoral behavior); Jonathan Haidt & Mathew. A. Hersh, *Sexual Morality: The Cultures and Emotions of Conservatives and Liberals*, 31 *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 191 (2001) (same).

other (realistically), but not itself (naïvely), of fitting its empirical beliefs about how the world works to its moral vision of how it should.⁴⁸ Citizens *defeated* in political conflicts of this sort will thus face the same form of humiliation they’d suffer had their worldviews been explicitly denigrated by culturally partisan laws. To avoid this experience, groups predictably mobilize and energize their members by advocating positions that expressively affirm their own partisan values—thereby provoking reciprocal anxiety and resistance by their adversaries, who can be expected in turn to resort to status-protective symbolic political action.⁴⁹

C. Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-conduct Distinction

There is an obvious tension between the phenomenon of culturally motivated cognition and the teleological conception of the speech-conduct distinction. Delimiting the scope of the First Amendment requires legal decisionmakers to determine whether a regulation (in general, and as applied in particular instances) is justified by a governmental purpose *independent* of aversion to any idea expressed by regulated acts. Such an assessment involves factual judgments akin to the empirical assessments that lawmakers and citizens make in considering the utilitarian efficacy of policies and laws: Is there a basis for believing the regulated behavior is causing the asserted harm? Are the magnitude of the harm and the effect of the regulation in abating it sufficiently large in relation to the cost of the regulation? Is indifference to behaviors that cause like harms grounds to suspect the genuineness of the regulators’ professed motivations? In making these sorts of determinations, legal decisionmakers are thus likely to experience the same type of identity-protective pressure that influences them to form culturally congenial perceptions of risk and other policy-consequential facts.

The potential impact of culturally motivated cognition on facts pertinent to the “speech”-“conduct” distinction, however, is arguably even more troubling than its impact on perceptions of policy-consequential facts. The vulnerability of democratic policy-making to anti-liberal impulses is familiar. It is precisely because we anticipate that democratically accountable officials will sometimes indulge the temptation to make law an instrument of cultural orthodoxy that we envision the Constitution, enforced by an independent system of adjudication, as integral to realization of liberal political principles in law. Indeed, the idea that democratically accountable actors might sometimes *unwittingly* succumb to partisan temptation is itself contemplated by the practice of judicial “strict scrutiny,” which probes the proffered justification of laws that incidentally abridge constitutional liberties to “flush out” unconscious illicit intentions as well as deliberately concealed ones.⁵⁰ However, this critical checking function would be subverted if factfinding and

⁴⁸ See generally Robert J. Robinson, Dacher Keltner, Andrew Ward & Lee Ross, *Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: “Naive Realism” in Intergroup Perception and Conflict*, 68 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 404 (1995).

⁴⁹ See Dan M. Kahan, *The Cognitively Illiberal State*, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 115 (2007). See generally Joseph R. Gusfield, *Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement* (2d ed. 1986).

⁵⁰ See, e.g., Kagan, *supra* note 7, at 431 n.55.

other elements of constitutional review were themselves subject to unwitting corruption by cognitive illiberalism.

Is this a psychologically realistic concern? Cultural cognition has already been shown to exert an impact on perceptions of legally consequential facts very similar to the one it exerts on perceptions of risk. Issues such as “consent” in acquaintance rape cases,⁵¹ the risks posed by fleeing suspects against whom the police use deadly force,⁵² and the feasibility of nonlethal alternatives when battered women and other controversial offenders resort to homicidal violence in self-defense⁵³ are ripe with social meanings. Studies show that citizens of diverse cultural outlooks divide along predictable lines when assessing such facts. This evidence furnishes reason to worry that fact-finding essential to constitutional law will be similarly pervaded by culturally motivated cognition.⁵⁴

But conjecture and story-telling, as suggestive of hypotheses as they might be, are not a substitute for proof.⁵⁵ The most reliable way to examine the potential impact of culturally motivated cognition on the “speech”-“conduct” distinction is to conduct an empirical study of the possibility.

III. STUDY

A. Overview and Hypotheses

We conducted a study to test the hypothesis that cultural motivated cognition will distort perception of the line between “speech” and “conduct.” The study focused on the lawfulness of police action to halt a political demonstration for allegedly obstructing, threatening, or intimidating members of the public. In broad outlines, this is a recurring scenario across diverse settings, from anti-war rallies to pro- and anti-civil rights marches to the picketing of commercial establishments, court houses, foreign embassies, and abortion clinics.

⁵¹ See Dan M. Kahan, [Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in 'Acquaintance Rape' Cases](#), 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 729 (2010).

⁵² See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, [Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism](#), 122 Harv. L. Rev. 837 (2009).

⁵³ See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, [The Self-defensive Cognition of Self-defense](#), 45 Am. Crim. Law. Rev. 1 (2008).

⁵⁴ Sood and Darley, *supra* note 3, report that individuals are likely to impute “harm” to behavior they find offensive when told that only “harmful” behavior can be criminalized, a finding, they recognize, with implications for constitutional law. Our study compliments theirs both by connecting motivated reasoning to the specific facts relevant to distinguishing permissible regulations of “conduct” from impermissible regulations of “speech,” and by examining how motivated cognition interacts with diverse systems of values, the distinctive focus of cultural cognition.

⁵⁵ See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, *Comment: Is Evolutionary Analysis of Law Science or Storytelling?*, 41 *Jurimetrics* 365 (2001); Dan M. Kahan, *The Economics—Conventional, Behavioral, and Political—of “Subsequent Remedial Measures” Evidence*, 110 *Columbia L. Rev.* 1616 (2010).

First Amendment jurisprudence here reflects the teleological conception of the speech-conduct distinction. The state’s obligation to permit “expression of unpopular views” rules out the enforcement of any governmental interest that is related to the “communicative content” of protest activity, such as protecting targets of criticism from the “indignity” of public opprobrium,⁵⁶ shielding parties from the “inconvenience [or] annoyance” of having to avoid disagreeable ideas,⁵⁷ or forestalling unrest *caused* by onlookers’ own aversion to the message protectors are conveying.⁵⁸ “The right to attempt to persuade others to change their views . . . may not be curtailed simply because the speaker’s message may be offensive to his audience.”⁵⁹ Indeed, because “a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute,” it is to be expected that it will sometimes “induce[] a condition of unrest, create[] dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stir[] people to anger.”⁶⁰ Nevertheless, the police needn’t stand idly by “when. . . the speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot.”⁶¹ Nor does the First Amendment prevent the police from intervening to stop demonstrators from engaging in assaultive behavior such as “jostling, grabbing, pushing, and shoving” or from intimidating others through “‘in your face’ yelling.”⁶² Discharging the “responsibility to keep the[] streets open and available for movement” and to assure passersby “entrance to a public or private building” also justifies police action to terminate a political demonstration.⁶³ Yet in all cases, it is necessary to scrutinize the facts to assure that the assertion of the “interest of the community in maintaining peace and order on its streets”⁶⁴ is not used to disguise censorial motives on the part of either the authorities or the public.⁶⁵

⁵⁶ *Boos v. Barry*, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988).

⁵⁷ *Terminiello v. Chicago*, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).

⁵⁸ See, e.g., *Cox v. Louisiana*, 379 U.S. 536, 550 (1965) (“the fear of violence . . . based upon the reaction of angry onlookers not sufficient to justify breaking up a civil rights demonstration”); *Texas v. Johnson*, 491 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1989) (“The State’s position, therefore, amounts to a claim that an audience that takes serious offense at particular expression is necessarily likely to disturb the peace and that the expression may be prohibited on this basis. Our precedents do not countenance such a presumption.”).

⁵⁹ *Hill v. Colorado*, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000).

⁶⁰ *Terminello*, 337 U.S. at 4.

⁶¹ *Feiner v. New York*, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951).

⁶² *Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network*, 519 U.S. 357, 363 (1997).

⁶³ *Cox*, 379 U.S. at 555.

⁶⁴ *Feiner*, 340 U.S. at 320.

⁶⁵ See, e.g., *Cox*, 379 U.S. at 546-47 (“The State argues . . . that while the demonstrators started out to be orderly, . . . [their behavior thereafter] converted the peaceful assembly into a riotous one. The record, however, does not support this assertion.”); *Edwards v. South Carolina*, 372 U.S. 229, 234 (1963) (“The state courts have held that the petitioners’ conduct constituted breach of the peace under state law, and we may accept their decision as binding upon us to that extent. But it neverthe-

In our study, subjects were instructed to imagine they were jurors in a case that turned on whether a group of protestors had crossed the speech-conduct line so conceived. The subjects indicated their findings on key facts after viewing a videotape of a political demonstration that was (we told them) halted by the police. The use of a video was designed to enhance the realism of the design. Cases challenging the use of police authority to halt allegedly violent, intimidating, or disorderly demonstrations often feature videotapes of the demonstrators’ behavior.⁶⁶ When such cases are reviewed by appellate courts, moreover, judges sometimes disagree with each other about whether the video depicts protected speech or instead regulable conduct.⁶⁷

To sharpen exploration of how values affect such perceptions, our study involved an experimental manipulation. Half of the subjects were advised that the filmed demonstration occurred outside an abortion clinic, and was aimed at protesting legalized abortion (“abortion clinic condition”); the other half were told the demonstration occurred outside of a college career-placement facility during interviews by the military, and was aimed at protesting the armed forces’ then-existing ban on service by openly gay and lesbian soldiers (“recruitment center condition”).⁶⁸ In both conditions, subjects were advised that the protestors were suing the police for ordering the protestors to disperse on the basis of an ordinance prohibiting “obstructing,” “intimidating,” and “threatening” persons seeking to use the facilities in question. The design permitted us to examine, first, whether subjects with *opposing* cultural worldviews would form different fact perceptions when they were assigned to the same experimental condition (that is, when they had the same beliefs about the cause of the demonstrators); and second, whether subjects assigned to one condition would form fact perceptions at odds with those of subjects who *shared* their worldview but who were assigned to the other condition (that is, who had a different belief about the cause of the protestors).

less remains our duty in a case such as this to make an independent examination of the whole record.”).

⁶⁶ See, e.g., *Madsen v. Women’s Health Center*, 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (abortion-clinic protest); *Cox v. Louisiana*, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (civil rights protest); *United States v. Soderna*, 82 F.3d 1370, 1373 (7th Cir. 1996) (abortion-clinic protest); *Jones v. Parmley*, 465 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2006) (tax protest).

⁶⁷ See, e.g., *Cannon v. City of Denver*, 998 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1993) (overturning ruling of summary judgment against abortion-clinic protestors suing police for breach-of-peace arrest: “We find in the instant case no assault or threatening of bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy, no personal abuse,” but rather “only an effort to persuade a willing listener”) *with id.* at 880 (Anderson, J., separately concurring) (“Frankly, in my view if the plaintiffs’ evidence at the end of a trial remained as it now stands, the trial judge would be entitled to grant a defense motion . . . for judgment as a matter of law” and thus “the record before us now could support the grant of summary judgment to the defendant”).

⁶⁸ The study was conducted in November 2010, before congressional repeal of the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy.

To measure the subjects’ worldviews, we employed scales used in previous studies of cultural cognition.⁶⁹ These scales characterize worldviews along two orthogonal dimensions. The first, Hierarchy-Egalitarianism, measures the subjects’ orientations toward social orderings that either feature or eschew stratified roles and forms of authority. The second, Individualism-Communitarianism, measures their orientations toward orderings that emphasize individual autonomy and self-sufficiency, on the one hand, and those that emphasize collective responsibilities and prerogatives, on the other. Combining the two scales generates four sets of worldviews—“hierarchy individualism,” “hierarchy communitarianism,” “egalitarian individualism” and “egalitarian communitarianism,” to which individuals’ affinities can be measured with continuous worldview scores.

Based on the nature of these cultural predispositions and on previous research, we formed a set of discrete hypotheses. We enumerate them and assign each a descriptive label to facilitate exposition.

1. *EI inversion.* Relatively egalitarian individualist subjects, we surmised, would form *anti-demonstrator* fact perceptions in the abortion condition but *pro-demonstrator* perceptions in the recruitment center condition. Egalitarian individualists are morally opposed both to social stratification, such as that associated with traditional gender roles, and to institutional rankings, such as those that pervade the military. Accordingly, we anticipated that egalitarian individualists would likely be hostile to protestors in the abortion-clinic condition and sympathetic to those in the recruitment-center condition. We also expected that egalitarian individualist subjects would also feel their worldviews were being affirmed and threatened, respectively, by the abortion-clinic and military-recruitment-center “free access” ordinances. We therefore predicted these subjects would be inclined to perceive the protestors had engaged in prohibited “conduct” in the abortion-clinic condition but protected “speech” in the recruitment-center condition.

2. *HC inversion.* We predicted that relatively hierarchical and communitarian subjects, by contrast, would form *pro-demonstrator* fact perceptions in the abortion condition but *anti-demonstrator* perceptions in the recruitment center condition. Hierarchical communitarians are strongly supportive of traditional gender norms, and as a result attach a negative social meaning to abortion rights, which to them denigrate the status properly afforded women for successful mastery of female domestic roles centering on maternity. We anticipated that they would therefore find the ordinance securing free access to abortion clinics particularly obnoxious. In contrast, they attach positive meanings to the military as an institution that is characterized by stratified internal orderings that subordinate the individual to the collective, and as a setting in which men, in particular, can occupy roles that display the virtue of patriotism. These resonances, we predicted, would create identity-protective pressure on hierarchical communitarian subjects to perceive the anti-abortion demonstrators engaged in protected “speech” and the anti-military demonstrators engaged in obstruction, intimidation and like prohibited “conduct.”

⁶⁹ See Dan M. Kahan, [Cultural Cognition as a Conception of the Cultural Theory of Risk](#), in Handbook of Risk Theory (ed. S. Roeser, forthcoming 2011) (Springer Publishing).

3. *HI bias.* We anticipated that subjects holding relatively hierarchical and individualistic values would form strong anti-demonstrator fact perceptions in the recruitment-center condition, but more muted anti-demonstrator perceptions in the abortion-clinic condition. Virtues such as courage, honor, and martial prowess figure conspicuously in this way of life and are status-conferring for men in particular. We expected, then, that hierarchical individualists would be morally hostile to the aims of the protestors in the military-recruitment condition, and hence form fact perceptions consistent with the finding that they engaged in prohibited “conduct” rather than protected “speech.” We anticipated that hierarchical individualists’ would be unlikely to take offense at the message of the anti-abortion protestors. Nevertheless, abortion rights do not bear a meaning nearly as threatening to hierarchical individualists as they do to hierarchical communitarians; in addition, hierarchical individualists tend to place a high value on social order generally. We anticipated, then, that hierarchical individualists would form less strong pro-demonstrator perceptions in the abortion-clinic condition than would hierarchical communitarians.

4. *EC bias.* We hypothesized that relatively egalitarian communitarian subjects would form strong pro-demonstrator fact perceptions in the recruitment-center condition and modestly anti-demonstrator fact perceptions in the abortion-clinic condition. Egalitarian communitarians see the imposition of legal disabilities on gays and lesbians as symbols of institutionalized patriarchy. They strongly support gay marriage and gay parenting, the social meanings of which enable alternative, nonpatriarchal forms of community and shared commitment.⁷⁰ We anticipated that similar sensibilities would make them supportive of lifting removal of restrictions on military service by openly gay and lesbian citizens, and hence trigger culturally motivated cognition supportive of the recruitment-center protestors. We also expected that egalitarian communitarians would be offended by the anti-gender equality resonances of the abortion clinic protestors. Nevertheless, abortion rights also bear individualistic meanings that egalitarian communitarians resist. Accordingly, we anticipated that egalitarian communications in the abortion-clinic condition would feel less impelled than egalitarian individualists in that condition to perceive the demonstrators as engaged in prohibited conduct rather than protected speech.

5. *EI/HC polarization.* The final two hypotheses relate to the expected intensity and character of the disagreement between subjects of opposing cultural identities. We hypothesized that in both conditions there would be strong, mirror image forms of polarization between relatively egalitarian and individualistic subjects, on the one hand, and relatively hierarchical communitarian ones, on the other. This prediction was simply a logical implication of the *EI* and *HC inversion* hypotheses.

6. *EC/HC semi-polarization.* Consistent with the *HI* and *EC bias* hypotheses, we predicted that disagreement between egalitarian and communitarian subjects,

⁷⁰ See Cultural Cognition Project, First Report on Gay & Lesbian Parenting, available at <http://www.culturalcognition.net/browse-papers/first-report-on-gay-and-lesbian-parenting.html>.

on the one hand, and hierarchical and individualistic ones, on the other, would be less symmetric. We expected the two to be strongly polarized in the recruitment-center condition, in which the cultural meaning of the protestors’ cause would exert diametrically opposing forces on their respective perceptions. However, because abortion rights bear more equivocal meanings within the worldviews of both of these groups, we anticipated that their disagreement in the abortion-clinic condition would likely be more moderate.




Figure 1. Summary of hypotheses. Based on their predispositions, subjects with opposing cultural values were expected to disagree with each other within each experimental condition, while those with the same values are expected to disagree with one another between experimental conditions. The *EI/HC polarization hypothesis* predicted that egalitarian individualists and hierarchical individualists would form diametrically opposed perceptions in both conditions. The *EC/HC semi-polarization hypothesis* predicted that egalitarian communitarians and hierarchical individualists would polarize most intensely in the military-recruitment-center condition.

B. Design and Methods

1. Sample

The subjects for the study consisted of 202 American adults. They were selected randomly from a stratified national sample by Polimetrix, Inc.,⁷¹ and participated in the study through Polimetrix’s on-line testing facilities. Forty-six percent of the sample was female. Seventy-two percent were white, and nine percent African-American. The median level of education was between “some” and “two years” of college. The median annual income was between \$40,000 and \$49,999. The average age was 46.

⁷¹ Polimetrix (<http://www.polimetrix.com/>) is a public opinion research firm that conducts on-line surveys and experiments on behalf of academic and governmental researchers and commercial customers (including political campaigns). It maintains a panel of over 1 million Americans that it uses to construct representative study samples. For more information, see <http://www.polimetrix.com/documents/YGPolimetrixSampleMatching.pdf>.

2. Cultural Worldviews

Subjects’ cultural worldviews were measured (in advance of the study) with the “Hierarchy-egalitarianism” (“Hierarchy”) and Individualism-communitarianism (“Individualism”) scales used in previous studies of cultural cognition.⁷² The scales consisted of twelve statements expressing attitudes characteristic of one or the other worldview dimension (e.g., “Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine”; “The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives”), and subjects indicated agreement or disagreement on a six-point scale. Each six-item scale was highly reliable (Hierarchy: Cronbach $\alpha = 0.87$; Individualism: Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.81$),⁷³ and the twelve items loaded appropriately on two separate factors, which were used as continuous predictors for multivariate testing of the study hypotheses.⁷⁴ In addition, to enable illustrative analyses, we designated each subject either a “hierarchical individualist,” a “hierarchical communitarian,” an “egalitarian individualist,” or an “egalitarian communitarian” based on his or her scores in relation to the sample medians on each scale.

3. Stimulus

Subjects were randomly assigned to either the “abortion clinic” condition or the “recruitment center” condition. They were then assigned to read a vignette and view an accompanying video.⁷⁵

a. Vignette. The vignette described the background of a lawsuit by political protestors against individual police officers and the police department. Depending

⁷² See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Hank Jenkins-Smith & Donald Braman, *Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus*, 14 J. Risk Res. 147 (2011). For a full discussion of the complete and short-form versions of the scales and of their psychometric properties, see Dan M. Kahan, *Cultural Cognition as a Conception of the Cultural Theory of Risk*, in Handbook of Risk Theory (ed. S. Roeser, forthcoming 2011) (Springer Publishing).

⁷³ Cronbach’s alpha (α) is a statistic for measuring the internal validity of attitudinal scales. By computing the degree of inter-correlation that exists among various items within a scale, it can be used to assess whether the items can properly be treated as common *indicators* of a latent attitude or trait—i.e., one that cannot be directly observed and measured. See generally Jose M. Cortina, *What Is Coefficient Alpha: An Examination of Theory and Applications*, 78 J. Applied Psychol. 98 (1993). Composite scales of this sort are desirable not only because they facilitate measurement of unobservable dispositions but also because the measurements they enable are necessarily more precise than ones based on any of the individual indicators alone, each of which can be seen as an imperfect or “noisy” approximation of the phenomenon being studied. See generally J. Philippe Rushton, Charles J. Brainerd & Michael Pressley, *Behavioral development and construct validity: The Principle of Aggregation*, 94 Psychol. Bull. 18 (1983). Generally, $\alpha \geq .70$ suggests scale validity—i.e., that the measures when aggregated furnish a reliable measure of the latent trait or attitude. See Cortina, *supra*.

⁷⁴ Treating Hierarchy and Individualism as *continuous predictors* maximizes statistical power and avoids the bias that can be introduced by splitting them at the mean or other selected points in order to transform them into discrete, categorical measures. See James Jaccard & Robert Turrisi, *Interaction Effects in Multiple Regression* 86 (2nd ed. 2003).

⁷⁵ The study instrument, including the vignette and response instruments is reproduced in Appendix A. The videos can be viewed on-line at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k8ru-PE2v_8 and <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X3PJACpL53k>.

on the condition, the protestors were described either as “members of a group that opposes permitting doctors and nurses to perform abortions at the request of pregnant women” or as “members of a group that opposes the ban on allowing openly gay and lesbian citizens to join the military.” The protestors’ complaint, the vignette stated, alleged that the police had “violated their rights by ordering them to end their protest at” either “an abortion clinic” or “a college campus recruitment center the day the Army was scheduled to interview students who were considering enlisting.”

Subjects were told that the defendants claimed halting the protest was justified by a law entitled the “Freedom to Exercise Reproductive Rights Law,” in one condition, or the “Freedom to Serve with Honor Law,” in the other. The law, enacted after a previous judicial ruling found that police lacked “clear guidelines” for halting such protests, made it illegal for “any person to intentionally (1) interfere with, (2) obstruct, (3) intimidate, or (4) threaten any person who is seeking to enter, exit, or remain lawfully on premises of” either “any hospital or medical clinic that is licensed to perform abortions” or “any facility in which the U.S. military is engaged in recruitment activity.” This text was patterned on the federal Freedom of Access to Clinics Entrances Act,⁷⁶ enacted in response to demonstration activity perceived to be intended to impede operation of abortion facilities, and the 2008 “Freedom to Serve Act” bill,⁷⁷ which would have created a similar provision relating to military recruitment facilities.⁷⁸ Each version also authorized officers to order protestors to cease and leave the vicinity upon “observ[ing] or [being] furnished with reliable evidence” that the law was being violated. The protestors, according to the vignette, alleged that they had been “only expressing their views, in a manner that did not violate the law.”

Subjects were advised that both parties agreed that a “video of the protest” furnished an “accurate impression of the nature of the protestors conduct” and

⁷⁶ 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (“FACE”) (“Whoever by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person because that person is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health services” is subject to criminal penalties).

⁷⁷ H.R. 6023, § 3, 110th Congress, May 12, 2008 (“Whoever by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person because that person is or has been providing Federal or State military recruiting service”).

⁷⁸ In *Hill v. Colorado*, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), all nine Justices, including three dissenters who would have invalidated the statute on other grounds, endorsed the constitutionality of language similar to that in our vignettes. *See id.* at 754-55 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.) (portion of law that “knowingly obstructs, detains, hinders, impedes, or blocks another person’s entry to or exit from a health care facility” is “narrowly tailored to serve” the state’s “asserted” interest in securing access to such a facility and would not have been reinforced with additional provisions had the state not also interested in stifling abortion-clinic protestors in particular); *id.* at 777 (presenting the same position). Lower courts have rejected constitutional challenges to FACE. *See, e.g.,* *United States v. Soderna*, 82 F.3d 1370, 1375 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.) (“To persuade and to blockade are importantly different forms of action.”).

thus represented “the key evidence” in the case. However, the parties were described as

disagree[ing] about whose position the video most supports: the position of the police officers, who assert that the protestors were “intimidating, interfering, obstructing or threatening” people trying to enter the abortion clinic campus recruitment center; or the position of the protestors, who say they were merely expressing their views in a lawful manner.

“Deciding who is right is the task for you as a member of the jury,” the vignette stated. Subjects were then instructed to view the video.

b. Video. Approximately three and one-half minutes in length, the video depicts an actual political demonstration that occurred in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in March, 2009. The protestors included approximately half-a-dozen members of the Westboro Church, a Kansas-based group whose members conduct demonstrations condemning homosexuality.⁷⁹ Also present was a substantially larger number of counter-demonstrators (approximately 200), although the video was designed to create the impression that they and the church members formed a single mass of protestors. The video consisted of five distinct scenes showing both the Westboro Church members and the counter-demonstrators congregated near the entrance of a building. The video also contains numerous shots of helmeted police officers who were present to direct traffic and control the crowd in the vicinity of the protest. In certain scenes, pedestrians (all college-aged males and females) are shown either veering away from the protestors gathered near the entrance of the building or walking in the opposite direction of the entrance while looking over their shoulders at the crowd (Figure 2).

⁷⁹ See *Snyder v. Phelps*, 113 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). The Supreme Court granted *certiorari* in *Phelps* approximately a year after the Cambridge demonstration that is featured in the study videotape. At issue in *Phelps* was an award of damages against the Westboro Church members for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The basis of the award was a protest that the Church conducted at the funeral of a soldier, whose death, the Church asserted, was an act of retaliation by God for the United States’s tolerance of homosexuality. Applying the teleological conception of speech, the Court held that the award of damages to the soldier’s father violated the First Amendment because “any distress occasioned by Westboro’s picketing turned on the content and viewpoint of the message conveyed, rather than any interference with the funeral itself.” *Id.* at 1219. The Court emphasized the “narrow” basis of this disposition, *id.* at 1220; nothing in its ruling, the Court indicated, would affect the authority of the state to sanction or prohibit protest behavior that was “unruly” or “violen[t],” *id.* at 1219-20, or that otherwise “disrupt[ed] th[e] funeral,” *id.* at 1220—the sorts of “noncommunicative” harms that can be averted or redressed consistent with the First Amendment.



Figure 2. Video. Subjects in each condition viewed a video of a political demonstration. Wording of signs was blurred to prevent identification of the actual subject matter of the protest. Subjects were instructed that blurring had been ordered by the court to prevent jurors from being influenced by the messages they contained.

A screen of explanatory text appeared before each scene (Figure 3). Described as “based on witness statements the parties agree is accurate,” the text related, in a deliberately bland manner meant to avoid expressing a position on any disputed issue, what the next scene would show (e.g., “Outside [the reproductive health clinic or campus recruitment center] 15 minutes before it was scheduled to open”). The text indicated that the pedestrians—described as either clinic “patients” and “staff” or “students” scheduled for interviews—did not enter the facility but did not state a reason (“Scene at the entrance of [clinic/campus recruitment center]. [Patient/student] approaches but does not enter”). In two scenes, a middle-aged man conversing with a police officer is identified as the “director” of either the “clinic” or “recruitment center” and is described as urging the police to halt the demonstration.

Modifications of the film were also made to prevent subjects from identifying the actual positions of either the Westboro Church members or the counterdemonstrators. These included the blurring of messages on their respective signs; subjects were instructed that the court had ordered the blurring to “assure that th[e] messages did not affect the jury one way or the other,” because “the U.S. Constitution prohibits the police from breaking up a protest based on the *messages* the protestors are trying to communicate.” Generic crowd noise, consisting primarily of a cacophony of shouts and chants, was added as a sound track.




Figure 3. Video text screens. Each of the five scenes in the video was introduced by a text screen. The text screens contained minor variations to fit the experimental condition but were otherwise identical in both conditions.

A pretest conducted on a group of approximately 100 judges and lawyers confirmed that the tape could be plausibly identified as either an abortion-clinic or a recruitment-center protest. None of the participants in the pretest recognized the protestors. Debriefing feedback for the study suggested that only one subject identified the protestors as members of the Westboro Church. That subject’s responses were therefore excluded from analysis.

The intent of both the filming and editing was to create grounds for opposing conclusions about the key facts. At no point is there physical contact between the protestors or counter-demonstrators and the pedestrians identified as not entering the facility. Nevertheless, the proximity of the protestors to the pedestrians and their proximity to the entrance would have furnished a basis for inferring that the pedestrians were either obstructed or intimidated. So would the passionate behavior of the demonstrators, including in particular one female protestor who is shown at various points yelling and gesturing in the direction (one would assume) of those intent on entering the facility. Yet it could also have been inferred that pedestrians avoided entering either because they were persuaded by the protestors’ message, were averse to being obliged to listen to the protestors, or were anxious not to be publicly condemned for their behavior. Members of the lawyer-judge pretest panel were close to evenly divided on these matters and thus on whether the police had cause for ordering a cessation of the protest.⁸⁰

⁸⁰ In reality, the police did not halt the protest, which terminated without incident after a period of approximately 45 minutes.

4. Response Measures

After watching the video, subjects were asked to indicate on a six-point scale their level of disagreement or agreement with twenty-one response items. The first seventeen items related to various facts relevant to application of the standard set forth in “the Freedom to Exercise Reproductive Rights Law” or the “Freedom to Serve with Honor Law.” Some of the items indicated that the police acted on grounds that would justify treating the protest activity as prohibited “conduct” under prevailing First Amendment doctrine (e.g., “The protestors obstructed individuals seeking to enter, exit, or remain lawfully on the premises of the [abortion clinic/campus recruitment center]; “There was a risk that the protestors might resort to violence if anyone tried to enter.”).⁸¹ Others, in contrast, suggested the protestors were engaged in lawful “speech” and that the motivation for ordering a halt to the demonstration was “speech related” and hence impermissible (e.g., “The protestors intended only to persuade people not to go into the [abortion clinic campus recruitment center], not to physically interfere with, intimidate, obstruct, or threaten anybody”; “It is more likely the director asked the police to break up the protest because the director and others found dealing with the protestors annoying than because the protestors were interfering with, intimidating, obstructing, or threatening anyone”).⁸² Some items attributed to the protestors behavior that clearly did not occur—that they “shoved” prospective facility users and “spit” at them, for example—but most of the facts were matters of interpretation and inference.

The last four items related to the proper disposition of the case. These included the appropriateness of an award of damages and entry of an injunction against future police “interfer[ence] with protests under conditions like the ones shown in the video.”

The fact and case-disposition items formed a highly reliable composite scale. Designated Pro_Protest (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.95$), the scale furnished a continuous measure (standardized by z -score transformation) of each subject’s relative inclination to form pro-demonstrator fact perceptions and case-disposition judgments.⁸³

⁸¹ The necessity of finding facts such as these, which parallel ones that the Supreme Court has indicated supply permissible grounds for restricting protest activity, *see supra* pp. 11-12, has been emphasized by the lower courts that have rejected constitutional challenges to the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act. *See, e.g., United States v. Scott*, 958 F. Supp. 761, 764 (D. Conn. 1997). The court in *Scott* found that one defendant protestor had violated FACE by “physically obstructing and threatening persons seeking to enter and exit . . . in order to intimidate and interfere,” *id.* at 768, but that a second had not because “her intent in sidewalk counseling and leafleting [was only] to persuade women to consider alternatives to abortion,” *id.* at 770-71.

⁸² *Cf. Terminello*, 340 U.S. at 4.

⁸³ Items expressing a pro-defense fact perception or outcome-judgment were reverse coded.

5. Analytic Strategy

Multivariate regression furnishes an appropriate and straightforward procedure for testing the study hypotheses.⁸⁴ Because Pro_Protest supplies a more precise measure of the latent disposition to form pro-plaintiff reactions than do the individual items, the scale furnishes the most reliable outcome variable for testing the study hypotheses.⁸⁵ The predictors in our study include the experimental manipulation, which we denote by the variable Recruitment (abortion-clinic = 0; recruitment-center = 1); and subjects’ worldviews, which are measured by their scores on the Hierarchy and Individualism scales. To enable testing of hypotheses relating to the varying impact of subjects’ cultural worldviews in the two experimental conditions, we constructed product-interaction terms: Hierarchy_x_Recruitment and Individualism_x_Recruitment, which measure any difference that an increasing disposition toward hierarchy or individualism, respectively, has on subjects’ fact and case case-disposition responses in the recruitment-center (Recruitment = 1) as opposed to the abortion-clinic (Recruitment = 0) condition.⁸⁶

C. Results

The study results appear in the regression analyses reported in (Table 1). Predictors and cross-product interaction terms are entered in steps to promote interpretation of the contribution that the various predictors make to variance in reactions to the video, as measured in Pro_Protest. Model 3 incorporates all the predictor and cross-product interaction terms that bear on the study hypotheses.⁸⁷

Putting aside subjects’ cultural worldviews, the impact of being assigned to one experimental condition or another is negligible. The coefficient for *Recruitment* indicates the impact of being assigned to the recruitment-center as opposed to the abortion-clinic condition. In Model 1, in which the experimental assignment is treated as the only predictor, the value of the coefficient for Recruitment is close to zero and is statistically nonsignificant.

⁸⁴ Charles M. Judd, *Everyday Data Analysis in Social Psychology: Comparisons of Linear Models*, in *Handbook of research methods in social and personality psychology* 370 (H. T. Reis and C. M. Judd ed., 2000) (outlining use of multivariate regression for analysis of experimental results and explaining advantages over ANOVA).

⁸⁵ See note 73 *supra*.

⁸⁶ See generally Jacob Cohen, Patricia Cohen, Stephen G. West & Leona S. Aiken, *Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences* 375-83 (3rd ed. 2003) (outlining and explaining the use of cross-product interaction terms in multivariate regression to model and test the hypothesis that the effect of a continuous predictor will vary across the levels of a categorical one).

⁸⁷ The underlying regression equation in Model 3 is

$$Y = b1 \times \text{Recruitment} + b2 \times \text{Hierarchy} + b3 \times \text{Individualism} + b4 \times \text{Hierarchy} \times \text{Recruitment} + b5 \times \text{Individualism} \times \text{Recruitment} + \text{constant}$$

where *Y* is the score on the score on Pro_Protest, and *b1-b5* the coefficients for the specified predictors and cross-product interaction variables.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Recruitment	-0.01	(0.14)	-0.01	(0.14)	-0.01	(0.13)
Hierarchy			-0.07	(0.07)	0.32	(0.09)
Individualism			-0.06	(0.07)	-0.26	(0.09)
Hierarchy x Recruitment					-0.82	(0.13)
Individualism x Recruitment					0.30	(0.13)
Constant	0.00	(0.10)	0.02	(0.10)	0.04	(0.09)
R^2	0.00		0.01		0.19	
ΔF			0.83		21.72	

Table 1. Multivariate regression analysis. $N = 196$. Dependent variable is Pro_Protest, the composite response-item scale transformed to a z-score with a mean of 0. Predictor effects are measured with unstandardized linear (OLS) regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bold type indicates that the predictor coefficient or change in F statistic is significant at $p < 0.05$.

Aggregate impressions not only were comparable between the two conditions but were also closely divided within each. This conclusion is reflected clearly in the raw data (Figure 4). In the abortion-clinic condition, 49% of the subjects indicated that they agreed (either “slightly,” “moderately,” or “strongly”) that the police should be found liable for ordering the protestors to cease the demonstration. In the recruitment-center condition, 45% of the subjects agreed the police should be found liable (Figure 4). Comparable proportions supported the proposition that the police should be enjoined from halting protests “under conditions like the ones shown in the video” (recruitment center, 46%; abortion clinic, 45%). The proportion who agreed that the protestors should be awarded damages was smaller—25% in each condition.




Figure 4. Main effects. Bars indicate the percentage of subjects who agreed (either “slightly,” “moderately,” or “strongly”) with items proposing the indicated dispositions.

Considered apart from the experimental manipulation, cultural worldviews likewise appear to have no meaningful effect on reactions to the video. The coefficients for Hierarchy and Individualism in Model 2 indicate the impact of subjects’

scores on the indicated worldview variables averaged across the two conditions. Again, both coefficients are close to zero and are statistically nonsignificant. There is no evidence, then, that being inclined either toward hierarchy or egalitarianism, toward individualism or communitarianism, or toward any combination of the two disposes individuals toward pro- or anti-demonstrator reactions irrespective of what subjects believe about the political cause of the demonstrators.

When cultural worldviews and experimental conditions are considered *together*, however, it becomes clear that who saw what did depend critically on the relationship between the demonstrators’ causes and the subjects’ own values. The nature of these influences, moreover, was consistent with study hypotheses.

The condition-specific effect of each worldview is reflected in Model 3.⁸⁸ Their impact in the abortion-clinic condition are indicated by the coefficient for Hierarchy, which is positive, and by the coefficient for Individualism, which is negative (both are significant).⁸⁹ These results indicate that subjects in the abortion-clinic condition formed progressively more *pro*-demonstrator fact perceptions and case-disposition preferences as their values became either *more hierarchical* or *more communitarian*; by the same token, they formed progressively more *anti*-demonstrator perceptions and preferences as their values became either *more egalitarian* or *more individualistic*. These relationships are reversed in the recruitment-center condition: the *positive* coefficients for Hierarchy_x_Recruitment and the negative ones for Individualism_x_Recruitment indicate that in that condition pro-demonstrator reactions dissipated as subjects become either more hierarchical or communitarian, but grew as subjects become either more egalitarian or individualistic.⁹⁰ It follows that subjects who are *simultaneously* more egalitarian and individualistic will form relatively extreme anti-demonstrator impressions in the abortion-clinic condition and pro-demonstrator impressions in the recruitment-center condition. Subjects who are who are simultaneously more hierarchical and communitarian (under any of the models) will form exactly the opposite impressions. These results thus confirm the *EI inversion* and *HC inversion* hypotheses, and hence the *EI/HC polarization* hypothesis as well.

It is more difficult to assess the remaining hypotheses by simply scrutinizing the regression outputs. Because Hierarchy and Individualism have opposite signs

⁸⁸ In Model 3, the coefficient for Recruitment and the constant are the effects of being assigned either to the military-recruitment center condition or to the abortion-clinic condition, respectively, when the cultural worldviews are equal to zero, or their mean values. Again, they are close to zero and statistically nonsignificant. One can thus conclude that the “culturally average” subject would react comparably in both conditions.

⁸⁹ The coefficients for each worldview predictor indicates the impact of the specified worldview scale when all the other predictors equal zero, *see* Leona S. Aiken, Stephen G. West & Raymond R. Reno, *Multiple Regression: Testing and Interpreting Interactions* 123-25 (1991), which will be true when a subject is assigned to the abortion-center condition (Recruitment = 0) and has the mean score on the other worldview scale.

⁹⁰ The coefficients for each cross-product interaction variable indicates the unique incremental effect associated with the indicated worldview in the recruitment-center condition. *See generally id.*

from each other in both conditions (and for each outcome variable), disagreement between subjects who are more hierarchical and individualistic, on the one hand, and those who are more egalitarian and communitarian, on the other, will necessarily be less extreme. This is consistent with the *EC/HI semi-polarization* hypothesis, but cannot be determined to support either it or the *EC bias* and *HI bias* hypotheses unless the magnitudes of offsetting effects are estimated and compared in each condition.




Figure 5. Multivariate regression estimates. Graphs display the impact of culture-condition interactions tested in the multivariate regression analyses (Table 1). Group estimates formed by setting values for Hierarchy and Individualism at ± 1 SD from the mean in the specified directions. CIs reflect 0.95 level of confidence. Change in each group’s score between conditions is significant at $p < 0.05$.⁹¹

Those effects are plotted in Figure 5. Consistent with the *EI* and *HC inversion* hypotheses, the estimated scores for Egalitarian Individualists and for Hierarchical Communitarians scales flip.⁹² It is also evident from the estimates that Egalitarian Communitarians became significantly more pro-demonstrator, Hierarchical Individualists significantly more anti-demonstrator, in the recruitment-center condition as opposed to the abortion-center condition. Whereas the difference between Egalitarian Individualists and Hierarchical Communitarians is significant in both conditions, the difference between Egalitarian Communitarians and Hierarchical Indi-

⁹¹ The statistical significance of the difference between any group’s estimated score in one condition and its estimated score in another, and of the difference between any two group’s estimated scores within a condition, must be determined by calculation. However, a rough visual heuristic is to consider whether the 0.95 confidence interval of one estimate overlaps with the point estimate of another (not the latter’s confidence interval, as is sometimes mistakenly stated). See generally Geoff Cumming & Sue Finch, *Inference by Eye: Confidence Intervals and How to Read Pictures of Data*, 60 *Am. Psychol.* 170 (2005); Sarah Belia, Fiona Fidler, Jennifer Williams & Geoff Cumming, *Researchers Misunderstand Confidence Intervals and Standard Error Bars*, 10 *Psychol. Methods* 389 (2005); Nathaniel Schenker & Jane F. Gentleman, *On Judging the Significance of Differences by Examining the Overlap Between Confidence Intervals*, 55 *Am. Stat.* 182 (2001).

⁹² For purposes of these estimates, the values for the cultural worldview predictors were both set one standard deviation from their means in the directions necessary to form the specified worldview combinations. See *id.* at 13.

vidualists is significant *only* in the recruitment center condition. This result fits the *EC/II semi-polarization* hypothesis, although we had not anticipated that there would be essentially no meaningful difference whatsoever between Egalitarian Communitarian and Hierarchical Individualistic subjects in the abortion-center condition.




Figure 6. Case-outcome measures, by cultural group. Lines connect points indicating the percentage of subjects within each of specified cultural groups who agreed (either “slightly,” “moderately,” or “strongly”) with items proposing the indicated dispositions.

The practical impact of these effects is readily illustrated by examining the responses for individual items (Figure 6 and Figure 7). Subjects characterized (on the basis of their mean scores on the worldview scales) as Egalitarian Individualists and Hierarchical Communitarians reacted in strong and opposite ways to the experimental manipulation (Figure 6). In the abortion-clinic condition, 70% of the Hierarchical Communitarians found that the police had violated the demonstrators’ rights. Yet in the recruitment-center condition, only 16% did. Matters were the other way around for Egalitarian Individualists: 76% of them concluded that the police had violated the rights of the protestors in the military-recruitment condi-

tion, yet only 28% of them took that position in the abortion-clinic condition. These patterns fit the *EI Inversion*, *HC Inversion*, and *EI/HC polarization* hypotheses.




Figure 7. Responses to select fact items, by cultural group. Lines connect points that indicate the percentage of subjects within each of specified cultural groups who agreed (either “slightly,” “moderately,” or “strongly”) with items proposing the indicated facts.

Egalitarian Communitarians and Hierarchical Individualists also reacted as predicted. In the abortion-clinic condition, 52% of both Egalitarian communitarians and Hierarchical Individualists found that the police abridged the protestors’ right to free speech. In the recruitment-center condition, the proportion of Egalitarian Communitarians who found a constitutional violation jumped to 71%, while the proportion of Hierarchical Individualists who did fell to just 17%. This pattern fits the *EC* and *HI* bias hypotheses, as well as the *EC/HI semi-polarization* hypothesis.

There was comparable cultural dissensus over remedies. Majorities of Egalitarian Individualists (69%) and Egalitarian Communitarians (59%) favored enjoining the police in the recruitment center condition, whereas only minorities of these subjects (Egalitarian Individualists, 12%; Egalitarian Communitarians, 48%) did in the abortion-clinic condition. Minorities of both Hierarchical Communitarians (32%) and Hierarchical Individualists (17%) favored issuing an injunction against the police in the recruitment-center condition; in the abortion-clinic condition, the proportion of Hierarchical Communitarians who supported an injunction rose to 65%, and the proportion of Hierarchical Individualists to an even 50%. Consistent with the sample-wide outcome, support among subjects of all worldviews was lower for damages than for injunctive relief. Nevertheless, for Hierarchical Communitarians and Egalitarian Individualists, in particular, the proportions support-

ing damages shifted within and between conditions in patterns identical to the shifts on the other outcome measures.

As one would expect, these differences in case-disposition judgments are mirrored in the subjects’ responses to the fact-perception items. Whereas only 39% of the Hierarchical Communitarians perceived that the protestors were *blocking* the pedestrians in the abortion-clinic condition, for example, 74% of them saw blocking in the recruitment-center condition. Only 45% of Egalitarian Individualists, in contrast, saw blocking in the recruitment-center condition, whereas in the recruitment-center condition 76% of them did. Fully 83% of Hierarchical Individualists saw blocking in the military recruitment-center condition, up from 62% in the abortion-clinic condition; a 56% majority of Egalitarian Communitarians saw blocking in that condition, yet only 35% saw such conduct in the recruitment-center condition. Responses on other items—such as whether the protestors “screamed in the face” of pedestrians and whether the protestors intended only to persuade or instead to threaten—displayed similar patterns.

Relatively few subjects reported observing “spitting” (18%) or “shoving” (16%) by the protestors or “physical contact” (20%) between the protestors and the pedestrians. There was also no meaningful cultural variation with respect to these items. This result suggests that the influence of values was confined to facts on which there was at least modest room for interpretation. It also helps to confirm that the subjects were not responding in a consciously biased manner in general.

IV. ANALYZING, APPRAISING, AND ADVOCATING

A. Summary of Results

The theoretical aim of the study was to test the hypothesis that culturally motivated cognition would influence individuals’ perceptions of facts essential to distinguishing “speech” from “conduct” for purposes of the First Amendment. The results strongly supported this hypothesis. Our subjects all viewed the same video. But what they *saw*—earnest voicing of dissent intended only to persuade, or physical intimidation calculated to interfere with the freedom of others—depended on the congruence of the protestors’ positions with the subjects’ own cultural values.

Motivated cognition not only polarized individuals of diverse cultural outlooks but also generated contradictions in what subjects of a shared orientation reported seeing. Relatively hierarchical and communitarian subjects rejected the proposition, credited by relatively egalitarian and individualistic ones, that demonstrators were blocking access to a facility represented to be an abortion clinic; yet when hierarchical communitarians understood the demonstrators to be objecting to the exclusion of openly gay and lesbian citizens from the military, they agreed the protestors were blocking access to the same building—a claim that egalitarian individualists now overwhelmingly dismissed. Subjects subscribing to a hierarchical individualistic outlook as well as those adhering to an egalitarian communitarian one exhibited similar shifts in perception.

We focused on our subjects’ cultural worldviews because of the demonstrated role of these outlooks in shaping perceptions of risk and related facts relevant to policy and law.⁹³ Our results thus suggest the utility of cultural cognition theory for measuring the impact and explaining the sources of motivated reasoning in constitutional decisionmaking as well.⁹⁴

⁹³ It is reasonable to surmise that the controversies featured in this study would divide subjects along lines in addition to cultural outlooks as we measure them. For example, women (55%) were more likely than men (37%) to agree that the police should be enjoined from halting future demonstrations. The proportions of both male and female subjects who supported this outcome, however, did not differ meaningfully across conditions. Thus, cultural variance obviously cannot be attributed or reduced to gender variance. Political party affiliation *did* register sensitivity to the experimental manipulation: in the abortion-clinic condition, the majority of Democrats (57%) opposed an injunctive remedy, and a majority of Republicans (62%) favored it; in the recruitment-center condition, a majority of Republicans (67%) opposed and a majority of Democrats (61%) favored such an outcome. Of course, this simple partisan inversion of impressions is necessarily less nuanced than the cross-cutting shifts observed when members of the sample were classified simultaneously along the two cultural dimensions. Moreover, among the *third* of the sample that did not identify themselves as either Democrats or Republicans, there was again no difference between the abortion-clinic and military-recruitment conditions. We are eager to add, however, that we regard the question “what has the biggest impact—culture, gender, political ideology, race, etc.?”—as ill-posed. Cultural worldviews tend to cohere with other characteristics—including political affiliation, gender, race, and class—in patterns that indicate the same latent predispositions the cultural worldviews by themselves measure. See Kahan, *supra* note 72. When forced to choose—as one often is, by sample size—cultural worldviews can be expected to be more discerning indicators of these predispositions, and hence stronger predictors of cultural variance in cognition, than these other characteristics. See Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, Geoffrey L. Cohen, John Gastil & Paul Slovic, [Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, Who Doesn't, and Why? An Experimental Study of the Mechanisms of Cultural Cognition](#), 34 *L. & Human Behavior* 501, 505 n.5 (2010). Ideally, however, nonlinear scaling and classification techniques, such as grade-of-membership modeling and latent class analysis, could be used to form even more discerning and hence even more predictive measures of cultural predispositions based on appropriate combinations of cultural worldviews and related identifying characteristics. See generally Kenneth G. Manton, Max A. Woodbury, Eric Stallard & Larry S. Corder, *The Use of Grade-of-Membership Techniques to Estimate Regression Relationships*, 22 *Socio. Method.* 321 (1992); R. F. Potthoff, K. G. Manton & M. A. Woodbury, *Dirichlet Generalizations of Latent-Class Models*, 17 *J. Classification* 315-353 (2000). Such an analysis would likely add resolution and detail to the picture of motivated cognition that our data reveal. But it would still be culturally motivated cognition that is being observed.

⁹⁴ We used a video to elicit evidence of cultural cognition because of the utility of a visual stimulus for the experimental design and because of the prevalence of video proof in real-world cases that involve First Amendment challenges to restrictions on protest activity. See *supra* note 62. Our results thus reinforce the concerns and cautions of authors who have emphasized the risk that judges and jurors will invest video proofs, which are becoming increasingly common, to mislead. See Neal Feingson & Christina Spiesel, *Law On Display: The Digital Transformation of Legal Persuasion and Judgment* (2009); Jessica Silbey, *Cross-Examining Film*, 8 *U. Md. L. J. Race, Religion, Gender & Class* 17 (2009); Howard M. Wasserman, *Video Evidence and Summary Judgment: The Procedure of Scott v. Harris*, 91 *Judicature* 108 (2008). Nevertheless, the impact of cultural cognition is by no means limited to visual perception. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, Paul Slovic, John Gastil & Geoff Cohen, [Cultural Cognition of the Risks and Benefits of Nanotechnology](#), 4 *Nature Nanotechnology* 87 (2009) (biased assimilation of evidence in written materials). Nor is there any reason to believe that videos are a form of trial proof uniquely vulnerable to the effects of culturally motivated cognition. See Kahan, Hoffman, & Braman, *supra* note 4, at 900-01.

B. *Cognitive Illiberalism and the Constitution*

The practical motivation for this study was to focus attention on the danger that *cognitive illiberalism* can pose to constitutional law. We use this term to refer to the vulnerability of political and legal decisionmakers to betray their commitment to liberal neutrality by unconsciously fitting their perceptions of risk and related facts to their sectarian understandings of the good life. This is the dynamic, we believe, that transforms seemingly empirical debates over how to protect the environment, promote public health, and secure the nation from external threats into occasions for divisive group-based status competition.⁹⁵ Our study results show how readily constitutional decisionmaking can become infected by this pathology.

In our subjects, cognitive illiberalism eviscerated the line between speech and conduct. The “speech”-“conduct” distinction can be seen as one doctrinal device courts employ to test whether a regulation conforms to liberal prohibition on governmental promotion of a moral or political orthodoxy: by requiring that a regulation be shown to promote a governmental interest independent of hostility to any particular idea, the teleological conception of the “speech”-“conduct” divide assures that law is used to pursue secular goods of value to all citizens regardless of their cultural outlooks.⁹⁶ Enforcing this test, however, necessarily requires decisionmakers to make critical determinations of *fact*: in the case of a mass demonstration, for example, did the protestors *intend* to intimidate or only *persuade*; were the protestors simply expressing impassioned dissent or did they impose themselves on members of the public in an assaultive or invasive manner (e.g., “screaming in their faces”); were onlookers genuinely frightened of physical assault—or merely angry, offended, or possibly even ashamed by exposure to the protestors’ message; did law enforcement actors intervene to preempt incitement to violence or only to quell a public backlash propelled by animosity toward the demonstrators’ point of view? For our subjects, the answers were decisively shaped by the congruence between the protestors’ message and the subjects’ own cultural worldviews. As a result, in the course of certifying that the law was free of culturally partisan influence, they ended up infusing it with exactly that.

Other First Amendment doctrines also seem vulnerable to this type of subversion. Like the speech-conduct distinction, the so-called “time, place, manner” doctrine requires that regulations be justified on the basis of an “interest unrelated to suppression of expression.”⁹⁷ It thus requires the same sort of fact-finding, subject to the same danger of motivated cognition and the same dangers of polarization.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ See Dan M. Kahan, *The Cognitively Illiberal State*, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 115 (2007).

⁹⁶ See Rubinfeld, *supra* note 13, at 818-19; *supra* pp. 7-8.

⁹⁷ See *Clark v. CCNV*, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).

⁹⁸ Cf. *id.* at 299 (“standard . . . for validating a regulation of expressive conduct . . . in the last analysis is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions”).

In addition, valid “time, place, manner” restrictions must be “content neutral”—that is, applicable without regard to speakers’ topics or points of view.⁹⁹ Regulators might try to evade this requirement by resort to seemingly general regulations (say, that marchers acquire liability insurance for a particular level of damages) that, in practice, meaningfully limits only a disfavored point of view (Ku Klux Klan members proposing to march in a predominantly Jewish community).¹⁰⁰ Or regulators might apply a facially neutral provision (e.g., on the number of groups that will be issued permits to march on a given day) in a selective manner that reflects their animosity toward a particular message or idea (“Irish gay pride,” on St. Patrick’s Day).¹⁰¹ We expect searching First Amendment review to give the lie to such stratagems.¹⁰² But if legal decisionmakers’ cannot shake the influence of culturally motivated cognition, how can we be confident that they themselves will reliably *perceive* that a regulator is defying the content-neutrality requirement in one of these ways? Why shouldn’t we expect those decisionmakers to *be perceived* by those who see things otherwise as having fit their conclusions to their values?

The same dynamics inhere in First Amendment standards relating to “unprotected” and “low value” categories of speech. Authorities can ban *obscenity* but not pornography, *fighting words* but not dissent: yet cultural meanings might well be exactly what a legal decisionmaker is perceiving when she determines that a particular form of speech (a depiction of a woman enjoying adulterous sex—or forced sex¹⁰³; the burning of a flag¹⁰⁴—or a cross¹⁰⁵) is one and not the other. The First

⁹⁹ See, e.g., *See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n*, 447 U.S. 530, 535-536 (1980).

¹⁰⁰ Cf. *Collin v. Smith*, 578 F.2d 1197, 1208 (7th Cir. 1978) (“[T]he Village has flatly prohibited First Amendment activity, not itself directly productive of the feared injury, by those too controversial to obtain commercial insurance.”).

¹⁰¹ Cf. *Olivieri v. Ward*, 637 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding “logistical” concerns to be a pretext for denying gay rights group a permit to assemble in public forum along St. Patrick’s Day parade route). But cf. *Irish Lesbian and Gay Organization v. Giuliani*, 918 F. Supp. 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (upholding reliance on content-neutral criteria involving traffic disruption and public safety to deny marching permit to gay and lesbian group).

¹⁰² See generally *Burson v. Freeman*, 504 U.S. 191, 213 (1992) (“In some cases, a censorial justification will not be apparent from the face of a regulation which draws distinctions based on content, and the government will tender a plausible justification unrelated to the suppression of speech or ideas. There the compelling-interest test may be one analytical device to detect, in an objective way, whether the asserted justification is in fact an accurate description of the purpose and effect of the law.”) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Kagan, *supra* note 7, at 454 (“the strict scrutiny test operates as a measure of governmental motive”); Rubinfeld, *supra* note 13, at 786 (First Amendment strict scrutiny best conceived of as a “a device for smoking out impermissible purposes”).¹⁰³ Cf. *American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut*, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).

¹⁰³ Cf. *American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut*, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).

¹⁰⁴ Cf. *R.A.V. v. St. Paul*, 505 U.S. 377, 416 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (cross-burning has “communicative content— communicative content—a message of racial, religious, or gender hostility”).

Amendment demands *proof* when regulators invoke “secondary effects”—traffic congestion, disruption of commerce, increased incidence of crime, and the like—to justify zoning restrictions on strip clubs and other forms of “low value” speech.¹⁰⁶ But if legal decisionmakers’ own ability to weigh the proffered evidence is affected by motivated cognition, they will do a poor, or at least a suspect, job of distinguishing pretext from truth.

Indeed, we suspect this point can be generalized to constitutional theorizing as a whole. As discussed, the First Amendment can be integrated into a general theory that reads the Constitution as implementing the liberal prohibition on state endorsement of partisan conceptions of the good life.¹⁰⁷ Like the First Amendment, the Equal Protection and the Due Process Clauses require courts to “strictly scrutinize” proffered secular rationales—public health, deterrence of criminal violence, national security, and the like—to “flush out” the impact, conscious or unconscious, of regulators’ animosity toward those whose identity or values defy dominant norms.¹⁰⁸ But if legal decisionmakers, like everyone else, are *cognitively motivated* by their cultural affiliations, then they—like everyone else—are more or less likely to *see* challenged laws as contributing to attainment of secular ends depending on whether those laws affirm or denigrate their own cultural commitments. Angry denunciations of judges who have thrown their lot in with one or the another of the belligerents in the American “culture wars” is itself a form of status conflict characteristic of cognitive illiberalism.¹⁰⁹

Some legal commentators¹¹⁰ (and historically certain jurists¹¹¹) have criticized constitutional standards that “balance” constitutional liberties against “com-

¹⁰⁵ Cf. *United States v. Eichman*, 496 U.S. 310, (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Th[is] case has nothing to do with ‘disagreeable ideas.’ It involves disagreeable conduct. . .”).

¹⁰⁶ See generally *City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.*, 535 U.S. 425, 438-39 (2002) (explaining that governing authority must furnish “evidence . . . [to] support its rationale” and cannot “get away with shoddy data or reasoning”).

¹⁰⁷ See *supra* pp. 7-8

¹⁰⁸ See *City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.*, 473 U.S. 432, 471, (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting *United States v. Carolene Products Co.*, 304 U.S. 144, n. 4 (1938)):

The discreteness and insularity warranting a ‘more searching judicial inquiry’ must . . . be viewed from a social and cultural perspective as well as a political one. To this task judges are well suited, for the lessons of history and experience are surely the best guide as to when, and with respect to what interests, society is likely to stigmatize individuals as members of an inferior caste or view them as not belonging to the community. . . . “

See generally John Hart Ely, *Democracy and Distrust* 146 (1980) (strict scrutiny “smokes out” illicit motivation in Equal Protection analysis); Jed Rubenfeld, *Affirmative Action*, 107 Yale L.J. 427, 436-37 (1997) (same).

¹⁰⁹ See generally J.M. Balkin, *The Constitution of Status*, 106 Yale L.J. 2313 (1997).

¹¹⁰ See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, *Affirmative Action*, 107 Yale L.J. 427, 441-43 (1997) (arguing against interest-balancing in Equal Protection analysis); Rubenfeld, *supra* note 13, at 778-93 (arguing against interest-balancing in Free Speech analysis).

elling interests,” such as national security, public order, and diversity. The phenomenon of culturally motivated cognition vindicates their anxiety that such “tests inevitably become intertwined with the ideological predispositions of those doing the balancing.”¹¹² But our study results suggest that these commentators are too quick to assume that their preferred alternative to balancing—such as the “teleological conception” of the speech-conduct distinction, the “anti-caste” principle,¹¹³ the liberal “harm” criterion,¹¹⁴ and the like—will necessarily avoid such entanglement. The primary implication of our study—the main message we are trying to get across—is that constitutional theorists have paid too much attention to explicating the normative content of various free speech standards and too little to the psychology of enforcing them.

C. Judges, Jurors, and Citizens

We have been assessing the potential impact and implications of culturally motivated cognition on constitutional decisionmaking. It should not be assumed, however, that all constitutional fact finders think in the same way. The design and sample we used in this study furnish evidence of how members of the public might be influenced by cultural cognition as jurors called upon to make findings of fact pertinent to the speech-conduct distinction and related doctrines.¹¹⁵ But oftentimes—when protestors seek a preliminary injunction against police interference with a planned rally or march, for example—*judges* will make these sorts of findings. Indeed, how likely such determinations are to be made by judges rather than jurors can be influenced by making appropriate adjustments in the standards used to decide threshold motions or to review findings of fact on appeal. Do the study results furnish insight on how factfinding and related decisionmaking tasks should be allocated between judges and jurors?

¹¹¹ See *Konigsberg v. State Bar*, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I believe that the First Amendment’s unequivocal command that there shall be no abridgement of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the ‘balancing’ that was to be done in this field.”).

¹¹² Ely, *supra* note 10, at 1500.

¹¹³ See Cass R. Sunstein, *The Anticaste Principle*, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410 (1994)

¹¹⁴ See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, *Consent, Aesthetics, and the Boundaries of Sexual Privacy after Lawrence v. Texas*, 54 DePaul L. Rev. 671 (2005); Paul M. Secunda, *Lawrence’s Quintessential Millian Moment and its Impact on the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions*, 50 Villanova L. Rev. 117 (2005).

¹¹⁵ Studies suggest that mock jurors’ reactions to detailed trial vignettes is strongly predictive of how they respond to more vivid forms of proof, including the testimony of live witnesses. See Brian H. Bornstein, *The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury Still Out?*, 23 Law & Human Behavior 75 (1999). In addition, the views of individual jurors after consideration of the evidence is generally thought to be highly predictive of how they’ll vote at the conclusion of deliberations, see Dennis J. Devine, Laura D. Clayton, Benjamin B. Dunford, Rasmy Seying & Jennifer Pryce, *Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups*, 7 Psychology, Public Policy, & Law 622, 690 (2001). Once the relationship between individual cultural worldviews and first-ballot votes is established, computer simulations can furnish additional insight into the probability of final verdicts in various kinds of cases conditional on the the worldviews (and other characteristics) of the individuals on any particular jury. See Maggie Wittlin, *The Results of Deliberation*, (unpublished June 15, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1865031.

We addressed a similar question in a previous article. In it, we examined the impact of cultural cognition on perceptions of a high-speed car chase that came to an end when the police deliberately rammed the fleeing motorist’s vehicle, causing a fiery crash that left the driver paralyzed. The Supreme Court (in an 8-1 opinion) had held that “no reasonable jury” whose members viewed a videotape of the chase shot from inside the pursuing police cruisers could dispute the “factual issue [that] respondent was driving in such fashion as to endanger human life.”¹¹⁶ Yet when we showed the video to a representative sample of over 1,000 members of the public, we found significant levels of disagreement between cultural groups on exactly that. We thus concluded that judges’ own perceptions of fact can sometimes furnish them with unreliable guidance on what “reasonable” but culturally diverse people are likely to perceive,¹¹⁷ a position since forcefully amplified by critics of Supreme Court decisions that expands the power of judges to grant motions for dismissal or for summary judgment.¹¹⁸

The results of the present study might be understood to furnish even more support for such a critique. It reinforces our previous study with experimental evidence that what people *see* in trial proof will often turn on who they *are*. If one thinks that adjudication will be more accurate or more legitimate if informed by a diversity of culturally grounded perceptions, then the law should be fashioned and applied in a manner that fortifies the central role of the jury in determining the facts.

But we can also see how, in the context of this study in particular, one might draw exactly the opposite conclusion. After all, one might well think that the point of constitutional review is to insulate the law (or at least certain aspects of it) from the influence of—and conflict over—partisan worldviews. Indeed, our finding that one and the same individual might well see the facts differently depending on her evaluation of protestors’ messages seems to involve exactly the sort of content-based discrimination that the First Amendment is understood to prohibit. In this and similar types of cases, then, one might advocate *enlarging* the role of courts in factfinding through a relatively aggressive exercise of summary adjudication pow-

¹¹⁶ *Scott v. Harris*, 550 U.S. 372 380 (2007).

¹¹⁷ See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, [*Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism*](#), 122 Harv. L. Rev. 837 (2009).

¹¹⁸ See Arthur Miller, *From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure*, 60 Duke L.J. 1, 25-26 & n.90 (2010) (citing study to critique newly announced “plausibility” standard used to judge sufficient of claim); Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. 12-13 (2009), available at <http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-02-09%20Burbank%20Testimony.pdf> (Statement of Steven Burbank) (arguing that Supreme Court’s “judicial experience and common sense” standard for judging motion to dismiss complaint is “an invitation to ‘cognitive illiberalism’”); Michael S. Pardo, *Pleadings, Proof and Judgment: A Unified Theory of Civil Litigation*, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1451, 1465-66 & n.19 (2010) (citing study to critique liberal summary judgment standards); Adam Steinman, *The Pleadings Problem*, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1293, 1313 (2010) (arguing on basis of study results that court’s judgments of factual “plausibility” of allegations in complaint are unreliable).

ers or through more penetrating forms of appellate review—procedures that both have foundation in the Court’s First Amendment precedents.¹¹⁹

Such a position, though, assumes that judges are less prone to culturally motivated cognition than are jurors. There is in fact convincing evidence that judges, when engaged in certain tasks distinctive of their professional role, are better able to resist various forms of at least some cognitive biases than are lay people under similar circumstances.¹²⁰ So the proposition that judges might be more successful than ordinary jurors in checking the influence of cultural cognition, too, is a plausible enough conjecture.

Nevertheless, what judges themselves *say* about what they see in cases like the ones featured in our study makes a contrary hypothesis¹²¹ plausible, too. To begin, they report observing *different* things. In the 1965 decision of *Cox v. Louisiana*,¹²² for example, the Supreme Court found no support for the finding of a trial court judge that civil rights protestors were on the verge of a violent rampage when arrested:

Our conclusion that the entire meeting from the beginning until its dispersal by tear gas was orderly and not riotous is confirmed by a film of the events taken by a television news photographer, which was offered in evidence as a state exhibit. We have viewed the film, and it reveals

¹¹⁹ See, e.g., *Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc.*, 466 U.S. 485, 508 (1984) (appellate court must “conduct an independent review of the evidence” in First Amendment cases); *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby*, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment). See generally Henry P. Monaghan, *Constitutional Fact Review*, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229 (1985) (appellate review); 10B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kayne, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 2730 (3d ed. 2010) (“[S]ummary adjudication may be thought of as a useful procedural tool” to reduce litigation cost incident to asserting First Amendment rights).

¹²⁰ See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, *Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases*, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 28 (2007) (showing power of judges to resist various biases at least in some circumstances); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, *Heuristics and Biases in Bankruptcy Judges*, 163 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 167, 184 (2007) (same); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, *Context Effects in Judicial Decision Making* 18 (Aug. 3, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at <http://ssrn.com/paper=1443596> (same); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, *Judging by Heuristic: Cognitive Illusions in Judicial Decision Making*, 86 Judicature 44, 50 (2002) (identifying means by which judges can minimize effects of cognitive illusions in deciding cases); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, *Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?*, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1195, 1221 (2009) (finding that judges are better able to resist implicit bias than lay people in some circumstances); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, *Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding*, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251, 1259 (2005) (finding that judges show power, albeit unevenly, to put inadmissible evidence out of mind when making rulings).

¹²¹ See Paul M. Secunda, *Cultural Cognition at Work*, 38 Fla. State Univ. L. Rev. 107 (2010) (attributing judicial conflict over employment law decisions to cultural cognition); cf. Richard A. Posner, *How Judges Think* 116 (2008) (concluding that cultural cognition influences judges but “only when empirical claims cannot be verified or falsified by objective data”).

¹²² 379 U.S. 536.

that the students, though they undoubtedly cheered and clapped, were well-behaved throughout.¹²³

Thirty years later, in *Madsen v. Women’s Health Center*, it was Justice Scalia, joined in dissent by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, who took issue with trial court findings on the basis of a film, this time a videotape put into evidence by parties seeking to enjoin an abortion-clinic protest. Justice Scalia described the tape as “show[ing] . . . a great many forms of expression” including “chanting, shouting, . . . peaceful picketing, . . . [and] efforts to persuade individuals not to have abortions” but “no suggestion of violence near the clinic” or “any attempt to prevent entry or exit.”¹²⁴

Judges not only report seeing different things when they make and review findings of fact akin to those in our study; they also attribute disagreements with their own views to *bad faith* on the part of their colleagues. Intimating an ideological double standard, Justice Scalia in *Madsen* asserted that “anyone who is familiar with run-of-the-mine labor picketing, not to mention some other social protests,” would “be aghast at” the Court’s rulings after viewing the abortion-clinic protest videotape.¹²⁵ Dissenting in *Cox* decades earlier, Justice Clark had made a similar charge of political favoritism: rebuking the Court for turning a blind eye to “an effort to influence and intimidate” thorough the “staging of a modern Donnybrook Fair” by a “mob of young Negroes” outside the local courthouse, Justice Clark stated, “I have always been taught that this Nation was dedicated to freedom under law not under mobs, whether they be integrationists or white supremacists.”¹²⁶ Reactions such as these are at least suggestive of naïve realism—the simultaneous apprehension of motivated reasoning in others and blindness to it in oneself that reinforces the power of empirical debates to spark illiberal status competition in democratic political life generally.¹²⁷

Indeed, how *ordinary citizens perceive* judges’ findings of “constitutional fact” is as important the impact of cultural cognition, if any, *on* judges. For decisions to be legitimate—for them to gain assent and to justify expectations of obedience¹²⁸—it

¹²³ *Id.* at 547. Compare *Edwards v. South Carolina*, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 (1963) (overturning based on “independent examination of the record” a trial court finding that civil rights protestors engaged in disorderly behavior “‘likely to produce violence’”) with *id.* at 244 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“The imminence of that danger has been emphasized at every stage of this proceeding This record . . . shows no steps backward from a standard of ‘clear and present danger.’”).

¹²⁴ *Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc.*, 512 U.S. 753, 790 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

¹²⁵ 512 U.S. at 786 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

¹²⁶ 379 U.S. at 589 (Cox, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); see also 379 U.S. at 471-72 (Black, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (““Those who encourage minority groups to believe that the United States Constitution and federal laws give them a right to patrol and picket in the streets whenever they choose, *in order to advance what they think to be a just and noble end*, do no service to those minority groups, their cause, or their country.”)

¹²⁷ See *supra* p. 9.

¹²⁸ See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, *Whose Eyes are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism*, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 837, 884-85 (2009).

isn’t enough that the law rely on decisionmakers who are psychologically capable of resisting motivated reasoning; it must also succeed in *assuring* citizens that those decisionmakers’ findings are genuinely untainted by cultural partisanship.¹²⁹ Supreme Court decisions applying the speech-conduct distinction don’t furnish such assurance. On the contrary, echoing the Court’s own dissenters, citizens of one or another cultural outlook routinely accuse the Court of bias. Citizens who hold a rival outlook reciprocate, denouncing the Court’s critics for flouting the authority of the law.¹³⁰ Far from quieting illiberal status competition, constitutional decisions by the Supreme Court (in this area and in others) thus become just another impetus to it.¹³¹

Ironically, one of the remedies the law prescribes for treating anxiety over partisan decisionmaking is the *jury*. Perhaps “[b]y mode of their selection, coming from the various classes and occupations of society, and conversant with the practical affairs of life,” jurors will enjoy advantages over a single judge, whose “habits and course of life” are necessarily peculiar, in ascertaining the truth when facts are disputed.¹³² But the law also hopes that conspicuously including representatives of as many diverse perspectives as possible in the decisionmaking process will vouch for the impartiality and fairness of the result, particularly in the minds of those citizens might have the most reason to be suspicious of or disappointed by it.¹³³ When judges offer their views of the “facts” in cases like *Madsen* and *Cox*—“demonstrations in front of abortion clinics impeded access to those clinics and were often confrontational”;¹³⁴ the order to disperse by “the Chief of Police ar[ose] from the laudable motive to avoid violence and possible bloodshed”¹³⁵ — citizens understand them to be proclaiming whose group and way of seeing the

¹²⁹ See Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, *Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights*, 43 Duke Law Journal 703 (1994).

¹³⁰ See, e.g., Ann Coulter, *The Abortion Exception*, Nationalreviewonline, Apr. 19, 2001, <http://old.nationalreview.com/coulter/coulter041901.shtml> (describing Court’s decisions upholding restrictions on abortion-clinic demonstrations are the “abortion exception to the Flynt Amendment”); Richard Hasen, *Crush Democracy but Save the Kittens*, Slate, Apr. 30, 2010, available at <http://www.slate.com/id/2252536/> (Justice Alito is guilty of an “indefensible double standard when it comes to free speech” because he purports to see no expression in animal torture videos but is “blind to . . . corruption” disguised as corporate campaign donations).

¹³¹ See J.M. Balkin, *The Constitution of Status*, 106 Yale L.J. 2313 (1997).

¹³² *Maher v. People*, 10 Mich. 212, 222 (1862). Or perhaps not. See Bruce D. Spencer, *Estimating the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts*, 4 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 305 (2007).

¹³³ See, e.g., *Batson v. Kentucky*, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (“The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.”).

¹³⁴ *Madsen*, 530 U.S. at 709.

¹³⁵ *Cox*, 379 U.S. at 472 (Clark, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).

world are virtuous and honorable and whose vicious and corrupt.¹³⁶ The hope is that if citizens see the result is one affirmed by a *jury* that included members who share those citizens’ experiences and outlooks, then they will see the findings of fact—*this* group, on *this* occasion, crossed the line from persuasion to intimidation; *this one* didn’t—as simply that.¹³⁷

Although we suspect that jury factfinding does indeed at least sometimes perform this valuable function, we think it’s implausible to believe that it invariably does. In the sorts of cases we have featured in this study (and in many others),¹³⁸ the perception that jury factfinding, too, is pervaded by partisan worldviews is widespread. Indeed, the anxiety that jurors *won’t* or *can’t* put their values aside in such cases is the reason thoughtful judges and lawmakers—in doctrines that enlarge the scope of summary adjudication or the depth of appellate review in First Amendment cases;¹³⁹ in statutes like the 1964 Civil Rights Act;¹⁴⁰ in decisions denying criminal defendants a jury trial in criminal prosecutions under FACE¹⁴¹—often steer “constitutional factfinding” to judges. As our study suggests, their worries are by no means groundless either.

Of course, more research is necessary on the impact of cultural cognition on judges *and* jurors. But to think that what such investigation will disclose is that cognitive illiberalism is simply not a problem for constitutional law strikes us as objectionably naïve. Identifying effective strategies for *fixing* that problem, including ones that operate on how constitutional decisionmakers perceive facts and

¹³⁶ At least some (likely all) of the Justices know that when the Court characterizes the behavior of such parties as unprotected “conduct” rather than protected “speech,” they are effectively saying to and about those citizens that their moral vision is so utterly unworthy of respect that the law needn’t afford them the dignity of being able to make it the basis of public appeals to others:

The vital principle of [*Planned Parenthood v. Casey*, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)] was that in defined instances the woman’s decision whether to abort her child was in its essence a moral one, a choice the State could not dictate. . . . [I]hose who oppose it are remitted to debate the issue in its moral dimensions. In a cruel way, the Court today turns its back on that balance. It in effect tells us the moral debate is not so important after all. . . . The Court tears away from the protestors the guarantees of the First Amendment when they most need it. So committed is the Court to its course that it denies these protestors, in the face of what they consider to be one of life’s gravest moral crises, even the opportunity to try to offer a fellow citizen a little pamphlet, a handheld paper seeking to reach a higher law.

Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 788, 791-92 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

¹³⁷ See generally Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, *Judging the Jury* 248-49 (1986).

¹³⁸ See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, *The Self-defensive Cognition of Self-defense*, 45 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1 (2008) (identifying cultural cognition in citizens’ perceptions of facts in controversial self-defense cases as source of high-profile political conflict over particular verdicts).

¹³⁹ See *supra* note 118.

¹⁴⁰ See Note, *The Right to Jury Trial under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964*, 37 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 167 (1969).

¹⁴¹ See, e.g., *United States v. Soderna*, 82 F.3d 1370, 1378-39 (7th Cir. 1996) (six-month maximum prison term and maximum \$10,000 fine for first offense under FACE not sufficiently severe to entitle defendant to jury trial); *United States v. Unterburger*, 97 F.3d 1413, 1415-16 (11th Cir. 1996) (same).

how different procedures affect how *citizens* perceive constitutional decisionmaking, should be one of the central aims of future empirical inquiry.

D. *Debiasing*¹⁴²

Of what sorts of solutions does the problem of culturally motivated reasoning in constitutional law admit? As we have indicated, the empirical work necessary for a complete answer is yet to be done. Nevertheless, extrapolating from what is known, we’ll offer some reflections that we hope might be useful both to other scholars interested in investigating this issue and to decisionmakers committed to doing the best they can in the meantime.¹⁴³

1. Affirmation and Jury Selection

The foundation of culturally motivated cognition is *identity threat*. An individual who comes to see behavior important to his cultural group as detrimental to society risks estrangement from those on whom he depends for material and emotional support. If the behavior is a source of status for the individual or for the group, then the prospect that others might form such a belief can diminish an individuals’ social standing generally. The mechanisms that cultural cognition comprises—from biased assimilation to selective attention and recall to skewed perceptions expert credibility—all derive from the impulse to dismiss evidence that has these identity-threatening consequences.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² We use the concept of “debiasing” here without apology but subject to a proviso that we want to make emphatically clear. We reject the idea that the perceptions informed by cultural cognition are invariably unworthy of moral respect. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, *Misfearing: A Reply*, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1110 (2006). Such perceptions are different from judgments attributable to “base rate neglect,” the “gambler’s fallacy,” “hindsight bias” and other manifestations of “bounded rationality.” They are not a consequence of limitations on our ability to process information pertinent to estimating the utility of one or another course of action; they are a reflection of *values* integral to our identities and our ties to others. In some settings, we might regard perceptions informed by cultural cognition as regrettable miscues that we should take precautions to avoid or correct (imagine that the subjects of the study we had started with had been football referee alumni of the respective schools). But in many contexts we will view them as furnishing reliable and unique insight into how we, as people of particular defining commitments, should orient ourselves toward some contingency: just as we are enabled to experience a valued form of shared identity by genuinely *seeing* things in the way a fan of *this* team, or as a parent of *this* child, characteristically would, so we reliably affirm our commitment to shared ways of life by attending appropriately to societal risks and opportunities that bear special certain meanings. See Dan M. Kahan, *Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation*, 156 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 741, 760-65 (2008). In sum, we believe cultural cognition can be *either* a faculty of moral perception *or* a cognitive bias depending on whether its effect on judgment promotes or frustrates ends that are morally appropriate to the settings and roles we inhabit. Cf. Dan M. Kahan & Paul Slovic, *Cultural Evaluations of Risk: “Values” or “Blunders”?*, 119 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 166 (2006). Our discussion of “debiasing” here, then, reflects the moral judgment that *constitutional law* is a setting, and *constitutional law decisionmaker* a role, in which the effects of cultural cognition are often pernicious.

¹⁴³ In the same spirit of pragmatic conjecture, Paul Secunda offers a thoughtful set of techniques for counteracting cultural cognition in Paul M. Secunda, *Cognitive Illiberalism and Debiasing Strategies*, 49 San Diego L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012).

¹⁴⁴ See generally David K. Sherman, Geoffrey L. Cohen & P. Zanna Mark, *The Psychology of Self-defense: Self-Affirmation Theory*, 38 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 183, 187-89 (2006).

But this dynamic can in fact be reversed. When information is presented under conditions that effectively *affirms* an individual’s identity, that individual is far less likely simply to dismiss evidence and arguments that challenge a belief characteristic of his defining group. By securing the individual’s sense of self-worth, affirmation supplies a buffer against the psychic cost associated with giving open-minded evaluation to threatening information. This dynamic has been demonstrated experimentally in connection with a variety of issues, from counter-terrorism policy to abortion to capital punishment to cancer risks.¹⁴⁵

We surmise that affirmation strategies could be used to counteract cultural cognition in jurors. In the laboratory, researchers induce affirmation by instructing subjects to identify positive characteristics of themselves or their groups and thereafter complete a writing exercise or survey that focuses subjects’ attention on the importance of that characteristic.¹⁴⁶ We believe such a technique could be used with prospective jurors when the venire is assembled. Administered at that stage, the affirmation stimulus would likely strike jurors as an element of the jury selection process rather than as a device intended to enhance open-minded appraisal of the evidence—a perception that could negate its effectiveness. In addition, the benefit of affirmation in promoting open-mindedness on the part of the selected jurors would be felt throughout the presentation of evidence.

2. Deliberative Depolarization

Jurors, as well as judges on multi-member appellate courts, engage in group decisionmaking. Counteracting culturally motivated reasoning in constitutional law thus requires attention to how deliberation interacts with the mechanisms cultural cognition comprises.

Research on deliberation in general suggests that it can both accentuate and mitigate group polarization.¹⁴⁷ Which outcome occurs is likely to depend on how the interaction shapes the participants’ sense of the relationship between the issue for determination and their group identities. Initial evidence that corroborates expectations of stark group divisions is likely to feed on itself because of the tendency of individuals to credit the arguments of those who share their identities and because of the motivation of individuals to protect their connection to their group. Unexpected indications of moderation or equivocation *within* groups, however, can trigger convergence: the willingness of others’ in her group to express uncertainty

¹⁴⁵ See David K. Sherman & Geoffrey L. Cohen, *Accepting Threatening Information: Self-Affirmation and the Reduction of Defensive Biases*, 11 *Current Directions Psychol. Sci.* 119 (2002); Geoffrey L. Cohen, Joshua Aronson & Claude M. Steele, *When Beliefs Yield to Evidence: Reducing Biased Evaluation by Affirming the Self*, 26 *Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull.* 1151 (2000).

¹⁴⁶ See Amy McQueen & William M. P. Klein, *Experimental manipulations of self-affirmation: A systematic review*, 5 *Self & Identity* 289-354 (2006); David K. Sherman, Zoe Kinias, Brenda Major, Heejung S. Kim & Mary Prenovost, *The Group as a Resource: Reducing Biased Attributions for Group Success and Failure via Group Affirmation*, 33 *Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull.* 1100 (2007).

¹⁴⁷ See generally Cass R. Sunstein, *Deliberative Trouble: Why Groups Go to Extremes*, 110 *Yale L.J.* 71 (2001).

conveys to a person that the identity *cost* of entertaining the opposing view is lower than she might otherwise have believed; and the expression of openness or ambivalence on the part of those in the opposing group dispels the animosity associated with naïve realism and generates instead a reciprocal motivation to display cooperative open-mindedness.¹⁴⁸

Experimental work also suggests a procedure that might promote the latter effect: obliging each participant to speak in turn and to identify not only his or her own position but also the strongest *counter-argument* to it. People tend to overestimate how uniformly and intensely members of their own and the other group hold their respective views. Eager to avoid estranging themselves from their peers, those who are equivocal are likely to keep silent or even misrepresent their impressions. Strategic reticence of this sort tends to reinforce individuals’ overestimation of how sharply they are divided and to increase self-reinforcing signals of group division early on.¹⁴⁹ The aim of obliging everyone to acknowledge counterarguments is to puncture this bubble of shared misunderstanding. This device creates a form of procedural immunity for the expression of equivocation. Nevertheless, speakers afforded this protection are likely to succeed in communicating the force and *genuineness* of their ambivalence. Thus, not only are dynamics that generate overstated signals of dissent preempted; existing reservoirs of equivocation are forced to the surface, where their positive effects in generating deliberative give-and-take can be felt.¹⁵⁰

This technique could be used with jurors. It would be a simple matter for judges to instruct jurors to make each member’s expression of his or her views along with his or her assessment of the strongest counterargument the first order of business when they commence their deliberations. There is also likely to be synergy between this procedure and the use of identity affirmation at the jury-selection stage since affirmation increases the likelihood that individuals will in fact have given sympathetic attention to evidence contrary to their cultural predispositions.

It’s also possible that this device could be used with appellate judges. There is at least some evidence that the quantity and quality of deliberations breaks down ideological voting patterns on multi-member appellate panels.¹⁵¹ We hypothesize that courts that enjoy a better deliberative culture might in fact be ones whose members have cultivated the norm of acknowledging equivocation and doubt when they deliberate.

¹⁴⁸ See generally David K. Sherman, Leif D. Nelson & Lee D. Ross, *Naïve Realism and Affirmative Action: Adversaries are More Similar Than They Think*, 25 *Basic & Applied Social Psychol.* 275 (2003).

¹⁴⁹ See generally Timur Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies* (1996).

¹⁵⁰ See David K. Sherman, Leif D. Nelson & Lee D. Ross, *Naïve Realism and Affirmative Action: Adversaries are More Similar Than They Think*, 25 *Basic & Applied Social Psychol.* 275 (2003).

¹⁵¹ See generally Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, *Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking*, 58 *Duke L.J.* 1895 (2009).

3. Judicial *Aporia*

As we have indicated, how citizens of diverse outlooks react to the perceptions of constitutional decisionmakers is as important as what those decisionmakers actually see. Much like subjects in this very experiment, ordinary citizens draw culturally congenial inferences from salient snippets of evidence and conclude that decisionmakers who purport to see things differently are engaged in partisan rationalization.

In the domain of constitutional law, we believe this effect is actually magnified by the way in which judges typically justify their decisions. Even in the Supreme Court, in which cases tend to be selected on the basis of divisions of opinion among lower courts, judicial opinions rarely admit of even the slightest doubt—even in the face of dissents, which themselves tend to profess the same remarkable degree of confidence, combined typically with outrage. Professional norms likely contribute to this style of presentation. Dan Simon is also likely right to see in it the influence of “coherence based reasoning”—a process in which the decisionmaker continuously revisits and revises her assessments of equivocal pieces of evidence to match her assessments of unequivocal ones, until any trace of doubt is vanquished.¹⁵² But whatever its cause, this style of writing is *part* of what makes Supreme Court decisions themselves an incitement to illiberal status competition. Like the ones we featured in our study, constitutional cases tend to be culturally fraught. The dogmatic certitude with which the Justices express their views—and the tone of indignant incredulity they adopt in the face of disagreement—predictably make those who see things differently see the *Court* as partisan.¹⁵³ Predictably, they *say* so—typically in terms that reciprocate the Court’s own stridency and provoke still more acrimony in the public realm.

So our recommendation here is that judges throttle back. In place of the muscular self-confidence that now dominates opinion writing, we propose an idiom of *aporia*, in which judges acknowledge the difficulty of the controversies before them.¹⁵⁴ This isn’t to say judges should be dishonest; on the contrary, it is to say that they should endeavor to *avoid misleading* either themselves or others when they are dealing with genuinely difficult cases—as is nearly always true in the Supreme Court. A style of justification that acknowledged rather than abjured doubt, we predict, would likely have salutary effects comparable to the ones observed in experiments in which members of opposing groups are obliged to begin their deliberations by identifying the feature of the other side’s case that gives

¹⁵² See Dan Simon, *A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making*, 71 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 511 (2004).

¹⁵³ See Secunda, *supra* note 120, at 142.

¹⁵⁴ *Aporia* refers to a distinctive mode of argumentative engagement that recognizes—both in the substance and form of the analysis—the intrinsic complexity of the issue at hand. See Nicholas Rescher, *Aporetic Method in Philosophy*, 41 Rev. Metaphysics 283 (1987). For a more detailed defense of *aporetic* reasoning in judicial opinions, see Dan M. Kahan, *The Supreme Court 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law* 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 59-66 (2011).

them the most pause. Such a gesture would be especially valuable in cases where judges can predict that their decisions will give rise to culturally oriented conflict. By confirming that judges actually *see* the complexity of such cases, the use of a more judicious idiom of explanation would enable defeated parties to see that judges are not blinded by partisanship, and spare citizens who share the losing side’s perspective from the insult of being accused (implicitly or explicitly) of bias themselves.¹⁵⁵ These citizens would in turn have less reason to attribute bad faith to the Supreme Court Justices and other judges—and citizens who share those judges’ points of view less reason to strike back in kind. Citizens generally would be less likely to form an exaggerated perception of the extent of cultural polarization surrounds such decisions. And without that perception, judicial determinations would simply *be* less meaningful as a symbol of the triumph of one side or the other’s worldview.¹⁵⁶

V. CONCLUSION

In the competitive jurisprudence of visual sense impressions, Justice Scalia has a record of one and one. In *Madsen v. Women’s Health Center*,¹⁵⁷ he was on the losing side of a 6-3 decision that upheld (most elements of) an injunction against abortion-clinic protestors found to have “interfered with ingress to and egress from the clinic.”¹⁵⁸ Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia implored “[a]nyone seriously interested in what this case was about” to watch a videotape of the demonstrators’ behavior, predicting that doing so would leave any fair-minded viewer “aghast at” the Court’s complicity in stifling “run of the mine” forms of “persuasive speech.”¹⁵⁹ In *Scott v. Harris*,¹⁶⁰ Justice Scalia wrote for the eight-Justice majority that put decisive weight on a video to support its conclusion that “no reasonable

¹⁵⁵ Lawyers might conceivably find this reasoning style less persuasive, or at least aesthetically pleasing, than would ordinary citizens. But what sorts of argumentation lawyers find compelling is no doubt shaped by what courts, through their own example, condition them to regard as such. Indeed, the likely impact of an idiom of judicial humility on the professional culture of lawyers (including the teaching of law) could magnify its contribution to reducing cultural status conflict in law and politics generally.

¹⁵⁶ Tom Tyler’s work on procedural justice also furnishes support for the hypothesis that an idiom of humility would enhance the legitimacy of constitutional decisionmaking. Tyler has amassed a large body of empirical data showing that the public’s willingness to assent to and abide by legal directives is influenced much more by citizens’ perceptions that they have been treated fairly than by their agreement with the substance of those directives. *See generally* Tom R. Tyler, *Why People Obey the Law* (1990); Tom R. Tyler & Yuen J. Huo, *Trust in The Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and Courts* (2002). In a study conducted with Gregory Mitchell, Tyler has found that citizens are more likely to see *Supreme Court* decisions as legitimate, in particular, when they believe the Justices have giving careful and respectful attention to rejected arguments. *See* Tyler & Mitchell, *supra* note 128.

¹⁵⁷ 512 U.S. 753, 786 (1994).

¹⁵⁸ *Id.* at 771.

¹⁵⁹ 512 U.S. at 771 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

¹⁶⁰ 550 U.S. 372 (2007).

jury” could find a citizen fleeing the police “was driving in such fashion as to endanger human life.”¹⁶¹ Justice Scalia took the lone dissenter, Justice Stevens (who joined the relevant portion of the majority opinion in *Madsen*), to be implying either that the Court’s “reaction to the videotape is somehow idiosyncratic” or that the Court was “misrepresenting its contents.” In response, Justice Scalia announced that “we are happy to allow the videotape to speak for itself”—and took the unprecedented step of ordering the clerk of the Court to post a link to it on the Supreme Court’s website.¹⁶²

We don’t mean to suggest that Justice Scalia’s perceptions were faulty in either case, that he was misreporting his impressions, or that he was guilty of any sort of inconsistency. Rather, we draw attention to his reactions toward the Justices who purported to see things otherwise to help us summarize the major themes of this paper.

One is that what people see will often be a reflection of what they value. In *Madsen*, Justice Scalia pulled no punches in attributing the majority’s decision to partisanship.¹⁶³ We obviously have no idea what the majority saw or why. But the results of the experiment we conducted confirm that people who have different cultural worldviews will often disagree with each other about whether political protestors are engaged in “conduct”—blocking, obstructing, intimidating—or “speech”—impassioned advocacy intended only to persuade. Indeed, whether individuals of any particular worldview see one thing or the other, we found, depends on whether they have been led to believe the demonstrators’ cause is one that defies or instead gratifies their own values. In a previous study, we found that individuals’ cultural identities also predicted whether they’d agree or disagree with the Court’s perception of the *Scott* video.¹⁶⁴ Contrary to what Justice Scalia suggests in *Madsen*, however, the influence of values on perceptions in such cases is not smoking-gun evidence of bad faith. Rather it is the signature of culturally motivated cognition, a normally unconscious process.

A second point is that there the ability to recognize the effect of values on fact perceptions typically involves a signature asymmetry. Like Justice Scalia, we all readily discern this dynamic in others, yet we tend to be completely oblivious to it in ourselves. In fact, much like Justice Scalia, we treat the contradiction between what we plainly see and what others say *they* do as confirmation that our antagonists are biased, not that we ourselves are vulnerable to distortions of perception. Known as naïve realism, this dynamic is integral to cultural cognition.

¹⁶¹ *Id.* at 380.

¹⁶² *Id.* at 378 n.5.

¹⁶³ See at 512 U.S. 785 (“Today the ad hoc nullification machine [that drives the Court’s abortion jurisprudence] claims its latest, greatest, and most surprising victim: the First Amendment.”) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

¹⁶⁴ See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, [*Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism*](#), 122 Harv. L. Rev. 837-906 (2009),

Still another point illustrated by Justice Scalia’s reactions is the ubiquity of cultural cognition. The disposition to form perceptions of fact congenial to one’s values isn’t a pathological personality trait¹⁶⁵ or a style of reasoning integral to a distinctive, and distinctively malign, ideology¹⁶⁶ (indeed, the appeal of those sorts of surmises could themselves be seen as evidence of the disposition to form culturally congenial perceptions of how the world works). Precisely because cultural cognition doesn’t discriminate on the basis of worldview, members of all groups can anticipate that as a result of it they, like Justice Scalia, will likely find themselves members of a disappointed minority in some empirical or factual debates and a member of the incredulous majority in others.

Finally, the setting for Justice Scalia’s reactions—constitutional adjudication—underscores the danger that culturally motivated cognition can pose to the realization of liberal political ideals. The quieting of struggles between rival sects to impose their contested visions of the good life by violent means (within or without the law) is the signal achievement of liberal democratic culture.¹⁶⁷ Yet despite widespread consensus that the only legitimate object of law is attainment of prosperity, security, health, and other secular goods, cultural polarization persists because of the contribution that values make to citizens’ perceptions of policy-relevant facts. Seemingly empirical debates thus become infused with partisan meanings, triggering symbolic status competition among groups intent on securing policy choices that affirm rather than denigrate their ideals. We expect the Constitution to repel threats to pluralism whether they arise from the conscious and willful designs of tyrannical governors or from the chaotic and spontaneous dynamics of popular self-rule. But if jurors and judges are as vulnerable to cultural cognition as are lawmakers, law-enforcers, and ordinary citizens—if their worldviews, too, are *perceived* to exert a decisive influence on how they see the world—then constitutional decisionmaking will not dispel cognitive illiberalism. On the contrary, it will just precipitate even more of it.

Our goal in conducting this study has been to awaken constitutional theory to this dilemma. The traditional focus of constitutional theorists has been the fit between constitutional norms and the doctrines used to implement them. The fit—or lack thereof—between those doctrines and the psychological dispositions of constitutional decisionmakers has been almost entirely neglected. As a result, constitutional theory stands mute in the face of the persistent failure of constitutional adjudication to achieve its most fundamental objectives.

Demonstrating the impact of cultural cognition on the “speech”-“conduct” distinction is admittedly only a modest first step toward remedying this deficiency.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950).

¹⁶⁶ Cf. John T. Jost, Jack Glaser, Arie W. Kruglanski & Frank J. Sulloway, *Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition*, 129 *Psychol. Bull.* 339 (2003).

¹⁶⁷ See generally Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and The Interests: Political Arguments For Capitalism Before Its Triumph* (1977).

But by using the compass of *psychological realism* to orient our inquiry, we hope we’ve made clear the direction constitutional theory needs to go.

APPENDIX. STUDY INSTRUMENT

I. Cultural Worldview Items

A. Individualism

People in our society often disagree about how far to let individuals go in making decisions for themselves. How strongly you agree or disagree with each of these statements? [strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree, strongly agree]

1. IINTRSTS. The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives.
2. SHARM. Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep people from hurting themselves.
3. IPROTECT. It's not the government's business to try to protect people from themselves.
4. IPRIVACY. The government should stop telling people how to live their lives.
5. SPROTECT. The government should do more to advance society's goals, even if that means limiting the freedom and choices of individuals.
6. SLIMCHOI. Government should put limits on the choices individuals can make so they don't get in the way of what's good for society.

B. Hierarchy

People in our society often disagree about issues of equality and discrimination. How strongly you agree or disagree with each of these statements? [strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree, strongly agree]

1. HEQUAL. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.
2. EWEALTH. Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth was more equal.
3. ERADEQ. We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor, whites and people of color, and men and women.
4. EDISCRIM. Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in our society.
5. HREVDIS2. It seems like blacks, women, homosexuals and other groups don't want equal rights, they want special rights just for them.
6. HFEMININ. Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine.

II. Vignette

[Abortion clinic protest version in blue underscore](#)

Military recruitment center version in green bold]

INTRO1. In this study, we want you to imagine you are on a jury in a civil trial. The facts are based on an actual case.

In the case, protestors are suing police officers and the police department. The protestors are members of a group that [opposes permitting doctors and nurses to perform abortions at the request of pregnant women](#) **opposes the ban on allowing openly gay and lesbian citizens to join the military**. The protestors allege that the police violated their rights by ordering them to end their protest at [an abortion clinic](#) **a college campus recruitment center the day the Army was scheduled to interview students who were considering enlisting**. The protestors are asking the court to issue an opinion that (1) declares that the police violated their rights and (2) orders the police **not to interfere with future protests** similar to this one. They also seek **monetary damages of \$10,000** from the police department.

It is not disputed that the protestors had a permit to conduct a “lawful protest,” and that the police stopped the protest by ordering the protestors to leave the vicinity of the [abortion clinic](#) **campus recruitment center** 30 minutes after the protest started.

What is disputed is whether the protestors were conducting the demonstration in a manner that violated a local ordinance known as the [Freedom to Exercise Reproductive Rights Law](#) **Freedom to Serve with Honor Law**.

The [Freedom to Exercise Reproductive Rights Law](#) **Freedom to Serve with Honor Law** was passed by the city council after a court found that the city’s police could not stop protests at [abortion clinics](#) **military recruitment sites** without clear guidelines. The law makes it illegal for

any person to **intentionally** (1) **interfere with**, (2) **obstruct**, (3) **intimidate**, or (4) **threaten** any person who is seeking to enter, exit, or remain lawfully on premises of any [hospital or medical clinic that is licensed to perform abortions](#) **facility in which the U.S. military is engaged in recruitment activity**.

If a police officer “observes or is furnished with reliable evidence” that a person or group is violating the [Freedom to Exercise Reproductive Rights Law](#) **Freedom to Serve with Honor Law**, the police can order the person or group to stop and leave the area around the [abortion clinic](#) **recruitment facility**. Courts have found the guidelines in the new law to be sufficiently clear, and otherwise lawful.

The only question in this case is whether the police properly used their authority under the [Freedom to Exercise Reproductive Rights Law](#) **Freedom to Serve with Honor Law** to end the protest. The police assert that they ordered the protestors to stop and leave because the protestors were violating the [Freedom to Exercise Reproductive Rights Law](#) **Freedom to Serve with Honor Law**. The protestors assert that they were only expressing their views, in a manner that did not violate the law.

The key evidence in the case is a video of the protest. The parties agree the video gives an accurate impression of the nature of the protestors’ conduct and condi-

tions near the entrance of the [abortion clinic](#) **campus recruitment center**. But they disagree about whose position the video most supports: the position of the police officers, who assert that the protestors were "intimidating, interfering, obstructing or threatening" people trying to enter the [abortion clinic](#) **campus recruitment center**; or the position of the protestors, who say they were merely expressing their views in a lawful manner. Deciding who is right is the task for you as a member of the jury.

Note: The video contains introductory and transitional text based on witness statements. The parties agree the text is accurate. Because the U.S. Constitution prohibits the police from breaking up a protest based on the *messages* the protestors are trying to communicate, the parties agreed that the messages on signs of the protestors should be visually blurred to assure that those messages did not affect the jury's decision one way or the other.

Please view the video.

III. Videos

abortion-clinic condition: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k8ru-FE2v_8

recruitment-center condition:
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X3PJACpL53k>

IV. Response Measures

Now we'd like you to indicate your view of the facts. Below are factual assertions made by parties in the case. Please indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with these factual assertions [strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree, strongly agree]:

1. DTHREAT. The protestors **threatened** individuals seeking to enter, exit, or remain lawfully on the premises of the [abortion clinic](#) **campus recruitment center**.
2. DINTIMIDATE. The protestors **intimidated** individuals seeking to enter, exit, or remain lawfully on the premises of the [abortion clinic](#) **campus recruitment center**.
3. DOBSTRUCT. The protestors **obstructed** individuals seeking to enter, exit, or remain lawfully on the premises of the [abortion clinic](#) **campus recruitment center**.
4. DINTERFERE. The protestors **interfered with** individuals seeking to enter, exit, or remain lawfully on the premises of the [abortion clinic](#) **campus recruitment center**.
5. PINTENDED. The protestors **intended only to persuade** people not to go into the [abortion clinic](#) **campus recruitment center**, not to physically interfere with, intimidate, obstruct, or threaten anybody.

6. PDIRECTOR. It is more likely the director asked the police to break up the protest because the director and others found dealing with the protestors annoying than because the protestors were interfering with, intimidating, obstructing, or threatening anyone.
7. PLISTEN. The people who decided not to enter the [abortion clinic campus recruitment center](#) did **not** feel threatened or intimidated; they just didn't want to have to listen to what the protestors were saying.
8. DBLOCK. The police had reasonable evidence to believe the protestors were obstructing, intimidating, assaulting, or threatening people trying to enter the [abortion clinic campus recruitment center](#).
9. PANNOY. It is more likely the police broke up the protest because they found dealing with the entire situation annoying or inconvenient than because they believed the protestors were violating the law.
10. DVIOLENCE. There was a risk that the protestors might resort to violence if anyone tried to enter.
11. DSPIT. One or more the protestors spat at someone who wanted to enter the building.
12. DSHOVE. One or more of the protestors attempted to shove people trying to enter.
13. DCONTACT. The protestors touched one or more of the people trying to enter.
14. PERSUADE. It is likely that at least some people who were going to enter the [abortion clinic campus recruitment center](#) changed their mind because they found the protestors' message convincing.
15. DDIRECTOR. The director was in a better position than the police to see everything that was going on, so it made sense for the police to stop the protest when he told them the protestors were interfering with or intimidating people trying entry the [abortion clinic campus recruitment center](#).
16. DHELP. People trying to enter asked the police to help them.
17. DSCREAM. One or more the protestor screamed in face of people who wanted to enter the [abortion clinic campus recruitment center](#).

INTRO3. Now we would like to know how you vote to decide the case. Your decision should be based on your view of the facts and on the law, which is displayed on the right-hand side of your screen. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with these statements. [strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree; slightly agree; moderately agree; strongly agree]

[Freedom to Exercise Reproductive Rights Law](#)

[Section 1. Prohibited Conduct. It is against the law for any person to intentionally \(1\) interfere with, \(2\) obstruct, \(3\) intimidate, or \(4\) threaten any person who is seeking to enter, exit, or remain lawfully on premises of any hospital or medical clinic that is licensed to perform abortions.](#)

[Section 2. Order to Desist. If a law enforcement officer observes or is furnished with reliable evidence that any person is engaged in behavior in violation of section 1, the officer may order such person to desist and to leave the immediate vicinity.](#)

Freedom to Serve with Honor Law

Section 1. Prohibited Conduct. It is against the law for any person to intentionally **(1) interfere with, (2) obstruct, (3) intimidate, or (4) threaten** any person who is seeking to enter, exit, or remain lawfully on premises of any facility in which the U.S. military is engaged in recruitment activity.

Section 2. Order to Desist. If a law enforcement officer observes or is furnished with reliable evidence that any person is engaged in behavior in violation of section 1, the officer may order such person to desist and to leave the immediate vicinity.

18. LIABILITY. I would vote to find the police did **not** have the evidence necessary to stop the protest under the [Freedom to Serve with Honor Law](#)/**The Freedom to Exercise Reproductive Rights Law**.
19. NOLIABILITY. I would vote to find the protestors were violating the [Freedom to Exercise Reproductive Rights Law](#) **Freedom to Serve with Honor Law**.
20. DAMAGES. I would vote to order the police to pay damages to the protestors.
21. ORDER. I would vote to order the police not to interfere with protests under conditions like the ones shown in the video.